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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
STATE OF IDAHO 
Plaintiff/Respondent 
vs 
Michael Jay Freitas 
Defendant/ Appellant 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
SUPREME COURT NUMBER 
41378 
CLERK'S RECORD 
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICTD 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
THE HONORABLE LANSING L. HAYNES, PRESIDING JUDGE 
FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT, PRESIDING 
MR. JAY LOGSDON 
PUBLIC DEFENDER 
400 NORTHWEST BLVD. 
COEUR D'ALENE, ID 83814 
MR. LAWRENCE WASDEN 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
STATE OF IDAHO 
700 W JEFFERSON, STE 210 
BOISE ID 83720-0010 
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Date: 10/21/2013 
Time: 06:25 PM 
Page 1 of 3 
First Judicial District Court- Kootenai County 
ROAReport 
Case: CR-2012-0018513 Current Judge: Lansing L. Haynes 
Defendant: Freitas, Michael Jay 
User: MCCANDLESS 
State of Idaho vs. Michael Jay Freitas 
Date 
10/10/2012 
10/17/2012 
10/18/2012 
11/15/2012 
11/20/2012 
11/21/2012 
11/26/2012 
12/3/2012 
12/7/2012 
12/12/2012 
12/19/2012 
12/26/2012 
12/31/2012 
1/3/2013 
1/4/2013 
Code 
NCRM 
NFTA 
HRSC 
ARRN 
ORPD 
PLEA 
ARPG 
ADMR 
HRSC 
HRSC 
STRS 
PRSD 
PROD 
NANG 
DRQD 
DISF 
DRSD 
MNDS 
HRSC 
NOTH 
HRHD 
WITP 
BROM 
DENY 
PSRS 
User 
LUCKEY 
OREILLY 
HODGE 
HODGE 
BIELEC 
BIELEC 
BIELEC 
BIELEC 
HOFFMAN 
HOFFMAN 
HOFFMAN 
HOFFMAN 
HOFFMAN 
BIELEC 
Judge 
New Case Filed - Misdemeanor To Be Assigned 
Notice Of Failure To Appear To Be Assigned 
Hearing Scheduled (Pre-Trial To Be Assigned 
Conference/Arraignment 11/15/2012 01:00PM) 
Notice of Pretrial Conference To Be Assigned 
Hearing result for Pre-Trial 0. Lynn Brower 
Conference/Arraignment scheduled on 
11/15/2012 01:00PM: Arraignment/ First 
Appearance 
Defendant: Freitas, Michael Jay Order Appointing 0. Lynn Brower 
Public Defender Public defender Public Defender 
A Plea is entered for charge: - NG 
(M291-7.4.10--SL UNLAWFUL TAMPERING 
WITH WATER SYSTEM) 
Acknowledgement Of Rights & Plea Of Guilty 
Administrative assignment of Judge 
Hearing Scheduled (Pre-Trial Conference 
12/26/2012 01:00PM) 
Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial Scheduled 
01/07/2013 08:30AM) 1/7-1/11 
Notice of Pre-Trial Conference and Trial 
Speedy Trial Limit Satisfied 
Plaintiffs Response To Discovery 
0. Lynn Brower 
0. Lynn Brower 
Clark A. Peterson 
Clark A. Peterson 
Clark A. Peterson 
BIELEC Plaintiffs Request For Discovery 
Clark A. Peterson 
Clark A. Peterson 
Clark A. Peterson 
Clark A. Peterson 
Clark A. Peterson MCCANDLESS Notice of Appearance, Plea of Not Guilty & 
Demand For Jury Trial 
MCCANDLESS Defendant's Request For Discovery 
ALBERS 
LUCKEY 
Disqualification Of Judge Watson - Self 
Defendant's Response To Discovery 
Clark A. Peterson 
Barry E. Watson 
Clark A. Peterson 
MCCANDLESS Motion To Dismiss Clark A. Peterson 
STOKES Hearing Scheduled (Motion to Continue Clark A. Peterson 
01/03/2013 01:30PM) Logsdon -15mins 
MCCANDLESS Notice Of Hearing Clark A. Peterson 
ROHRBACH Hearing result for Pre-Trial Conference Robert B. Burton 
scheduled on 12/26/2012 01:00 PM: Hearing 
BROWN 
BROWN 
STOKES 
CARROLL 
Held - off the record 
Witness List - Plaintiffs 
Brief in Opposition to Motion To Dismiss 
Clark A. Peterson 
Clark A. Peterson 
Hearing result for Motion to Dismiss scheduled Clark A. Peterson 
on 01/03/2013 01 :30 PM: Motion Denied 
Logsdon - 15mins 
Plaintiffs Supplemental Response To Discovery Clark A. Peterson Michael Jay Freitas 41378 2 of 235
Date: 10/21/2013 First Judicial District Court- Kootenai County User: MCCANDLESS 
Time: 06:25 PM ROAReport 
Page 2 of3 Case: CR-2012-0018513 Current Judge: Lansing L. Haynes 
Defendant: Freitas, Michael Jay 
State of Idaho vs. Michael Jay Freitas 
Date Code User Judge 
1/4/2013 MNLI CARROLL Motion In Limine Clark A. Peterson 
1/7/2013 PSRS MCCANDLESS Plaintiff's 2nd Supplemental Response To Clark A. Peterson 
Discovery 
DROR STOKES Defendant released on own recognizance Clark A. Peterson 
SUBF CRUMPACKER Subpoena Return/found 1/3/13 BSN Clark A. Peterson 
DRJI STOKES Defendant's Requested Jury Instructions Clark A. Peterson 
PRJ I MCCANDLESS Plaintiff's Requested Jury Instructions Clark A. Peterson 
HRHD ROHRBACH Hearing result for Jury Trial Scheduled scheduled Clark A. Peterson 
on 01/07/2013 08:30AM: Hearing Held 
1/7-1/11 
HRSC ROHRBACH Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial Scheduled Clark A. Peterson 
01/08/2013 08:30AM) 
1/8/2013 RTSV CRUMPACKER Return Of NonService AS Clark A. Peterson 
JTST STOKES Hearing result for Jury Trial Scheduled scheduled Clark A. Peterson 
on 01/08/2013 08:30AM: Jury Trial Started 
MISC STOKES Jury Instructions Given Clark A. Peterson 
VERD BURRINGTON Verdict Clark A. Peterson 
SNPF BURRINGTON Sentenced To Pay Fine (M291-7.4.10--SL Clark A. Peterson 
UNLAWFUL TAMPERING WITH WATER 
SYSTEM) 
STAT BURRINGTON Case status changed: closed pending clerk Clark A. Peterson 
action 
JDMT BURRINGTON Judgment Clark A. Peterson 
1/9/2013 ADMR BROWN Administrative assignment of Judge Lansing L. Haynes 
NOTC BROWN Notice Of Appeal Lansing L. Haynes 
1/11/2013 .ESTI CAMPBELL Estimate Of Transcript Costs Lansing L. Haynes 
1/16/2013 ORDR SVERDSTEN Order to Stay Sentence Pending Appeal Lansing L. Haynes 
2/20/2013 NLTR CAMPBELL Notice of Lodging Transcript - Motion Hearing Lansing L. Haynes 
and Jury Trial (2 transcripts) 
LODG CAMPBELL Lodged - Transcript - Motion Hearing Lansing L. Haynes 
LODG CAMPBELL Lodged -Transcript- Jury Trial Lansing L. Haynes 
RECT BROWN Receipt Of Transcript- Motion Hearing And Jury Lansing L. Haynes 
Trial- KCPA 
2/21/2013 FILE MCCANDLESS New File Created Expando Lansing L. Haynes 
2/22/2013 RECT BROWN Receipt Of Transcript - Motion Hearing and Jury Lansing L. Haynes 
Trial- PO 
3/12/2013 BRIE MCCANDLESS Brief Supporting Appeal Lansing L. Haynes 
3/19/2013 NOTS CAMPBELL Notice Of Settling Transcript On Appeal and Lansing L. Haynes 
Briefing Schedule 
5/20/2013 BRFR CARROLL Brief Of Respondent Lansing L. Haynes 
5/22/2013 BRIE MCCANDLESS Appellant's Reply Brief Lansing L. Haynes Michael Jay Freitas 41378 3 of 235
Date: 10/21/2013 
Time: 06:25PM 
Page 3 of3 
First Judicial District Court- Kootenai County 
ROAReport 
Case: CR-2012-0018513 Current Judge: Lansing L. Haynes 
Defendant: Freitas, Michael Jay 
User: MCCANDLESS 
State of Idaho vs. Michael Jay Freitas 
Date Code User Judge 
5/30/2013 HRSC SVERDSTEN Hearing Scheduled (Oral Argument on Appeal Lansing L. Haynes 
07/01/2013 09:30AM) 
SVERDSTEN Notice of Hearing Lansing L. Haynes 
7/1/2013 DCHH SVERDSTEN Hearing result for Oral Argument on Appeal Lansing L. Haynes 
scheduled on 07/01/2013 09:30AM: District 
Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: Val Nunemacher 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: 
8/8/2013 OPIN SVERDSTEN Intermediate Appellate Opinion Lansing L. Haynes 
8/13/2013 APSC OREILLY Appealed To The Supreme Court Lansing L. Haynes 
9/12/2013 NAPL OREILLY Notice Of Appeal Due Date From Supreme Court Lansing L. Haynes 
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SPIRIT LAK~ 
POLICE DEPT. 7813 
IDAHO UNIFORM CITATION 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE 1ST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
STATE OF IDAHO 
_____ Mp. KOOTENAI . County, Idaho. 
Date Officer/Party .Serial #/Address Dept. 
Date Witnessing Officer Serial #/Address Dept. 
THE STATE OF IDAHO TO THE ABOVE NAMED DEFENDANT: 
I hereby certify service upon the defendant personally on _______ , 20 
Officer 
NOTICE: See reverse side of your copy for PENALTY and COMPLIANCE instructions. 
COURT COPY VIOLATION #1 
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SPIRIT LAKE POLICE DEPAR·rMENT 
AGENCY I DIST I 
CRIME REPORT 181 INCIDENT REPORT 0 .I CASE NUMBER PAGE 
2808 14 SL12 -1458 1 OF2 
P~YCRIMECODEANDNAME ~CONDARYOUMECODEANDNAME 
7-4-1 0 Spirit Lake City Code Violation 
DATE & TIME OCCURRED I DAY DATE & TIME REPORTED I LOCATION OF OCCURRENCE 
09/28/12 @ 1330 hrs. FRI 09/28/12 @ 1330 hrs. 5870 W. Rhode Island St. 
LEGEND: V-VICTIM W~WITNESS RP=REPORTING PARTY M MENTIONED !NOR NEAR CITY, STATE 
Spirit Lake, ld. 
NAME (LAST. FIRST MIDDLE) I ~DE RESIDENCE ADDRESS RESIDENCE PHONE City of Spirit Lake 
OCCUPATION I RACE/SEX I AGE I D.O.B. I BUSINESS NAME/ADDRESS (SCHOOL IF JUVENILE) BUSINESS PHONE 
INJURIES 0 NOT APPLICABLE 0NONE 0POSSffiLE INTERNAL INJURY 0APPARENT MINOR INJURY 0LOSS OF TEETH 
0APPARENT BROKEN BONES O~VERE LACERATIONS 00THER MAJOR INJURY 0UNCONSCIOUSNESS 
NAME (LAST, FIRST MIDDLE) 
-,CODE RESIDENCE ADDRESS RESIDENCE PHONE 
OCCUPATION I RACE/SEX I AGE I D.O.B. I BUSINESS NAME/ADDRESS (SCHOOL IF JUVENILE) BUSINESS PHONE 
NAME (LAST, FIRST MIDDLE) I CODE RESIDENCE ADDRESS RESIDENCE PHONE 
OCCUPATION 
.I RACE/SEX I AGE I D.O.B. I BUSINESS NAME/ADDRESS (SCHOOL IF JUVENILE) BUSINESS PHONE 
SUSPECT OR INVESTIGATIVE LEADS 
No I. NAME (LAST, FIRST MIDDLE) D.O.B I RACE/SEX I AGE HT. l15o I8Ro I EYES Freitas, Michael J. W/M 44 505 HAZ 
ADDRESS HOMEPHONE CLOTHING WORN 
208 623-2517 
ALIAS NAME D.L. #/STATE ARRESTED 
181YES 0NO 
No. 2 NAME (LAST, FIRST MIDDLE) D.O.B. RACE/SEX I AGE HT. WT. I HAIR I EYES 
ADDRESS I HOMEPHONE CLOTHING WORN 
ALIAS NAME SSN D.L. #/STATE ARRESTED 
DYES 0NO 
VEIDCLE IF INVOLVED 
YEAR I MAKE/MODEL I COLOR/COLOR I BODY LICENSE NO. I STATE I LOCATION I OVICTIM 0 SUSPECT 
ADDmONAL VEHICLE IDENTIFIERS VIN VALUE 
EVIDENCE/PROPERTY 
USE CODE FOR TYPE OF EVIDENCE USE CODE FOR ITEMS BEING HELD AS 
li=LOST IF DAMAGED S=STOLEN R=RECOVERED O=OTHER E=EVIDENCE S=SAFEKEEPING F=FOUND O=OTJIER 
ITEM QTY PROPERTY DESCRIPTION- ITEMIZE PROPERTY- BRAND, COLOR, SIZE, ~NUMBER, OTHER IDENTIFIERS DATEI11ME ENlERED VALUE TYPE HELD AS 
I 
OFFENDER USING I RELATION TO VICTIM 
OA DD DC ON ou 
REPORTING OFFICER l5ao6 I APPROVED BY BADGE# Tcrw2a112 Officer T. Wise 
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SUSPECT I VICTIM I REPORTING PARTY 
Freitas, Michael J. 
CRIME CODE OR INCIDENT TYPE 
Spirit Lake City Code Violation 
DATE & TIME OF ORIGINAL INCIDENT 
09/28/12@ 1330 hrs. 
(1) DESCRIBE EVIDENCE/PROPERTY 
(2) DESCRIBE WHERE EVIDENCE WAS 
FOUND, BY WHOM, & DISPOSITION 
(3) IDENTIFY ADDITIONAL VICTIMS 
(4) IDENTIFY ADDITIONAL WITNESSES 
(5) IDENTIFY AND/OR DESCRIBE 
ADDITIONAL SUSPECTS 
SPIRIT LAKE POLICE 
OFFICER'S REPORT 
CASE NUMBER 
SL12 -1458 
0CONTINUATION 0 INFORMATION 0 CRIME PAGE 2 OF 2 
0TRAFFIC 0 SUPPLEMENT 0 OTHER 
LOCATION DATE OF THIS REPORT 
5870 W. Rhode Island St., Spirit Lake, Jd 09/28/12 
(6) DESCRIBE ADDITIONAL VEHICLE(S) (10) RECONSTRUCT INCIDENT 
INVOLVED (11) FORJWENILES,INDICATE 
(7) DESCRIBE VICTIMS INJURIES AND PARENT & HOW NOTIFIED 
WHERE MEDICAL EXAM OCCURRED (12) INDICATE ARRAIGNMENT 
(8) DESCRIBE VICTIM PREMISES OR RECOMMENDATIONS 
VEHICLE LOCATION (13) SPECIAL ROUTING 
(9) DESCRIBE M.O.E.,WHERE, HOW (14) OFFICER OPINIONS 
AND TOOLS USED FOR ENTRY 
On 09/28/12 at approximately 1330 hours, I was asked by the Spirit Lake City Clerk, Barbara Brown, to cite Michael J. 
Freitas for a Spirit Lake City water system violation. 
Freitas had been given a written warning on 09/27/12. He is providing water to a neighbor, George Adams at 5822 Rhode 
Island whose water has been turned off due to non payment. I saw a water hose stretching from Freitas's outside water 
faucet, across the alley way and attached to the Adam's residence. 
Ord. 7-4-10 430, 8-221998: 
Every part of the city water system up to and including, any shutoff valve and or meter, which may be installed at or near 
the property line of nay lot, is the property of the city. It shall be unlawful for any person to connect to, interfere or tamper 
with, turn on or off, permit connection or delivery of water to third persons for use within a residence or other building not 
otherwise provided with water service in accordance with this chapter, or to operate or introduce any substance into any 
part of the city water system unless that person is acting under the direct supervision of a qualified employee of the city or 
first obtains express written permission from the mayor. 
Freitas was issued a uniform citation for Spirit Lake City, water system code violation 7-4-10, unlawful act and issued 
citation #7813. 
INVESTIGATING OFFICER 
Officer T. Wise #5006 
STATUS [8:1 ACTIVE 
0 INACTIVE 
0CLOSED I 
[8]ARREST OINSUF. EV 
0REF. TO OTHER AGENCY 
0 UNFOUNDED 0 OTHER 
I 
SIGNATURE "'---;--;;:?. J ,, 
Officer T. Wise #5006 ~-c.A.A..__j 
I 
ARRESTED I APPROVING OFFICER 
[8]ADUL T [8]MALE 
0JUV. 0FEMALE 
DATE 
09/28/12 
DATE 
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Log of 1K-COURTROOM11 o·· . ~/15/2012 Page 1 of 1 
Description CR 2012-18513 Freitas, Michael20121115 Pretrial Conference Arraignment 
Judge 0. Lynn Brower 
Clerk - Blair Bielec 
Rights Video 1 : 03pm 
1 ~ 1 KCPA- Laura McClinton & Jim Reierson ~ ~H i7l'A J f "'- ) 
D ·1·11·1 ~/LU12 location II 1 K-COURTROOM11 
Time Speaker Note 
02:43:27 PM Judge 0. Lynn Calls Case-- Michael Freitas, Def Brower 
02:43:52 PM Michael Freitas, BGvL !:luilty 
02:44:03 PM PA State was only recommending a fine at this point in time but jail may be asked for later 
02:44:25 PM Judge 0. Lynn NG/PTC/JT Brower 
02:44:28 PM II~~ • r-u 1-\PPOINTED 
02:44:33 P_M II END 
Produced by FTR Gold™ 
www.fortherecord.com 
file://R:\LogNotes- HTML\Magistrate\Crirninal\Brower\CR 2012-18513 Freitas, Michae... 11115/2012 
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CASE NO. Q£4a- }~·~ CL 
ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF RIGHTS UPON GUILTY PLEA 
1. You have the right to remain silent. Anything you say can and will be used against you in court. 
2. You have the right to be represented by an attorney. If you can not afford the services of an 
attorney you are entitled to a court appointed lawyer at public expense. 
3. You have the right to a trial by jury. In order for the jury to reach a verdict all six (6) jurors must 
agree on the verdict. 
4. The burden of proving any criminal charge is solely upon the prosecution. The State must prove 
each and every element of the criminal charge by proof beyond a reasonable doubt. 
5. You have a right to cross examine any witness that the State calls against you and to confront any 
evidence presented. 
6. You have the right to bring witnesses of your own choosing to testify on your behalf at trial. You 
may compel the attendance of witnesses without expense to you. 
7. You have the right to testify at trial on your own behalf. You can not be forced to testify. If you 
choose not to testify or call any witnesses, your silence at trial can not be used against you. 
8. You have the right to appeal the conviction. 
9. If you plead guilty you are admitting that you have committed the crime with which you are 
charged. 
10. If you plead guilty you are giving up any defense that you may have to the charge. 
11. If you plead guilty there will not be a trial and you will be giving up those rights that go along with 
the trial that have been explained in this document. 
12. The court will explain to you the maximum penalty for the crime charged. The court will also tell 
you if there is a mandatory penalty that must be imposed if you plead guilty. 
13. If the prosecutor has agreed to make a certain recommendation to the court regarding the 
sentence it is important that you understand that the court is not required to go along with that 
recommendation. 
14. If you are not a citizen of the United States, it is possibie ihai ihe eniry of a guilty piea couid have 
immigration consequences of deportation, inabiiity to obtain legal status, or denial of United States 
citizenship. 
Acknowledgment of Rights Upon Guilty Plea DC 039 Rev. 12-09 
>ss ) 
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MUST BE COMPLETED 
TO BE CONSIDERED 
BELOW IS A TRUE AND CORRECT STATEMENT OF MY FINANCIAL CONDITION: 
1. EMPLOYMENT: .·· 
A. Employed: __ yes ~o B. Spouse Employed: __ yes __ no 
C. If not employed, or self-employed, last date of employment~d:::;..o_dO--=...::;d"""-------------
D. My employer is:_~-·----------------------------
Address: ___ ----__ -_-------------------------------
2. HOUSEHOLD INCOME MONTHLY (Include income of spouse): 
Wages before deductions $ y Zi3 Other income: (Specify: Child Support, S.S., V.S., A.D.C., 
LessDeductions $ . ~Etc.) ~
Net Monthly Wages $ C, f~ 7 . $ ....... /...__,-:J!d.__-..c------
3. HOUSEHOLD EXPENSES MONTHLY~-··-
Rent or Mortgage Payment $., -;;;,.r; -~ Child Care 
Utilities $ / r jY Recreation 
Clothing $l Medical 
$ ____ _ 
$ ____ _ 
$ ____ _ 
Transportation $ Insurance 
School $ Other (Specify) 
Food $ ____ _ 
Financial Statement and Order Regarding Public Defender, page 1 DC 028-.Rei¥.-V. ~3JO.m.6--
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3. 
DEBTS: Creditor ~~'+"""ii+-"""--'lfi'F-ri-/L.6.X.l""'f--'u...;o""'f.,­
Creditor -¥.-~~~-=--L-'"\+--­
Creditor --==~V41---II-.I-=~-Y+--+---
Total$ ~(.A,,..4-..L..,~­
Total $\...4...~===:...----
$ ...... ~~(j~~~0~'~·· __ permo 
$ - -r-'r"'• oc2:::::> ~L.I permo 
$ 0:=- <90 U..2 ·permo 
4. ASSETS: 
A. I (we) have cash on hand or in banks 
oe:; $~5~~~,-· - -----------
B. I (we) own personal property valued at 
C. I (we) own vehicle(s) valued at 
D. I (we) own real property valued at 
$~~~·=----------------­$--~~---------------------­
$ __ /~11~~- ---
E. I (we) own stocks, bonds, securities, or interest therein $----"~z_L._ __________ _ 
5. THE FOLLOWING ALSO AFFECTS MY FINANCIAL CONDITION (Specify): __________________ _ 
6. DEPENDENTS: ___ self ___ spouse 
AP LICANT t 
l/~ _{ {<; / v0 ~ Subscribed and sworn to before me this v day of --=-...::0:.....0=-· -=C:...J·~~:.....Q_1L..u.._ ______ , 20~ 
~/;:},d£.--tJ /LJ El#_;] (1-111/if:/ 
NOTARY PUBLIC/CLERK/JUDGE 
The above named ;G defendant parent guardian appeared before the 
court on the aforesaid charge and requested~ aid of counsel. The court having considered the foregoing, and 
having personally examined the applicant; ~ORDERS ~IES the appointment of the s_ervice of 
counsel. y~cs\.)~ ~'-~ \t\ov\fd--
The applicant is ordered to pay $ monthly beginning , 20___ ~ 
for the cost of appointed counsel. Payments are to continue until 
[ ] notified by the court that no further amount is due. 
[ ] the sum of$ has been paid. 
THE APPLICANT IS ORDERED TO PAY REIMBURSEMENT FOR THE COST OF APPOINTED COUNSEL AT 
THE CONCLUSION OF THE CASE; THISdUNT MAY BE IN ADDITION TO ANY SUMS ORDERED ABOVE. 
ENTERED this /~ day of ~tJW&U , 20_tg_. 
Custody Status: ___ In Out 
Bond$ _____ _ 
es to: 
t(1 ~rosecuting Attorney 
~ublic Defender 
V\i\ \LL\ \Y} ~Ou~ ~ 
Date eputy Clerk 
Financial Statement and Order Regarding Public Defel"ldel',...pag&-2---QG-a28-R~IG6--
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12/04/2012 TUE 12:05 FAX 4461702 KC PUBLIC DEFENDER~~~ Dist. Court-file docs 
~ Jay Logsdon, Deputy Public Defender . · 
11 PO Box 9000 . 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816 
Phone: (208) 446-1700; Fax: (208) 446-1791 
Bar Number: 8759 . 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF rHE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
MICHAEL JAY FREITAS, 
Defendant. 
) 
) 
) CASE NUMBER CR-12-0018513 
). Misd 
) 
) . MOTION TO DISQUALIFY 
) PURSUANT TO ICR 25 ) 
) 
~------------------------~) 
141003/015 
COMES NOW, the above named defendant, by and through his attorney, Jay Logsdon, 
Deputy Public.Defender, pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 25 and hereby moves the Court for an 
Order Disqualifying the Honorable Barry E. Watson in the above-entitled case. 
This motion is not made to hinder, delay or obstruct the administration of justice. 
DATED this '{- day ofDece~ber, 2012. 
THE LAW OFFICE OF THE KOOTENAI 
COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER 
BY: · tl< t'~~ J~OGSIIN 
DEPUTY PUBLIC DEFENDER 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was personally served by 
placing a copy ofthe same as indicated below on the '( day ofDecember, 2012, addressed 
to: 
Kootenai County Prosecutor FAX 446-183 3 
. ~ ViaFax 
Interoffice Mail 
MOTION TO DISQUALIFY 
Page 1 
-~···-------- ·········~----:--·--·.---:·--·-.-------~--~-·-·-.-: ---·-;-···-------~-~~ .. -- ... ···--.-:··· ··:::--·--:-:~----.---------··:.·-··--:..-:---. --~-·-· .. -.... ~ ........... ~·· 
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12/04/2012 TUE 12:05 FAX 4461702 KC PUBLIC DEFENDER ~~~ Dist. Court-file docs 
Jay Logsdon, Deputy Public Defender 
The Law Office of the Kootenai County Public Defender 
PO Box 9000 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816 
Phone: (208) 446-1700; Fax: (208) 446-1701 
Bar Number: 8759 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF l'HE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
) CASE NUMBER CR-12-0018513 
Plaintiff, ) Mud 
) 
v. ) 
) ORDER TO DISQUALIFY 
MICHAEL JAY FREITAS, ) 
) 
Defendant. ) 
--------------------------~ 
141004/015 
The Court having before it the timely Motion to Disqualify and good cause appearing, 
now, therefore 
IT. IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Honorable Barry E. Watson be and hereby is 
disqualified from hearing the above-entitled proceeding. 
DATED this 2 day of December; 2012. 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was personally served by 
placing a copy of the same as indicated below on the '] day of December, 2012, addressed 
to: 
Kootenai County Public Defender FAX 446-1701V" 
. Kootenai County Prosecutor FAX 446-1833 / 
ORDER TO DISQUALIFY 
Page 1 
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12/12/2012 WED 14:16 FAX 4461702 KC PUBLIC DEFENDER~~~ Dist. Court-file docs ~019/030 
~~}$ 
Jay Logsdon, Deputy Public Defender 
The Law Office of the Public Defender of Kootenai County 
POBox 9000 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816 
Phone: (208) 446-1700; Fax: (208) 446-1701 
Bar Number: 8759 
Z812 DEC I 2 PH 2: fB 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
CASE NUMBER CR-12-0018513 
Plaintiff, Misd 
v. 
MOTION TO DISMISS 
MICHAEL JAY FREITAS, 
Defendant. 
COMES NOW, the above named defendant, by and through his attorney, Jay Logsdon, 
Deputy Public Defender, and hereby moves this honorable Court for an order dismissing the 
above entitled matter. This motion is made pursuant to I.C.R. 48. 
This motion is made on the grounds that Spirit Lake Ordinance 7-4-10 is unconstitutional 
on its face and as applied under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and 
Article I§§ 1, 13, 14, 15, 21, Article XII§ 2, Article XV §1, 4, 5. 
I. The City of Spirit Lake has no claim of ownership over water once it has been draWn. 
The City of Spirit Lake owns and operates a municipal water system. See Ordinance 7-4-
2, 7-4-3. The service sells water for use by residents in a propriety capacity. Skaggs Drug 
Centers v. City of Idaho Falls, 90 Idaho 1, 7 (1965) (citing Gilbert v. ·Village of Bancroft, 80 
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Idaho 186 (1958); Hooton v. City of Burley, 70 Idaho 369 (1950)). 
The city's relationship with its citizens as regards the water service is contractual. City of 
Grangeville v. Haskin, 116 Idaho 535 (1989). Once the water has been drawn, the resident owes 
the municipality for that water which is recorded by a meter so that the city may collect using a 
monthly bill. See Ordinances 7-4-4, 7-4-5. Municipalities are granted the power to own, 
maintain, and operate a water system by the Idaho Legislature. See I. C. § 50-323. No 
constitutional provision, law, or Spirit Lake ordinance allows the Spirit Lake to retain a 
possessory interest in the water once it has been drawn. 
Possessory interests in water are protected by the Idaho Constitution and cannot be altered 
by government without due process of law and just compensation. Bennett v. Twin Falls North 
Side Land & Water Co. et al., 27 Idaho 643, 150 P. 336, 339 (1915); see also Article XV§§ 1, 4, 
5 of the Idaho Constitution. Therefore, the City of Spirit Lake cannot by ordinance alone take the 
property of one of its citizens. See also Article I§ 14 of the Idaho Constitution. 
The City of Spirit Lake for the reasons stated has.no possessory interest in water once 
drawn and therefore cannot regulate the use of the water in ways that do not comport with the 
public interest. State v. Clark, 88 Idaho 365, 375 (1965) 
II. The City of Spirit Lake has no authority to pass laws criminalizing the sharing of water. 
The Idaho Supreme Court "has repeatedly held that municipalities may exercise only 
those powers granted to them or necessarily implied from the powers granted." City of 
Grangeville v. Haskin, 116 Idaho 535, 538 (1989) citing Caesar v. State, 101 Idaho 158, 160 
(1980); Hendricks v. City of Nampa, 93 Idaho 95, 98,456 P.2d 262 (1969). If there is a fair, 
reasonable, substantial doubt as to the existence of a power, the doubt·must be resolved against 
Page1 
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tlie city. O'Bryant v. City of Idaho Falls, 78 Idaho 313, 320, 303 P.2d 672 (1956), Oregon Short 
Line Railroad Co. v. Village of Chubbuck, 83 Idaho 62, 65, 357 P.2d 1101 (1960). 
A city acts in a proprietary capacity when it owns, maintains, and operates a water system 
for the benefit of its inhabitants. Skaggs Drug Centers v. City of Idaho Falls, 90 Idaho 1, 7 
(1965) (citing Gilbert v. Village of Bancroft, 80 Idaho 186 (1958); Hooton v. City of Burley, 10 
Idaho 369 (1950)). Municipalities are granted the power to own, maintain, and operate a water 
system by the Idaho Legislature. See I.C. § 50~323. The Legislature further provided that 
municipalities may 
.. . prescribe and collect rates, fees, tolls or charges, including the 
levy or assessment of such rates, fees, tolls or charges against 
governmental units, departments or agencies, including the state of 
_Idaho and its subdivisions, for the services, facilitie~ and . 
commodities furnished by such works, or by such rehabilitated 
e~isting electrical generating facilities, a11d to provide methods of 
collections and penalties, including denial of service for 
nonpayment of such rates, fees, tolls or charges; ... 
I.C. 50-:1030(f) 
The City of Spirit Lake passed local ordinances 7-4-2 and 7-4-3 making the city the 
qwner and operator of its municipal water system. The city also provided for fees and denial of 
s~ce. See Ordinance_ 7-4-4, 7-4-8. Once service is denied, the city may declare the residence 
or building unfit for habitation and a public nuisance. See Ordinance 7-4-9. 
The city took an e?{tra ~tep to consolidate its power over water by passing ordinance 7-4-
10. The ordin~~e-states 
]ivery part of the city water system up to, and including, any 
shutoff valve andlor·m.eter, which may be installed at or near the · 
property line of any /(Jt, is the property of the city. It shaU be 
unlawful for any perso~ to connect to, interfere or tamper with, 
Page2 
..... ·_·:-·······:··-~-·-····-:-·-··:·······,.,._, ......... : ····--·· ·. ·····.····-----···· -· ............. ~·-······--··- ··:··---···:·----· .. ··-.. :········--.-···-:····--· .. -· .. -····-.-..... _,_, _______ :··---.. -.-~--·-·····-······-~-··.···-·-:··--·~~----~·-·.-::·--- .. --.. - ... ··:·-·----:··~-------···--.·----.···---········· .... -~---~, 
Michael Jay Freitas 41378 16 of 235
12/12/2012 WED 14:16 FAX 4461702 KC PUBLIC DEFENDER ~~~ Dist. Court-file docs 
turn on or off, Pll!:_mit connection or delivery of water to third 
persons l!!_r qse wjtlaiM B: I'BSidenep or other building not 7 
otherwise provided with water service in accordance with. this 
chapter. or to operate or introduce any substance into any part of 
the city water system unless that person is acting under the direct 
supervision of a qualified employee of the city or first obtains 
express written permission from the mayor. (emphasis added) 
~022/030 
The ordinance makes it unlawful for a person to permit connection or delivery of water to third 
persons for use within a residence not otherwise provided with water service in accordance with this 
chapter. While this leads to the absurd result that a person commits a misdemeanor by filling a water 
bottle with tap water in Spirit Lake and later sharing that tap water with a person that does not live in 
their home while both are in either a home or building without water from Spirit Lake, criminal laws 
must be strictly construed, and the Supreme Court will not change or strike down a law for absurdity. 
See Verska v. SaintAlphonsus Regional Med. (:enter, 151_Idaho 889,895 (2011);Statev. Sivak, 119 
Idaho 320, 325 (1990). 
However, the City of Spirit Lake lacks the _authority to criminalize these acts. In City of 
Grangeville v. Haskin, 116 Idaho 535 (1989), the Idaho Supreme Court struck down an ordinance 
allowing a municipality to place a lien for nonpayment of utilities on a property owner when his 
tenants failed to pay. The Court found that 
the city may collect the charges for the water, sewer and garbage 
services provided by the city from those who use the services. This 
right to collect does not depend on any expressed or implied power 
of the city,. but rather on principles of contract law that obligate 
one who accepts a service to pay for it. what the city has attempted 
t~ do here is to rewr~te those principles to allow collection from. 
the owner, even though the services were not ordered, contracted 
for, or used by the owner. 
The Court held 
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An implied power to collect from an owner who had not ordered, 
contracted for, or used the service would be unreasonable because 
it would create a liability not consistent with principles of contract 
law. We are not prepared to read this power into these statutes. 
In this case, the City of Spirit Lake relies on police powers rather than contract law. A 
~023/030 
municipal corporation is granted police powers under Article XII§ 2 of the Idaho Constitution. 
Any county or incorporated city or town may make and enforce, 
within its limits, all such local police, sanitary and other 
regulations as are not in conflict with its charter or with the 
general laws. 
From a review of the cases construing such constitutional provision it may be said that 
there are three general restrictions which apply to legislation under the authority conferred by 
such provision: (1) the ordinance or regulation must bt: confmed to the limits of the 
governmental body enacting the same, (2) it must not be in conflict with other general laws of the 
state, and (3) it must not be an unreasonable or arbitrary enactrrient. State v. Clark, 88 Idaho 365, 
374 (1965). Police powers must be used to. serve_the public interest. See id at 375 .. 
No constitutional provision or legisla~ive enactment provides the City of Spirit Lake with 
authority to maintain a monopoly over the supply of water through criminal sanctions that could 
only be useful to extort people who are not paying their water bill. Once a person has paid for 
water, the city has no rational or legitimate reason to hinder their ability to use the water 
themselves or elsewhere so long as that person is not using the water to do harm.· Sharing water 
cannot harm the person sharing, the person being shared with, the community, or the 
municipality. Further, nothing prevents a person or corporate entity from delivering water from 
an outside source, or from simply paying for another person's water bill. The ordinance is 
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therefore arbitrary and must be struck down; 
The Idaho Legislature set out in I. C. 50-1030(t) a limited list of ways in which a 
municipality may enforce its claim to payment for services. That· list, while not exhaustive, does 
not provide examples that would lead one to read an implication that the municipality has the 
authority, in addition to "denial of service for nonpayment of such rates; fees, tolls or charges," 
to criminalize the permission of a person legally in possession of water to deliver it to another. 
Similar to the case in Haskin, the matter before this Court involves an ordinance that oversteps 
statutory authority and must be struck down. 
Further, the ordinance makes no attempt to limit its scope to the City of Spirit Lake. 
Every person engaged in any chain of events that leads to the use of Spirit Lake water in a home 
not provided that water in accordance with the municipality's ordinances will be in violation of 
these laws. 
III. The ordinance, even if constitutional on its face. is unconstitutional as applied. 
The facts of this case may be in dispute. According to the police reports of Officer Wise 
of the Spirit Lake Police Department, .on September 28,2012, he cited Mr. Michael Freitas for 
providing water using a hose stretching·fr~m hls outside water faucet to hi~ :neighbor Georg~ 
.. 
Adams a."ld the three adults a."ld three children staying there. The city had shut off water to the 
dwelling. On October 15,2012, Officer McMillen returned and spoke to Brenda Nash who was 
... 
staying in Mr. Adams' home, and learned that Mr. Feitas was allegedly still providing water to 
the home. Ms. Nash told the officer she had nowhere else to go. 
As explained above, the City of Spirit Lake has no reasonable or legitimate interest in 
preventing Mr. Freitas from giving water he pays for to his neighbors. Mr. Freitas respectfully 
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asks this honorable Court to dismiss this case because the ordinance is unconstitutional as 
applied to these facts. 
Further, the ordinance, if read properly, has nothing to do with this case. The ordinance 
. . 
refers to interfering with, tampering with, turning on or off, permitting connection or delivery of 
water to third persons for use within a residence or other building not otherwise provided with 
water service in accordance with this chapte~. The statute. is best ~e~d to mean that it would be 
unlawful for anyone to interfere with, tamper, turn on or off, permit connection or delivery of 
water to another within a residence or building- through the use of the city's water system. The 
water system extends to the "standard service connection" to the "main distribution line.'' See 
Ordinances 7-4-3 and 7-4-4. In other words, the ordinance seeks to outlaw acts that would either 
do harm to the water system or siphon water from it without paying. It has no application to 
water drawn and properly paid for by a citizen. If this is a reasonable reading of the statute it 
must also be the correct one. State v. Sivak, 119 Idaho 320~ 325 (1990) .. 
IV. The Ordinance is void for vagueness. 
Alternatively, Spirit Lake Ordinance 7-4-10 is void for vagueness on its face an,d as 
. . . 
applied. In order to comport With the notice requirements of due process guaranteed by the . 
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I § 13 of the Idaho 
Constitution, a law must use language that conveys a sufficiently definite description of the 
l?roscribed conduct. 1990 Idaho Op. Atty. Gen. 15, Idaho Op. Atty. Gen. No. 90-3, 1990 WL 
. . . . 
48948 at *2 (Idaho A.G.), citing Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967); H. & V 
. . . . . . . .. 
Engineering v. Board of Professional Engineers, 113 Idaho 646 (1987). As the Court wrote in 
Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984), 
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Michael Jay Freitas 41378 20 of 235
12/12/2012 WED 14:17 FAX 4461702 KC PUBLIC DEFENDER~~~ Dist. Court-file docs 
The requirement that government articulate its aims with a 
reasonable degree of clarity ensure that state power will be 
· exercised only on behalf of policies reflecting an authoritative 
choice among competing social values, educes the danger of 
caprice and discrimination in the administration of the laws, 
enables individuals to conform their conduct to the requzrements of 
law, and permits meaningful judicial review. · 
Due Process also guarantees that a statute will not be so Written as to allow arbitrary and 
~026/030 
capricious enforcement. 1990 Idaho Op. Atty. Gen. 15 at *2 citing LDS, Inc. v. Healy, 589 P .2d 
490 (Colo.l979)~ Furthermore, Due Process requires that explicit standards be created for 
·individuals or groups tasked to apply basic policy. Id. citing Tuma v. Board of Nursing, 100 
Idaho 74 (1979); Saxon Coffee Shop, Inc .. v. Boston Licensing Board, 401 N.E.2d (1980); Chief 
of Fire Dept. of Worcester v. Wibley, 507 N.E.2d 256 (Mass. 1987); Wheeler v. State Board of 
Forestry, 192 Cal.Rptr. 693 (Cal.App. 1983) .. 
Ordinance 7-4-10 reads in relevant part 
It shall be unlawful for any person to connect to, interfere or 
tamper with, turn on or off, permit connection or delivery of water 
to third persons for use within a residence or other building not 
otherwise provided with water service in accordance with this 
chapter ... 
This ordinance can be broken down to outlaw the following 
1. Connect to water for use by a third person ·within a residence or other 
. building not otherwise provided with water s.ervice in accordance with this 
chapter. 
2. Interfere or tamper with water for use by a third person within a residence 
or other building not otherWise provided with water service in accordance 
with this chapter. 
3. Turn on or off water for use by a third person within a residence or other 
. ~uilding not otherwise provided with water service in accordance with this 
chapter. 
4. Permit connection or delivery of water to third persons for use within a 
residence or other building not otherwise provided with water service in 
.J)age 7 
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accordance with this chapter. 
It is difficult to understand why the city would have concerned itself with those interfering with 
the illegal use of water by others, or why the city is not concerned about people who connect 
illegally for their own use. One way to correct the absurdity is to remove the "of water to third 
persons" language, but that fails to fix the interfering part, while removing the "not otherwise 
provided" qualifier makes the connecting part absurd. As it stands, the law is too confusing to 
provide either reasonable persons or the government with any idea as to how it is meant to be 
enforced. Therefore, it must be struck down. 
Counsel requests that this motion be set for hearing in order to present oral argument, 
evidence and/or testimony in support thereof. Requested time is 1 0 minutes. 
DATED this t1.. day of December, 2012. 
THE LAW OFFICE OF THE PUBLIC 
DEFENDER OF KOOTENAI COUNTY 
BY: ~~· Jlivoa6N 
DEPUTY PUBLIC DEFENDER 
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a copy of the same as indicated below on the. J::J... day of December~ 2012, addressed to: 
~~ . 
• ... l<etenai County.Prosecutor FAX 446-183 3. 
Via Fax 
. . 
·Interoffice Mail 
·---·-········ ····-:···~- ........ , ........... , ... ···-·· ---------···~-···-···----::· ·--~ --···- ........ '-·~·---.·--:~·--·-·--·------~---.-· .. ---·-.--... -:---:-..... ·---····-.. ::·~ ·······~-··· .. ·~--~·--. -----~-·-·....-.o;·-~ .. ~~--..~~------:··~ .. ~--·~---···:-:------.- ·· ......... . 
Michael Jay Freitas 41378 22 of 235
, 
/ 
' 
BARRY McHUGH 
Prosecuting Attorney 
501 Government Way/Box 9000 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-9000 
Telephone: (208) 446-1800 
Facsimile: (208) 446-1833 
STATE Of IDAHO ) 
COUNTY OF KOOTENAIJSS FILED: 
29 12 DEC 31 AH IO: 19 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) Case No. CR-2012-18513 
) 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
) BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO 
) MOTION TO DISMISS 
) 
) 
MICHAEL JAY FREITAS ) 
) 
Defendant. ) 
COMES NOW the State, by and through Laura McClinton, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, 
and hereby submits its brief in opposition to The Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. 
FACTS 
The State expect the evidence to show: on September 28, 2012 Officer Terry Wise cited 
Michael J. Freitas ("The Defendant") for providing water to his neighbor George Adams whose 
water had been turned off by the City of Spirit Lake. Officer Wise had previously advised the 
Defendant he was in violation of Spirit Lake Ordinance § 7-4-10 by running a hose from his 
house to his neighbor's house where water had been shut off. The Defendant stated he had talked 
to his lawyer about the situation and that he was not "doing anything wrong," and would "take it 
to court." Office Wise provided a highlighted copy of the statute, but did not cite the Defendant. 
The next day when Officer Wise returned to the Defendant's residence, 5870 Rhode Island 
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Street, Spirit Lake Idaho, 83869, Officer Wise observed the hose was still being used to transport 
City water to the neighboring residence and The Defendant was cited for violating the ordinance. 
On December 12, 2012, The Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss the charge alleging 
Spirit Lake does not have the authority to regulate The Defendant's use of City water once it is 
paid for, and that Spirit Lake Ordinance 7-4-10 is unconstitutionally vague. 
ARGUMENT 
I. The Defendant has not shown a taking has occurred, and assuming a taking 
did occur, dismissal is not the appropriate remedy under the Takings Clause. 
The "Just Compensation Clause," which is also referred to as the "Takings Clause," is a 
"complicated and multi-faceted area of constitutional law. Boise Tower Associates, LLC v. 
Hogland, 147 Idaho 774215 P.3d 494, 503-04 (Idaho 2009). A government must provide 
compensation if the government's "regulations deprive an owner of' all economically beneficial 
us[e]' ofher property." !d. quoting Lingle, 544 U.S. at 538, 125 S.Ct. at 2081, 161 L.Ed.2d at 
887 ((emphasis and bracket in original). 1 There is no claim of inverse condemnation, claim under 
the Takings Clause, "unless an actual taking of private property is established." Covington v. 
Jefferson County, 137 Idaho 777, 780, 53 P.3d 828, 831 (Idaho 2002) citing Snyder v. State, 92 
Idaho 175, 179,438 P.2d 920,924 (1968). 
In the present case, whether the City of Spirit Lake has a property interest or not, there is 
no taking that requires compensation. The Spirit Lake Ordinance simply denies a person who is 
obtaining city water from sharing it with an individual who does not have running water at their 
residence. Not orJy is the interference with use ofwater de minimus, but citizens of Spirit Lake 
1 A taking may also include where the government physically modifies the property interest of a 
party, or where the taking is temporary in nature. Boise Tower Associates, LLC v. Hogland, 147 
Idaho 774215 P.3d 494, 503-04 (Idaho 2009). Neither ofthese types of taking apply to the 
ordinance in question in the present case. · 
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retain almost the entire economic value in the water, and what is lost falls nowhere near "all 
economically beneficial use." Further, the appropriate remedy under the Taking Clause is to 
provide the compensation for depriving the owner of a property interest, not to dismiss an action 
or find a regulation unconstitutional. The Defendant cannot establish that a taking has occurred, 
and as such, the Takings Clause has no implication requiring a dismissal. 
II. The City of Spirit Lake has the authority to regulate water use as 
authorized by the Idaho Constitution and the Idaho Legislator. 
A municipality may make and enforce "all such local police, sanitary and other 
regulations as are not in conflict with its charter or with the general laws. Caesar v. State, 101 
Idaho 158, 161, 610 P.2d 517, 520 (Idaho 1980) quoting Idaho Const. art. XII,§ 2. This 
constitutional grant of powers is viewed "as a grant of local police powers to Idaho cities." !d. 
"The burden falls on the party challenging the validity of a police power to show that it is either 
in conflict with the general laws of the state, unreasonable or arbitrary. Potts Canst. Co. v. N 
Kootenai Water Dist., 141 Idaho 678,682, 116 P.3d 8, 11 (Idaho 2005) citing Plummer v. City of 
Fruitland, 139 Idaho 810, 813, 87 P.3d 297, 300 (2004). "Generally courts are not concerned 
with the wisdom of ordinances and will uphold a municipal ordinance unless it is clearly 
unreasonable or arbitrary." !d. Further, "[i]t is well recognized that the social objective of 
preventing financial hardship and possible reliance upon the welfare agencies of the state is a 
permissible goal of police power action." Adams v. City of Pocatello, 91 Idaho 99, 101,416 P.2d 
46, 49 (Idaho 1966) citing Home Accident Ins. Co. v. Industrial Commission, 34 Ariz. 201, 269 
P. 501 (1928). 
The Idaho Legislator has also granted cities the authority to create regulations '"to 
maintain the peace, good government and welfare of the corporation and its trade, commerce and 
industry." I.C. § 50-302. I.C. § 50-302 expressly authorizes that a city may enforce these 
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ordinances through fines and by incarceration. Id. One such trade, commerce, and industry a city 
may conduct is the management of a city water system. I. C.§ 50-323. 
The City of Spirit Lake has exercised its authority under the Idaho Constitution and 
Legislative Power to pass Spirit Lake Ordinance 7-4-10. This statute prohibits an individual from 
allowing connection or delivery of city water to third persons for use in a residence that is not 
receiving city water. The City of Spirit Lake charges roughly $15.00 a month for 12,000 gallons 
ofwater, and then $1.25 for each additionall,OOO gallons of water. The City created this 
ordinance in an attempt to prevent unlawful sharing of city water for the use in a residence which 
does not have running water. The rate is low, and the City of Spirit Lake is well within its 
authority to attempt to avoid a resident from using a large number of gallons of water in an 
attempt to pass along free water to a neighbor. The City of Spirit Lake can take action to limit the 
chance its residents will seek welfare; and in this case the ordinance is designed to keep water 
rates low and allow affordable access to water to the people of Spirit Lake. 
II. The City of Spirit Lake Ordinance is not unconstitutionally vague on its 
face or as applied. 
The Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment ofthe United States Constitution 
requires that the laws of the United States and of the several states not be vague when defining 
criminal conduct. Idaho v. Korsen, 138 Idaho 706,711, 69 P.3d 126, 131 (2003). The U.S. 
Constitution and policy requires that "no [person] ... be required at the peril of loss of liberty to 
speculate as to the meaning of penal statutes." I d. 
A statute is unconstitutional and therefore void-for-vagueness where "its prohibitions are 
not clearly defined." Id. A prohibition is not clearly defined if it "fails to give adequate notice to 
people of ordinary intelligence concerning the conduct it proscribes ... or if it fails to establish 
minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement or others who must enforce the statute." Jd. at 
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712, 69 P.3d 132. The key to determining whether a statute is void-for-vaguness "is not the 
possibility that it will sometimes be difficult to determine whether the incriminating fact it 
establishes has been proved; but rather the indeterminacy of precisely what the fact is." United 
States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 286, 128 S.Ct. 1830, 1835 (2008). In cases of constitutional 
challenges, the burden is on the challenging party; there is a strong presumption in favor of the 
validity of a statute. Idaho v. Leferink, 133 Idaho 780,783,992 P.2d 775, 778 (1999). 
A statute may be challenged as unconstitutionally vague in two, mutually exclusive, 
ways. Burton v. Dep 't ofTransp., 149 Idaho 746, 748, 240 P.3d 933, 935 (2010). First, "[a] 
statute may be challenged as unconstitutionally vague on its face[.]" Id A statute is facially 
unconstitutional if'"the law is impermissibly vague in all of its applications."' Korsen, 138 
Idaho 712, 69 P.3d 132. 
Second, a statute may be challenged as unconstitutionally vague "as applied to the 
complainant's conduct." Burton, 149 Idaho 748, 240 P.3d 935. A statute is unconstitutionally 
vague as applied if "the statute failed to provide fair notice that the complainant's specific 
conduct was prohibited or failed to provide sufficient guidelines such that police had unbridled 
discretion in determining whether to charge the complainant." Id 
A. FACIAL CHALLENGE. 
A statute is unconstitutionally facially vague if there are no circumstances under which 
the statute could be constitutionally applied. Idaho v. Cobb, 132 Idaho 195, 199, 969 P.2d 244, 
248 (1998). A statute can survive a constitutional challenge where there is an identifiable 
circumstance in "which the statute or ordinance unquestionably could be constitutionally 
applied." Id at 247, 969 P.2d 247. 
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Spirit Lake Ordinance§ 7-4-10 states in relevant part, "It shall be unlawful for any 
person to connect to, interfere or tamper with, turn on or off, permit connection or delivery of 
water to third persons for use within a residence or other building not otherwise provided with 
water service in accordance with this chapter ... " Spirit Lake Ordinance§ 7-4-10. The ordinance 
is not ambiguous and its language is clear when given its "commonly understood, everyday 
meanings." Idaho v. Warriorwoman, 2008 WL 4202272 at *5 (Idaho Dist., 1st Dist., Aug. 15, 
2008) (unpublished opinion); Korsen, 138 Idaho at 713, 69 P.3d at 133. A person of ordinary 
intelligence can understand that this statute means that a person cannot "connect or deliver" 
Spirit Lake water to an individual for the use within a residence that is not paying for Spirit Lake 
city water. This is exactly how Defense Counsel has read the statute, "The ordinance makes it 
unlawful for a person to permit connection or delivery of water to third persons for use within a 
residence not otherwise provided with water service in accordance with this chapter." 
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss p. 3. 
B. AS APPLIED. 
To determine whether a law is void-for-vagueness under an as applied challenge the court 
should apply a two prong test. Idaho v. Foelsch, 2009 WL 3287575, at *3 (Idaho Dist., 1st Dist., 
Sept. 17, 2009) (unpublished opinion). The law will be unconstitutionally vague, as applied, if 
"(1) the law [does not] create minimum guidelines for police, judges, or juries charged with 
enforcement of the statute; and (2) [the law does not] provide a reasonable person with adequate 
and fair warning of the proscribed conduct." !d. In other words, a law is unconstitutionally 
vague if it gives authorities "unbridled discretion" and it does not put the individual on notice of 
what action is required or forbidden. Korsen, 138 Idaho 712, 69 P.3d 132. 
As previously noted, the statute prohibits a person to "connect or deliver" Spirit Lake 
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water to an individual for the use within a residence that is not paying for Spirit Lake city water. 
In the present case the Defendant connected a hose and delivered Spirit Lake water to his 
neighbor's residence, which was not paying for Spirit Lake water. This is a clear violation of the 
ordinance and the Defendant was sufficiently put on notice that he was in violation of the 
ordinance by previous law enforcement contact. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss should be denied. 
DATED this)~ day of December, 2012. 
~~-Jlardi:.La 
LAURA MCCLINTON 
DEPUTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the :J ~ day of ))c C... , 2012, a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing was caused to be faxed as follows: 
JAY LOGSDON 
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT 
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Log of 1K-COURTROOM10 • 1/3/2013 Page 1 of3 
Description CR 2012-18513 Freitas, Michael Jay 2013010~ 
Judge Peterson ( - ~ A 
Clerk Cristine Stokes C~ 
Date 1/3/2013 Location 111 K-COURTROOM1 0 
Time J~l Note 
02:41:03 PM Judge 
calls case Peterson 
02:56:39 PM Mr Freitas pres 
02:56:46 PM Ms 
McClinton pres 
02:56:49 PM pres, this motion includes an applied challenge, state and I have 
Mr stipulated to most of the facts accept #28, water had been shut of 
Logsdon by City of Spirit Lake. Stipulation is just for purpose of this hearing 
not trial 
02:59:41 PM Ms 
calls Barbara Brown McClinton 
03:00:04 PM swears to oath, states name and spells for record, employed 
through City of Spirit Lake, I am the Clerk and Treasurer, been 
employed there for 33 years, I over see City's record keeping, 
employee's, HR, water and sewer funds, attend all meetings, 
record all documents. I see that the ordinances are followed, for 
the employees and citizens, for monthy residental acces it is $15 
per month for 12k gallons, if a resident uses more than its $1.25 
per 1 k, those rates have been in place since 2006-2007 maybe. 
Ms Brown We try to keep the water prices low, we have a lot of low income, 
single income and a lot of people that are financially stressed, we 
have to review it every year to make sure we can pay our bills, we 
are one of the lowest municipal systems around. If you use the 
service we bill you so on 12/31 we bill for the months of 
December, we only read meters in the summer, so its just a flat 
rate in the winer, water and sewer is $42 but water only is $15, 
familiar w/ unlawful act of sharing water. Normally when it does 
happen we write a letter and let them know that its a violation 
03:04:56 PM Judge questions Ms Brown Peterson 
03:05:04 PM Mr Adam's water was shut off by the city for non payment and 
Ms Brown there was a hose run across the alley from Mr Freitas to Mr 
Adam's home 
03:05:57 PM Mr 
Logsdon cross 
03:06:00 PM 
rate for water is based on a base rate, some systems have a base 
rate that start at zero gallons, some allow 5, or 10 we allow 12k 
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Log of 1K-COURTROOM10, 1 /3/2013 Page 2 of3 
gallons for $15 Cities in 10 have an organization of all of the cities 
Ms Brown and they do water rate analyses and from looking at those I know thats how it is lower than a lot of the cities, that was put out on the 
internet about 1-2 years ago. 
03:07:36 PM Ms 
no other questions McClinton 
03:08:26 PM ordinance is 7 410 of Spirit Lake, reads out loud in open court, I 
am challenging it as an unlawful taking and violated municipalities 
to pass laws. Its my contention that this is void for vagueness, if 
you look at statute as a whole. Seems that statute seeks to 
Mr punish people that are conecting to water system and delivering 
Logsdon water through the system. For this situation this is easy, we can 
say none of the front part matters, its not an ordinance that the 
state can enforce. He's paid for the water and the question is the 
use of sharing of the water is that something cognizable by the 
court. I would point the court to Adams vs United States. 
Continues to read 10 Code section 50-323 into the record 
03:18:58 PM Judge people could set up their own private water deliveries systems 
Peterson and hook up 30 surounding neighbors? 
03:19:31 PM issue is that when we talk about a list we often say anything that 
isn't stated in that list is not allowed, they followed w/ denial of 
service. When I read this is shot me back to exmples of L&L, 
when you have examples you can't extrapolate from those and 
give power to do anything you want, I found City of Grangeville vs 
Mr Haskins, made it okay to play Ieins on properties for land owners 
Logsdon that haven't been being paid by their tenants. City of Spirit Lake 
can condem a home if their water is shut off. There is a long !ist of 
ways a person could not have to purchase through the 
municipalities, there does not appear to be any sort of limit for 
geographical limitis on this. We are not talking about sale or 
marketing water. He purchased the water and provided it for free 
to his neighbor, asking for this case to be dismissed 
03:24:40 PM 
city of Spirit Lake does have right to make ordinances to maintain 
peace, commerce, industry and good government for the people 
of Spirit Lake. Allows for punishmet of $1000 or not more than 6 
months in jail, this ordinace is not vague when read in context. 
Statute is best read, its read exactly how its suppose to be read. 
States 10 vs Corsen, I think clearly when read in context you can 
Ms understand what this ordinace is prohibiting. This doesn't braden 
McClinton spectrum to not allowing people to bring a glass of water to their 
neighbor, you would have to know that their water was shut off. 
He received noticed of the behavior and then ultimetly cited for it. 
They have had problems w/ this issue in the past, they are trying 
to keep their costs down for City of Spirit Lake, this ordinance has 
a purpose here for general welfare of the community. Sanitary 
issues as well. Sharing water through a hose?The state does not 
believe that this actions rises to a taking here. City is not taking 
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Log of 1K-COURTROOM10 r 1/3/2013 Page 3 of3 
03:29:31 PM 
Judge 
Peterson 
03:34:20 PM Mr 
Logsdon 
03:34:43 PM Judge 
Peterson 
03:35:52 d 
and prohibiting economic value, he is able to use it for his own 
personal use, just not deliver it to his neighbor, ask the motion to 
dismiss be denied 
muncipalities have authority to regulate and that can lead to 
criminal action - court denies motions as it is to being a taking, 
now regarding whether its unconstitutional, court notes strong 
presumtion of validity of statutes. I think language w/ in ordinace 
which sets forth very clear violations and has a clear meaning. 
Find motion to dismiss is denied. I think statute at issue hear is 
read very clear. City is sole regulator of their water system. 
Defendant received notice that his neighbor was not receiving 
water from the system and he provided water himself to this other 
individual. Court finds you have failed to meet your burden as 
statute applied, deny in its entirety your motion. It is your role to 
bring these types of challenges. 
findings as to three reasons why ordinances may have gone 
beyond its authroity that I listed in my brief 
I have to constrew statute to be constitutional, and I have to read 
the statute that way, noted that ordinace here is both reasonable 
and not arbotrary 
Produced by FTR Gold™ 
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BARRY McHUGH 
Prosecuting Attorney 
501 Government Way/Box 9000 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-9000 
Telephone: (208) 446-1800 
Facsimile: (208) 446-1833 
Assigned Attorney 
LAURA MCCLINTON 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF 
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MICHAEL JAY FREITAS, 
Defendant. 
Case No. CR-2012-18513 
MOTION IN LIMINE 
COMES NOW, Laura McClinton, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney for Kootenai County, to 
request that Defense counsel, the Defendant, and/or any defense witness not be allowed to refer 
to the Motion to Dismiss that was heard in front of the Honorable Judge Peterson on the 3rd day 
of January, 2013 at trial in this matter. 
The issues addressed in Defendant's Motion to Dismiss have no relevance in the instant 
matter and any reference relating to the constitutionality of Spirit Lake Ordinance 7-4-10 must be 
excluded pursuant to Idaho Rule of Evidence 402. Judge Peterson denied Defendant'sMotion to 
Dismiss, thus upholding the constitutionality of said ordinance. As such, the issue that was in 
question has already been decided and is irrelevant as to whether Defendant violated the 
ordinanGe. 
Further, even if relevant, the issues raised in the Motion to Dismiss have no probative value 
in the matter to betried, but raise a substantial danger of unfair prejudice to the State, and should 
Michael Jay Freitas 41378 33 of 235
be excluded under Idaho Rule of Evidence 403. The State is concerned that any reference to the 
constitutionality of the Spirit Lake ordinance would serve to improperly mislead or confuse the 
trier of fact, possibly having an impact on the Jury's deliberations, and resulting in prejudice to 
the State. 
Counsel requests that this motion be set for hearing in order to present oral argument, 
evidence and/or testimony in support. Requested time is ten minutes. 
DATEDthls _____ =j~------
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
CEriCATE OF MAILING / 
I hereby certify that, on the day~ , ~caused the foregoing to be 
transmitted as followed: 
JAYLOGSDON 0,~ 
FAXED ~-~~·~d~-+-7+-----------------
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Log of 1K-COURTROOM7 0' '7/2013 Page 1 of 1 
Description CR 2012-18513 Freitas, Michael20130107 Jury Trial Status 
Judge Peterson · ~~ 
Clerk Shari Rohrbach 
Date 1t112o13 11 I . 111 K-COURTROOM7 L.V\,CI Ll VII 
I Time II Speaker II Note 
Q_9: 15:06 AM IJ 
09:15:16 AM 
DA 
09:16:05 AM PA 
09:16:33 AM J 
I 09:16:51 AM I 
I 09:54:33 AM I J 
09:54:36 AM DA 
09:55:03 AM PA 
09:55:34 AM J 
09:55:42 AM DA 
J 
: ... 
09:5 . 
02:19:35 PM J 
02:19:52 PM DA 
I Q2:2o: 15 P J 
II Q2:20:3o P 
02:21:19 PM 
02:21:19 PM lEnd 
II Calls, def not present, Mr Logsdo and Mcclint 
I spoke to him and he wants this left set. He lives in Spirt Lake and 
has difficutly with transportation, he's handicapped. He was here 
Friday, may have been confusion, ask his absence be excused. 
Ask a warrant, he was aware of court today. He hasn't tried to get 
here. 
Table this one until the end of the calendar. 
Pass. 
REcall. 
This is a strange case and a strange law. We're happy to go to 
trial. 
Still request a warrant. State has 4 witnesses coming in from Spirit 
Lake. 
He was just here last week. 
He forgot he had court this morning. The abilty for him to get here-
he still wants to go to trial. 
I Bump this to 1 :30 today. 
II 
I 
R~=~,..~ll. 
My client apologizes for not being here this morning, ask to leave 
set. State has filed some motions in limine. 
Leave set, will go tomorrow. 
I'll issue a supplemental order. Be here at 8:30 Tues. 
Produced by FTR Gold™ 
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141 001/017 
\ 
' T ,., '! · .. : SJ 
. ,_ •.. IJ 
Jay Logsdon, Deputy Public Defender 
The Law Office of the Public Defender of Kootenai County 
POBox 9000 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816 
Phone: (208) 446-1700; Fax: (208) 446-1701 
Bar Number: 8759 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE ~ 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
MICHAELJAY FREITAS, 
Defendant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
------------------------~~) 
CASE NUMBER CR-12-0018513 
'Misd 
DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED 
JURY INSTRUCTIONS 
COMES NOW, the above named defendant, by and through his attorney, Jay Logsdon, 
Deputy Public Defender, and respectfully submits the Defendant's Requested Jury Instructions No. 
l through 8 , in addition to the Court's general instructions on the law. 
DATED this 7 day of January, 2013. 
BY: 
THE LAW OFFICE OF THE PUBLIC 
DEFENDER OF KOOTENAI COUNTY 
LIC DEFENDER 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was personally served by placing 
a copy of the same as indicated below on the / day of January, 2013, addressed to: 
Kootenai County Prosecutor FAX 446-1833 ~ :::~ceMail .. · . . ·~ 
. :··--·· -·- ~- ··· .. ---·· .. ··--· ···-··- ·······-- ·- ·- -. ··-·· ..... ···--··-·· .. ·······--~- ·······-· ·-······ ···.···----~ -----·-· -··· ..... ·····- ..... ; ... ·-···· .. . . . .. . ... " 
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01/07/2013 MON 15:46 FAX 4461702 KC PUBLIC DEFENDER ~~~ PETERSON JUDGE [4J 002/017 
Icn 103 
REASONABLE DOUBT 
PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE-REASONABLE DOUBT 
DEFENDANTS REQUESTED 
INSTRUCTION NO. 1 
Under our law and system of justice, the defendant is presumed to be innocent. The 
presumption of innocence means two things. 
First, the state has the burden of proving the defendant guilty. The state has that burden 
throughout the trial. The defendant is never required to prove his innocence, nor does the 
defendant ever have to produce any evidence at all. 
Second, the state must prove the alleged crime beyond a reasonable doubt A reasonable 
doubt is not a mere possible or imaginary doubt It is a doubt based on reason and common 
sense. It may arise from a careful and impartial consideration of all the evidence, or from lack of 
evidence. If after considering all the evidence you have a reasonable doubt about the defendant's 
guilt, you must fmd the defendant not guilty.-
Comment 
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that the jury _be instructed on the 
presumption of innocence. Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478 (1977). Although technically not a 
"presumption", the presumption of innocence is a way ofdescribing the prosecution's duty both 
to produce evidence of guilt and to convince the jury beyond a reasonable doubt. I d. 
"The beyond a reasonable doubt standard is a requirement of due process, but the Constitution 
neither prohibits trial courts from defining reasonable doubt nor requires them to do so as a 
matter of course. Indeed, so long as the court instructs the jury on the necessity that the 
defendant's guilt be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, the Constitution does not require that any 
particular form of words be used in advising the jury of the government's burden of proof. 
Rather, 'taken as a whole, the instructions [must] correctly conve[y] the concept of reasonable 
doubt to the jury."' Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. I, 5 (1994) (citations omitted). 
The above instruction reflects the view that it is preferable to instruct the jury on the meaning of 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt. This instrUction defines that term concisely while avoiding the 
~=~~i~ing fro7me o~er attempts to define this concept. · 
REFUSED 
ACCEPTED 
MODIFIED 
COVERED 
JUDGE 
···:··-~ -----··-:-·-:-"----:----····: -------·-··-···----------- -~-.---~·: ---------:-:·--.--·---;--··--··---~-·---·- :--~ ·--·-·-· ·-~----·- -----·-·· . ··-·---· ...... - ··---~---- . . ..... . ---- ..... -~ ... 
Michael Jay Freitas 41378 37 of 235
01/07/2013 MON 15:47 FAX 4461702 KC PUBLIC DEFENDER ~~~ PETERSON JUDGE 141 003/017 
ICTI 301 
EFFECT OF DEFENDANT'S ELECTION NOT TO TESTIFY 
~~~~ANTS REQUESTED 
INSTRUC NO. 2 
ant in a criminal trial has a constitutional · ght not to be compelled to testify. The 
decisi whether to testify is left to the defendant, acf with the advice and assistance of the 
de ndant's lawyer. You must not draw any inference o guilt from the fact that the defendant 
oes not testify, nor should this fact be discussed by yo or enter into your deliberations in any 
REFUSED 
ACCEPTED 
MODIFIED 
COVERED 
JUDGE 
·····-·--:··-····--···· ·-.............. ·----------····---~----------:---------·":··--·-···· 
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01/07/2013 MON 15:48 FAX 4461702 KC PUBLIC DEFENDER~~~ PETERSON JUDGE ~ 004/017 
.. -··-· -····t····-····· .... 
. . 
ICJI 305 
UNION OF ACT AND INTENT 
DEFENDANTS REQUESTED 
INSTRUCTION NO. 3 
In every crime or public offense there must exist a union or joint operation of act and intent. 
Comment 
I.C. s 18-114. The word "intent" does not mean an intent to commit a crime but merely the 
intent to knowingly perform the interdicted act, or by criminal negligence the failure to perform 
the required act. State v. Parish, 79 Idaho 75; 310 P .2d 1082 (1957); State v. Booton, 85 Idaho 
51, 375 P.2d 536 (1962). The term "criminal negligence", means gross negligence, such as 
amounts to reckless disregard of consequences and the rights of others. State v. McMahan, 57 
·Idaho 240, 65 P.2d 156 (1937) (construing former I.C. s 17-114 which was identical to s 
18-114). 
This instruction is unnecessary when the crime charged requires a specific mental element and 
the jury is properly instructed regarding that mental element. State v. Hoffman, 137 Idaho 897, 
55 P.3d 890 (Ct. App. 2002). 
GIVEN / 
REFUSED 
ACCEPTED 
MODIFIED 
COVERED 
. JUDGE 
. -----~- -···-- .,.. ... ------····- .--------------·-- -------.- --~-----·--- -· --.-- ···-··--···· ·-.-----------···-···· 
Michael Jay Freitas 41378 39 of 235
01/07/2013 MON 15:49 FAX 4461702 KC PUBLIC DEFENDER ~~~ PETERSON JUDGE 
DEFENDANTS REQUESTED 
INSTRUCTION NO. 4 
141005/017 
In order for the defendant to be guilty of the charge of unlawful act under the Spirit Lake 
Domestic Water Ordinance, the state must prove each of the following: 
1. On or about September 28,2012 
2. in the state of Idaho 
3. the defendant Michael Freitas permitted the delivery of water the residents of 5822 
Rhode Island St., Spirit Lake, ID, or -
4. the defendant permitted the residents of 5822 Rhode Island St., Spirit Lake, ID, to 
connect to water, and 
5. the defendant was aware that the residents of 5822 Rhode Island St., Spirit Lake, ID, 
lived in a residence not provided with water by the city of Spirit Lake. 
If any of the above has not been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, you must fmd the 
defendant not guilty. If each of the above has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, then you 
must find the defendant guilty. , 
Comment 
See Spirit Lake City Ordinance 7-4-10 (2012). 
GIVEN 
REFUSED 
ACCEPTED 
MODIFIED 
COVERED 
JUDGE 
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01/07/2013 MON 15:49 FAX 4461702 KC PUBLIC DEFENDER ~~~ PETERSON JUDGE 
DEFENDANTS REQUESTED 
INSTRUCTION NO. 5 
141006/017 
In order for the defendant to be guilty of the charge of unlawful act under the Spirit Lake 
Domestic Water Ordinance, the state must prove each of the following: 
1. On or about September 28, 2012 
2. in the state ofldaho 
3. the defendant Michael Freitas permitted the delivery of water from the Spirit Lake city 
water system to the residents of 5822 Rhode.Island St., Spirit Lake, ID, or 
4. the defendant permitted the residents of 5822 Rhode Island St., Spirit Lake, ID, to 
connect to water in the Spirit Lake city water system, and 
5. the defendant was aware that the residents of 5822 Rhode Island St., Spirit Lake, ID, 
lived in a residence not provided with water by the city of Spirit Lake. 
If any of the above has not been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, you must find the 
defendant not guilty. If each of the above has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, then you 
must fmd the defendant guilty. 
-Comment 
See Spirit Lake City Ordinance 7-4-10 (2012). 
GIVEN 
REFUSED 
ACCEPTED 
MODIFIED 
COVERED 
JUDGE 
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01/07/2013 MON 15:50 FAX 4461702 KC PUBLIC DEFENDER~~~ PETERSON JUDGE 
DEFENDANTS REQuESTED 
INSTRUCTION NO. 6 
The Spirit Lake city water system is property of the city up to and including any shutoff valve 
and/ or meter which may be· installed at or near the property line of any lot. 
Comment 
See Spirit Lake City Ordinance 7-4-10 (2012). 
GIVEN 
REFUSED I 
ACCEPTED 
MODIFIED 
COVERED 
JUDGE 
·, 
l4J 007/017 
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01/07/2013 MON 15:51 FAX 4461702 KC PUBLIC DEFENDER~~~ PETERSON JUDGE 141 008/017 
ICJI 1512 
NECESSITY DEFENSE 
DEFENDANTS REQUESTED 
INSTRUCTION NO. 7 
The defendant cannot be guilty an unlawful act under the Spirit Lake City Water Ordinance if 
the defendant acted because of necessity. Conduct which violates the law is justified by 
necessity if: 
1. there is a specific threat of immediate harm to the residents of 5822 Rhode Island St, Spirit 
Lake, ID, 
2. the defendant did not bring about the circumstances which created the threat of immediate 
harm, 
3. the defendant could not have prevented the threatened harm by any less offensive 
alternative, and 
4. the harm caused by violating the law was less than the threatened harm. 
The state m).lst prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not act becarise of 
necessity. If you have a reasonable doubt orr that issue, you must find the defendant not guilty. 
Comnient 
State v. Hastings, 118 Idaho 854, 801 P.2d 563 (1990). 
GNEN 
REFUSED 7 
ACCEPTED 
MODIFIED 
COVERED 
rLJDGE 
. ' 
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01/07/2013 MON 15:52 FAX 4461702 KC PUBLIC D~FENDER ~~~PETERSON JUDGE ~ 009/017 
1Cll220 
-SINGLE COUNT 
DEFENDANTS REQUESTED 
INSTRUCTION NO. 8 
IN THE ISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
ATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
) 
) 
) 
) 
CASE NUMBER CR-12-0018513 
Plaintiff, 
CHAEL JAY FREITAS, 
Defendant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
VERDICT 
__________________________ ). 
We, the Jury, unanimously find the defendant Michael Jay Freitas: 
___ Not Guilty 
___ Guilty 
Dated this ___ day of ___ , 2013. 
Comment 
Use t ·s verdict form when only on. e offense has been c7arge and there are no included offenses 
or spec1 circumstances to be established. Otherwise use I JI 221 and ICll 222 or ICJI 223 and 
ICJI224. 
GIVEN 
REFUSED 
ACCEPTED 
MODIFIED 
COVERED 
JUDGE 
········--·-···· ·····-··.-·-···· .----··-···~·-··· -·-;····~-···-- .. ,... ·····--·--------··-·. ,_ .. ,,,, -··-
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01/07/2013 MON 15:53 FAX 4461702 KC PUBLIC DEFENDER ~~~ PETERSON JUDGE 
INSTRUCTION NO. __ 
Under our law and system of justice, the defendant is presumed to be innocent. The 
presumption of innocence means two things., 
First, the state has the burden of proving the defendant guilty. The state has that burden 
throughout the triaL The defendant is never.requiredto prove his innocence, nor does the 
defendant ever have to produce any evidence at all. 
l4l 010/017 
Second, the state must prove the alleged crime beyond a reasonable doubt. A reasonable 
doubt is not a mere possible or imaginary doubt It is a doubt based on reason and common 
sense. It may arise froin a careful and impartial consideration of all the evidence, or from lack of 
evidence. If after considering all the evidence you have a reasonable doubt about the defendant's 
guilt, you must fmd the defendant not guilty. 
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01/07/2013 MON 15:53 FAX 4461702 KC PUBLIC DEFENDER ~~~ PETERSON JUDGE 141011/017 
INSTRUCTION NO. __ 
A defendant in a criminal trial has a conStitutional right not to be compelled to testify. The 
decision whether to testify is left to the defendant, acting with the advice and assistance of the 
defendant's lawyer. You must not draw any inference of guilt from the fact that the defendant 
does not testify, nor should this fact be discussed by you or enter into your deliberations in any 
way. 
••••••••·-·•··---•· •· • • ••• ~--·--------•* ·:~•··-•: .•·-· • •• ,.,,,,,,,, •• ••''••••••••• '''' ········-········-----n•-"'' 
. ·····-· ·····--·----o·~-,-,--:-----.-------··----------·-.... --
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INSTRUCTION NO .. __ 
In every crime or public offense there must exist a union or joint operation of act and intent. 
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01/07/2013 MON 15:55 FAX 4461702 KC PUBLIC DEFENDER~~~ PETERSON JUDGE ~ 013/017 
INSTRUCTION NO. __ 
In order for the defendant to be guilty of the charge of unlawful act under the Spirit Lake 
Domestic Water Ordinance, the state must prove each of the following: 
1. On or about September 28, 2012 . 
2. in the state of Idaho 
3. the defendant Michael Freitas permitted the delivery of water the residents of 5 822 
Rhode Island St., Spirit Lake, ID, or 
4. the defendant permitted the residents of 5822 Rhode Island St., Spirit Lake, ID, to 
connect to water, and 
5. the defendant was aware that the residents of 5822 Rhode Island St., Spirit Lake, ID, 
lived in a residence not provided with water by the city of Spirit Lake. 
If any of the above has not been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, you must find the 
defendant not guilty. If each of the above has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, then you 
must fmd the defendant guilty. 
Michael Jay Freitas 41378 48 of 235
01/07/2013 MON 15:56 FAX 4461702 KC PUBLIC DEFENDER~~~ PETERSON JUDGE 141 014/017 
INSTRUCTION NO .. __ 
In order for the defendant to be guilty of the charge of unlawful act under the Spirit Lake 
Domestic Water Ordinance, the state must prove each of the following: 
1. On or about September 28, 2012 
2. in the state ofldaho 
3. the defendant Michael Freitas permitted the delivery of water from the Spirit Lake city 
water system to the residents of 5822 Rhode "Island St., Spirit Lake, ID, or 
4. the defendant permitted the residents of 5822 Rhode Island St., Spirit Lake, ID, to 
connect to water in the Spirit Lake city water system, and 
5. the defendant was aware that the residents of 5822 Rhode Island St., Spirit Lake, ID, 
lived in a residence not provided with water by the city of Spirit Lake. 
If any of the above has not been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, you must find the 
defendant not guilty. If each of the above ha~ been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, then you 
must find the defendant guilty. 
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INSTRUCTION NO .. _....,.... 
The Spirit Lake city water system is property of the city up to and including any shutoff valve 
and/or meter which may be installed at or near the property line of any lot. 
~ 015/017 
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INSTRUCTION NO. __ 
The defendant cannot be guilty an unlawful act under the Spirit Lake City Water Ordinance if 
the defendant acted because of necessity. Conduct which violates the law is justified by 
necessity if: 
1. there is a specific threat of immediate harm to the residents of 5822 Rhode Island St., Spirit 
Lake, ID, 
2. the defendant did not bring about the circumstances which created the threat of immediate 
harm, 
3. the defendant could not have prevented the threatened harm by any less offensive 
alternative, and 
4. the harm caused by violating the law was less than the threatened harm. 
The state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not act because of 
necessity. If you have a reasonable doubt on that issue, you must find the defendant not guilty . 
..... _, ··--·-·--~····:···--·······------ -----·- . ···--- ·- ... , .. --.-~--------------- ----.-- .,. ·-·. . ........... ····· ..... ·-··-····------.. ···------------···· .. ··-·· , .... ·- --······.: -----.. --.--- .. ·-- ---------··:····--:--------·····-·--:·-·-·-··--: -------------· ·-·· .. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF TIJE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
MICHAEL JAY FREITAS, 
Defendant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
__________________________ ) 
CASE NUMBER CR-12-0018513 
VERDICT 
We, the Jury, unanimously find the defendant Michael Jay Freitas: 
______ Not Guilty 
______ Guilty 
Dated this _____ day of~ ___ ,2013. 
Presiding Officer 
141017/017 
.................. , ... --.···· -·- ...... '· ---- ···•······. ····:···-.-------------.·-····-------,····:···-·-···-·--·--·--···········: ·-··--. -~ .......... -- ...... - ..... , ______________________ .. 
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2 ~01~078 (~) 17:02 
BARRY McHUGH 
Prosecuting Attorney 
501 Government Way!Box 9000 
Coeur d'Alene, ID '83816-9000 
Telephone: (208.) 446-1800 
Facsimile~· (208) 446-1833 
FAXI~:208 446 1840 P. 002 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE F1RST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MICHAEL lAY FREITAS, · 
Defendant. 
) Case No. CR-2012:.18513 
) 
) 
) . . . PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED 
) · JURY IN'STRUCTIONS 
) ' 
) 
) 
The Plaintiffherein respectfully submits the following requested Jury instructions in addition. 
to the Court's general instructions on the la~. 
DATED this :1= day of January, 2013. 
BARRY McHUGH 
Prosecuting Attorney in and for 
~:;un~ ~~ 
VIlf&t1«:M!Jt . 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
. I 1:?-ereby ~that o~ the --d--- day .of January, 2013, a true. and con-ect co~y. o~ the·. 
foregomg was caused to be delivered to. . · 
JAY LOGSDON . 
PUBLIC DEFENDERS OFFICE 
FAXED 446·1701 
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2013~01~078 (~) 17:02 FAXi~:208 446 18~n 
PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED 
. JNSTRUCTIONNO._ 
P. 004 
YOU ARE INSTRUCTED that the essential elements of .the crime of UNLAWFUL 
. . 
DEUVERY OF WATER which the Defendant is charged are: 
1. On o~ about the _28th day of September, 20 12; 
2. in Kootenai County, State of Idaho; 
3. The Defendant, MICHAEL JAY FREITAS, permitted connection or delivery of city. 
water; 
4. to third persons; 
5. for use \Yithln. a residence; 
6. not otherwise provided with water service. 
If any of the above has not been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, you must find the 
defendant not guilty. If each of the above has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, you must 
:find the defendant guilty. 
Citation: Spirit Lake Ordinance 7 4-10 
GIVEN:-----
REFUSED:----
MODIFIED:----
COVERED: __ ~----
JUDGE 
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PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED. 
INSTRUCTION NO._ 
YOU ARE INSTRUCTED that the defendant, MICHAEL JAY FREITAS, is charged 
with the crime of UNLAWFUL DELIVERY OF WATER alleged to have occ1med as follows: 
that the Defendant, MICHAEL JAY FREITAS, on or about the 28tll day of September, 2012, in 
the County of .Kootenai, State of Idaho, did permit connection or delivery' of city water, to third 
persons, for us~ within a resi~nce not otherwise provided with water service. To this charge the 
defendant has plead not guilty. 
To this charge the defendant has plead not guilty. 
Citation: Spirit Lake Ordinance 7-4~ 10 
GIVEN: 
·------REFUSED:. ____ _ 
MODIFIED: ___ _ 
COVERED:. _____ _ 
JUDGE 
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PLAIN11FF'S REQUESTED 
lli"STRUCTION,NO. __ 
P. 006 
YOU ARE INSTRUCTED that the essential elements of the crime of UNLAWFUL 
. ' 
DELIVERY OF WATER whi~h the Defendant is charged are: 
1. On or about the 28th September, 201 ~; 
2. in Kootenai County, State ofldaho; 
3. The Defendant, :MICHAEL JA"¥ FREITAS, permitted ~onnection or delivery of city 
water; 
4. to third persons; 
5. for use wi~ a residence; 
6. not otherwise provided with w:ater service. 
If any of the above has not been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, you must find the 
defendant 'not guilty. If each of the above has been proven beyond a reasonable. doubt, you must 
find the defendant guilty. 
CITATION: Spirit Lake Ordinance 74-10 
GIVEN:-----
REFUSED: 
MODIFIED-: ---
COVERED: _____ __ 
·. 
JUDGE 
. ' 
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PLAlNTlFF'S REQUESTED 
1NSTRUCTIONNO. 
P. 007 
Do not ~em yourself with the subject of penalty or p\lDishment. That _subject must not in any ~ay affect . 
your verdict. If you find the defendant guilty, it will be my duty to determine 1he appropriate penalty 9r p\lDishment. 
Citation: Icn 106 · 
GIVEN: 
REFUSED=-:----
MODIFIED:. ___ _ 
covmpm:. ___ _ 
JUDGE 
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PLA!NTIFF'S REQUESTED 
INSTRUCTION NO. __ _ 
You have be~n instructed as to .aU the rules of law that may be necessary for you to reach a verdict. 
. ' . 
Whether some of the instru.ctiOlls will apply will depend upOll yow: determination of~ facts. You will disregard 
any instruction which applies to a state of fucts ~hich you determine does ~ot exist You must: not conclude fro~ 
. . 
the fuct that an instruction ~ been given that the Court is expres~ing any opinion as to the facts. 
Citation: ICJI205 
Q.IVEN; REFUSED~:----
MODIFIBP:. ___ _ 
COVERED:. ____ _ 
niDGE 
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PLAJNTlFP'S REQUESTED 
:mSTRUCTION NO. 
It is alleged that th~ crime charged was committed "on or about"' a certain date. Ifyou find the crime was 
. . . 
. . 
committed, the proof need not show· that it was committed on that precise date. 
Citation: ICJI 208 
GIVEN: REFUSE.~D~:----
MODJFIED:. ___ _ 
<;:OVERED:. ___ _ 
JUDGE 
0 
' . 
' 
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JNSTRUCTION NO._ 
YOU ARE INSTRUCTED that the defendant, MICHAEL JAY FREITAS, is charged 
with the crime of UNLAWFUL DELIVERY OF WATER alleged to have oc.curred as follows: 
. . ' 
that the Defendant, MICHAEL JAY FREITAS, on or about the 28th day of September, 2012, in 
the County of Kootenai, State of Idaho, did P.ermi~ connection or delivery of city ~ater, to third 
persons, for use witb,in a residence not otherwise provided with water service. To :tJris charge the 
defendant has plead not guilty. 
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INSTRUCTION NO.~ 
YOU ARE INS'IRUCTED that the essential elements of the crime of UNLAWFUL 
. ' 
DELIVERY OF WATER which the Defendant is charged are: 
1. On or about the 28th day of September, 2012; 
2. in Kootenai County, State of Idaho; 
3. The Defendant~ MICHAEL JAY FREITAS, permitted connection ·or delivery of city 
water; 
4. to thlrd persons; 
5. for use within a residence; · 
6. not otherwise provided with water service. 
If any of the above has not been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, you must find the 
defendant not guilty. If each of the above has been proven beyond _a reasonable doubt, you must 
:find the defendant guilty. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. __ 
YOU ARE INSTRUCTED that the defendant, MICHAEL JAY FREITAS, is charged 
wi~ the crime ofUNLAWFl.JL DELIVERY O;F W.ATER alleged to have occurred as folio~: 
that the Defendant, MICHAEL JAY FREITAS, on or about the 28th day of September, 2012, in 
the County of Kootenai, State of Idaho~ did penmt connection or delivery of city water, to third 
persons, for use witlrin a residence not otherwise provided with water service. To this charge the 
defendant has plead not guilty. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. __ 
YOU ARE INSTRUCTED that the essential elements of the crltrie of UNLAWFUL 
DELIVERY OF WATER which the Defendant is charged are: 
1. On or about the 28th September, 2012; 
2. in Kootenai County, State of Idaho; 
3. The Defendant, MICHAEL JAY ~ITAS, permitted connection ~r delivery of city 
water; 
4. to third persons; 
5. for use within a residence; 
6. not otherwise provided with water service. 
If any of the above :Q.as not been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, you must find the 
defen4ant not guilty. If each of the above has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, yo~ rp.ust 
:find the defendant guilty. 
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JNSTRUCTIONNO. 
Do not concern yourself With the subject of penalty or punishment. That subj~ must not in any way affect 
your verdi~ 1f you find the defendant guilty, it will be my .duty to determine the .appropriate penal!¥ or punishment. 
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INSTRUCTION NO: __ _ 
You have been instructed as to all the rules of law that may. be ne<:essary for you to·reach .a verdict. 
Whether some of the instructions will apply will depend upon your determination of'the facts. You will disregard 
any instruction which applies to a state of facts which you det~e does not exist. You must not conclude :froDl 
the fact that an :instruction has been given that the Cot.nt is expressing any opinio1,1 as to the facts. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. _ ___;.. 
It is alleged that the crime charged was committed ''on or about'' a certain date. If you find the crime was 
committed, the proof need Dot show that it was committed on that precise date. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST nJDICIAL DISTRICT OF tHE--''' 
STATE OF IDAHO, 1N AND FOR TIIE COUNTY OF KeO'fENAI 
StATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
.vs. 
MICHAEL JAY FREITAS, 
Defendant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
). 
) 
) 
Case No. CR-2012-18513 
VERDICT 
______________________ ) 
We, the Jury, duly empanelled and sworn to try the above-entitled action, for our verdici(s )t, 
say that we unanimously find the Defendant: 
GUJLTYofUNLAWFUL DELIVERY OF WATER 
NOTGUILTYofUNLAWFULDELNERYOFWATER 
. .. 
DATED this __ day of January, 2013. 
PRESIDING JUROR 
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Description CR 2012-18513 Freitas, Michael Jay 2013010~~ 
Judge Peterson - -
Clerk Cristine Stokes - -......._ 
Date 111/8/2013 I Location Jl!!s.-COURTROOM6 
Time 
08:42:50 AM 
08:42:57 AM 
8:42:59 AM 
8:43:06 AM 
08:43:30 AM 
08:44:08 AM 
08:45:21 AM 
08:46:06 AM 
08:46:27 AM 
08:47:09 AM 
08:47:48 AM 
08:48:07 AM 
08:48:13 AM 
08:50:44 AM 
08:51:45 AM 
08:51:53 AM 
I Speaker II Note 
Judge 
calls case Peterson 
Ms pres McClinton 
Mr Freitas pres 
I Mr Logsdon I pres 
Judge we had a discussion about prefered jury procedure off the 
Peterson record. State has proposed its charging instruction 
there is a disagreement between myself and the state as to the 
Mr Logsdon name of the crime, I STARS lists as unlawful tampering of water 
system and State is alledging unlawful use, I would prefer 
unlawful act relating to water system of spirit lake 
Ms state doesn't have an objection as to wording, ordinace says 
McClinton unlawful act, I think it just needs to include the word water 
system somewhere. 
Judge if you can please prepare clean version indicating unlawful act of 
Peterson water system 
Ms Mr Logsdon is stipulation to states motion in liminie, and we 
McClinton wont be talking about constitutionality of ordinance 
IMr Logsdon I that is the stipulation. I will ask for exclusion of witness 
Judge 
Peterson 
Judge 
Peterson 
Ms 
McClinton 
Judge 
Peterson 
!End I 
I will grant that motion now 
recalls case, same parties remain, 
I received some information that Officer Wise slipped on some 
ice and sh~ was our first witness, advised to be here by 1 Oam 
today and is transporting one other witness 
thanks for keeping us posted 
Produced by FTR Gold™ 
www. fortherecord. com 
I 
file://R:\LogNotes- HTML\Magistrate\Criminal\Peterson\CR 2012-18513 Freitas, Michael... 1/8/2013 
~ 
Michael Jay Freitas 41378 68 of 235
Log of IK-COURTROOM7 or '~/2013 Page 1 of7 
·'. 
/ 
~ 
Description CR 2012-18513 Freitas, Michael Jay (13010's Jwy T:_)\,_. 
Judge Peterson /\. 
Clerk Cristine Stokes __ -..,_ 
Date 11/8/2013 II Location 111 K-COURTROOM7 
Time I Speaker Note I 
09:10:30 AM Judge 
calls case I · Peterson 
I 09:10:34 AM jMr Freitas pres I 
09:10:39 AM Ms 
I McClinton pres 
09:10:43 AM Mr 
Logsdon pres 
09:11:09 AM Judge introduction to Jury Peterson 
09:14:29 AM Ms introduction Mclinton 
09:15:15 AM Mr introduction Logsdon 
~~16:04A& Clerk I reads citation 
09:16:53 AM Judge 
continues w/ introduction Peterson 
09:22:30 AID§ efirst 14 
09:23:24 AM Judge thanks panel, begin voir dire process Peterson 
I 09:26:15 AM I Clerk administers voire dire oath 
I 09:26:21 AM I Judge I begins w/ voire dire I Peterson 
09:32:54 AM Ms lvoire dire I McLinton 
09:41:40 AM Mr 
loject I Logsdon 
09:41:44 AM Judge go ahead an finish question and I will rule Peterson 
09:41:56 AM Ms I continues I Mclinton 
I 09:42:11 AM I Judge I ridiculous I Peterson 
I 09:42:30 AM II Ms I 
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Mclinton voire dire 
09:51:24 AM Mr 
object Logsdon 
09:51:33 AM Judge permisable Peterson 
09:51:50 AM Ms 
voire dire, pass for cause Mclinton 
10:00:08 AM Mr 
voire dire , pass for cause Logsdon 
10:03:29 AM Judge 
we will no begin preemptory challenges Peterson 
10:07:05 AM Judge 
alright now we will reveal the final 6, excuses remaining jurors Peterson 
II 1o:10:"'"7 ;~i ,... lf;d'ministers try cause oath vlt::l" 
10:11:04 AM Judge 
reads instruction to jury, excuses panel Peterson 
10:12:18 AM Ms I don't have an update regarding Officer Wise, Ms Brown should 
Mclinton be here and then Ms Nash was getting picked up by our investigator 
10:12:58 AM Judge 
calls case, all parties remain, outside presence of the jury Peterson 
10:32:50 AM Ms Officer Wise is getting X-rays done at KMC Mclinton 
10:33:22 AM Judge I please retreive the Jury I Peterson 
10:36:48 AM Judge Jury is now present, explains procedure for hearing, reads 
Peterson preliminary instructions 
10:49:50 AM Ms I opening statement I McClinton 
10:53:20 AM Mr I opening statement I Logsdon 
10:53:46 AM Ms 
calls Barbara Brown McClinton 
10:53:57 AM swears to oath, states name and spells, city clerk Treasurer for 
City of Spirit Lake, been there for 33 years, I monitor all the 
records, finances, take care of Day to Day things that need to be 
Ms Brown done. I'm the city record keeper for all records in the City. I 
answer the phone, turn new services on, and off. Revs states 
proposed exhibt 1, computer program we use to monitor water 
and sewer records and payments 
j1 0:57:36 AM II Mr I 
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Logsdon objection hear say 
10:57:42 AM Judge it has not been introduced Peterson 
10:57:50 AM Ms Brown some were made by Deputy Cerk Anne Clapper and some were 
made by me, most of the entries are done daily 
10:58:45 AM Ms 
move to admit states 1 McClinton 
10:58:55 AM Mr 
object lack of foundation Logsdon 
10:59:05 AM Judge 
over rule, PL 1 is admitted Peterson 
10:59:26 AM this residence is for 5822 W Rhode Island St, George Adams, 
Ms Brown water was turned off on 7/26/12, water was turned back on 
10/18/12 it was off on Sept 28, 2012 
11:00:45 AM Mr 
objection lack of foundation Logsdon 
11:00:51 AM Judge 
over rule Peterson 
11:00:58 AM Ms Brown yes it was off on that date 
11:01:04 AM Ms thats all McClinton 
11:01:09 AM Mr 
nothing from us Logsdon 
11:02:49 AM Ms 
calls Brenda Nash McClinton 
11:02:56 AM swears to oath, staes name and spells for record, live at 5822 
Rhode Island St, I live w/ a few people. I'm familiar w/ Mr Freitas, I 
Ms Nash met him a month and a half ago as a neighbor. I recognize him today in court, he is wearing a sweater. Darrel Adams owns the 
resident, refered to as George too. i moved in about Sept 27, 
2012 Mr Adams was still residing there 
11:05:38 AM Mr 
objection hearsay Logsdon 
111 :05:43 AM I Judge 
. Peterson sustained 
11:05:47 AM when I moved in there was running water in the home, I did not 
Ms Nash know where the water was coming from, then I found out it was 
coming from a neighbor 
11:06:37 AM Mr 
no foundation Logsdon 
111:06:42 AM I Judge 
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~~eternon sustained 
11 :06:4 1>:> ~"IICl>:>h I obtained knowledge from Darrel 
111:07:15AM I Mr object leading Logsdon 
!11 :07:20AM II Ms Nash lum 
11:07:27 AM Mr 
objection Logsdon 
11:07:38 AM Judge 
over ruled Peterson 
11:07:43 AM I saw a hose connected to my home, it crossed the alley and 
connected to my house, but not sure where it was coming from, 
Ms Nash Darrel told me where the house was connected to, thats all I 
know. I knew the water was shut off before I moved in, about a 
week prior. I eventually asked where it was coming from 
11:09:13 AM Mr 
object lack of foundation Logsdon 
11:09:20 AM Judge 
sustaied Peterson 
11:09:24 AM I received contact from City of Spirit Lake, Jeremy McMillen came 
Ms Nash to my house and had me in tears about, no contact w/ Officer 
Wise 
11:10:20 AM Mr 
object hearsay Logsdon 
11:10:24 AM Judge 
over ruled Peterson 
Ms Nash= ! Jeremy McMillin informed me he was going to 
11:10:41 AM Mr 
objection Logsdon 
11:10:46 AM okay ! was served w/ papers, ! was aware that the water had been 
Ms Nash shut off. Me, my exhusband and my mother paid to have it turned 
back on 
11:11:19 AM Mr 
Logsdon cross 
11 :i 1:22AM Ms Nash my son and his three children and his fiance, Jeremy, Stephanie, Brookly, Skylar and Auroa moved in w/ me. 
11:12:14 AM Mr 
nothing further Logsdon 
11:12:40 AM Ms Officer Wise is my remaining witness McClinton 
11:13:09 AM 
Judge if you can contact your office to see when the witness will be 
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Peterson available, we can be at ease for a moment. 
11:14:44 AM Ms 
she will be here, she has a broken leg, but she will be here McClinton 
11:14:58 AM Judge we will discharge you for the lunch hour than, I have received both 
Peterson parties proposed instructions 
11:16:44 AM Lunch 
Break 
11:16:52A 
01:05:34 PM Judge I calls case, same parties remain I Peterson 
01:05:55 PM Ms I offers updated Jury Instructions I McClinton 
01:08:33 PM Judge !Jury is now present I Peterson 
01:08:41 PM Ms 
calls Officer Wise McClinton 
01:08:46 PM swears to oath, states name, employed by Spirit Lake PD for the 
last 3 years, worked 4 years for Bonner County Sheriff's Office 
dispatch and 15 yrs as Detention Officer, I went to Mr Freitas door 
and gave him a warning, there was a hose running w/ water to his 
neighbors and it was overflowing at the junction. I contacted him 
at 5870 Rhode Island. The house was connected to an outside 
spicket, his residence is a mobile home, I remember at least two, 
maybe three hoses. The hose ran about 75ft. In the alley there 
were two hoses that were connected and the water was squirting 
Officer out of the connections. I handed Mr Freitas a copy of the Spirit 
Wise Lake Ordinace, I also gave Brenda Nash a copy of the ordinance 
as well. I gave Mr Freitas a copy of the ordinance and he said 
thank you and that was pretty much it. I issued him a citation the 
next time I came into contact it was Sept 28th, I made contact to 
check to see if the hose was still running and if their was a 
connection. I filled out a citation and went to his residence and 
handed him a citation and had him sign it. Mr Freitas said he 
didn't realize there was anything wrong w/ the water that was 
running through his meter and he was paying for it. The residence 
the water was being provided to is George Adams residence. 
01:18:37PM Mr 
objection hear say Logsdon 
I 01:18:44 PM I Judge 
. Peterson thats fine 
I 01:18:48 PM I ~~gsdon no questions 
I 01:19:44 PM I Ms state rests 
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I II McClinton I 
I 01:19:56 PM I Mr I need to make a motion Logsdon 
01:20:02 PM Judge 
we will take a break Peterson 
01:20:42 PM Judge 
outside presence of jury Peterson 
01:20:48 PM move for acquital under 29, seems like we agree that under courts 
Mr ruling my client would have had to deliver water to another city? 
Logsdon state has failed to meet that burden, no evidence that it is the 
water that is delivered to my clients residence 
01:22:25 PM object to motion, believe state has proven burden here, evidence 
Ms presented w/ Officer Wise, Mr Freitas indicated he was paying for 
McClinton the city water and that he could do w/ it what he pleased and that he was delivering it to the neighbors residence. The Officer said 
she saw the hoses running from Mr Freitas home to Mr Adams 
01:24:02 PM Judge 
reviews rule 29, court denies rule 29 motion at this time Peterson 
01:27:35 PM Mr my client is not going to be testifying and we have no evidence to 
Logsdon offer 
01:28:13 PM Judge lets talk Jury Instructions then Peterson 
01:28:24 PM 
I 01 :28:24 PM I 
01:35:54 PM back on the record, all parties remain, jury is not present, we have 
Judge had an informal instructions conference. Charging instruction has 
Peterson already been given. reviews rest of packet. I will utilize verdict 
form. We will finalize packet come back in, and instruct panel 
01:41:00 PM Ms 
releases Officer Wise McClinton 
lt~8PM End 
01:41:12 PM Judge We are back on the record. Bring in jury panel. Jury panel returns. 
-lA- L-~ s; p. Reviews and gives out jury packets to jurors. Reads jury 
'Bo rr 1 Y\~ T Peterson (J j~,.· c instructions. 
02:07:03 PM Closing argument. Instruction 11 is the elements instruction. 
There are six elements. There was hose connected from his 
Ms house to his neighbors house. He was paying for that water and 
McClinton he felt he could do what he pleasesd. He admitted to that. The 
water was shut off in the residence Ms. Nash was living in. This 
case is straightforward. He was cited for it. She came back on the 
next day and it was still connected. This was a unlawful act. 
02:10:58 PM Closing argument. 9/28/12 people moved into home in Spirit Lake, 
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02:14:34 PM 
02:15:2 
02:1G2-.. ,....~v~ 
02:32:10 PM 
02:34:"n f':'v• 
02:36:29 PM 
02:36:42 PM 
02:37:25 PM 
02:37:48 PM 
02:38:08 PM 
02:38:35 PM 
02:39:57 PM 
~~4:12PM 
02:44:45 PM 
lr=o247:27 PM 
02:47:55 PM 
water was shut off and she said she had water. Reviews elements 
Mr. instruction. No one ever testified that it was Spirit Lake water. It 
Logsdon was not proven to be City water. This case is about sharing water. State has to meet burden. They have not even come close to 
proving a crime was committed. 
Ms. Rebuttal. Asking you to rely on what you heard and what you 
McClinton remembered in testimony today. 
Judge Oathe given to bailiff 
ge Excuses jury panel to dileberation. 
Judge We are back on the record. Bring jury panel in for reading of 
verdict. 
,.,. 0"'""'"'~ ' erdict. Guilty. vlt::ll\ 
1Judge Excuses jury panel. 
lEnd 
Mr. Asking for stay pending appeal. Rule 545. Logsdon 
Judge Reviews rule 545. 
Ms. proceed. 10/10 jail. 300 fine and 1 year unsup prob. McClinton 
Very strange law that doesnt allow family to share water. He 
Mr. shared water. State is requesting a fine, seems at best to do 
Logsdon probation, dont understand a fine. He paid for water and gave it to 
those in need. 
Two hill factor of sentencing. This is a unique situation. This is 
now a misd. conviction on his record forever. There is not a 
Judge possibility of recurrance. Its doubtful. I am NOT going to do 
probation. 500 fine and NCO is terminated. Fine only and nothing 
further. Nothing further. Stay to be entered. 
End 
Regarding rule 545. I dont seen need to post bond pending 
Judge appeal. Reads rule 545 .. Set for status conference regarding the 
apppeal and the stay? 
Judg"" I \AI;u "''"·ait the stay 
,_ II' -·· . 
End 
Produced by FTR Gold™ 
www.fortherecord.com 
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FilLED \~~·\3 AT §·.aa ~. s;: IDAHO, COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
B~~._.DEPUTY 
FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF IDAHO 0 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
324 W. GARDEN AVENUE 
COEUR D'ALENE, IDAHO 83814 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) 
Plaintiff, ) 
vs. ) Case No: CR-2012-0018513 
) 
MICHAEL JAY FREITAS ) 
) JURY INSTRUCTIONS GIVEN 
Defendant. ) 
) 
DOB: ) 
DL or SSN: ) 
Attached hereto are the jury instructions given on the trial of the above 
matter. 
Copies have been given to counsel of record. 
<"'\ rnf'\C t. f'~\f'- / 
DATED this ----==----- day of ----'0=--U;::,.._\ _\\....J-.----'\J"'-~-~ -;lr---' 20 1 3. 
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PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
YOU ARE INSTRUCTED that the defendant, MICHAEL JAY FREITAS, is charged 
with the crime of UNLAWFUL ACT REGARDING WATER SYSTEM alleged to have 
occurred as follows: that the Defendant, MICHAEL JAY FREITAS, on or about the 28th day of 
September, 2012, in the County of Kootenai, State ofldaho, did permit connection or delivery of 
city water, to third persons, for use within a residence not otherwise provided with water service. 
To this charge the defendant has plead not guilty. 
To,this charge the defendant has plead not guilty. 
Citation: Spirit Lake Ordinance 7-4-10 
GIVEN: _____ _ 
REFUSED: 
-----
MODIFIED: ____ _ 
COVERED: ____ _ 
JUDGE 
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PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
YOU ARE INSTRUCTED that the essential elements of the crime of UNLAWFUL 
ACT REGARDING WATER SYSTEM which the Defendant is charged are: 
1. On or about the 28th September, 2012; 
2. in Kootenai County, State ofldaho; 
3. The Defendant, MICHAEL JAY FREITAS, permitted connection or delivery of city 
water; 
4. to third persons; 
5. for use within a residence; 
6. not otherwise provided with water service. 
If any of the above has not been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, you must find the 
defendant not guilty. If each of the above has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, you must 
find the defendant guilty. 
CITATION: Spirit Lake Ordinance 7-4-10 
GIVEN: ________ __ 
REFUSED: ______ __ 
MODIFIED: ____ _ 
COVERED: ______ __ 
JUDGE 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 
YOU ARE INSTRUCTED that the defendant, MICHAEL JAY FREITAS, is charged 
with the crime of UNLAWFUL ACT REGARDING WATER SYSTEM alleged to have 
occurred as follows: that the Defendant, MICHAEL JAY FREITAS, on or about the 28th day of 
September, 2012, in the County of Kootenai, State ofldaho, did permit connection or delivery of 
city water, to third persons, for use within a residence not otherwise provided with water service. 
To this charge the defendant has plead not guilty. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 
YOU ARE INSTRUCTED that the essential elements of the crime of UNLAWFUL 
ACT REGARDING WATER SYSTEM which the Defendant is charged are: 
1. On or about the 28th September, 2012; 
2. in Kootenai County, State ofldaho; 
3. The Defendant, MICHAEL JAY FREITAS, permitted connection or delivery of city. 
water; 
4. to third persons; 
5. for use within a residence; 
·6. not otherwise provided with water service. 
If any of the above has not been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, you must find the 
defendant not guilty. If each of the above has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, you must 
find the defendant guilty. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 
Do not concern yourself with the subject of penalty or punishment. That subject must not in any way affect 
your verdict. If you find the defendant guilty, it will be my duty to determine the appropriate penalty or punishment. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. __ _ 
You have been instructed as to all the rules of law that may be necessary for you to reach a verdict. 
Whether some of the instructions will apply will depend upon your determination of the facts. You will disregard 
any instruction which applies to a state of facts which you determine does not exist. You must not conclude from 
the fact that an instruction has been given that the Court is expressing any opinion as to the facts. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 
It is alleged that the crime charged was committed "on or about" a certain date. If you fmd the crime was 
committed, the proof need not show that it was committed on that precise date. 
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PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
YOU ARE INSTRUCTED that the defendant, MICHAEL JAY FREITAS, is charged 
with the crime of UNLAWFUL ACT REGARDING WATER SYSTEM alleged to have 
occurred as follows: that the Defendant, MICHAEL JAY FREITAS, on or about the 28th day of 
September, 2012, in the County of Kootenai, State ofldaho, did permit connection or delivery of 
city water, to third persons, for use within a residence not otherwise provided with water service. 
To this charge the defendant has plead not guilty. 
Citation: Spirit Lake Ordinance 7-4-10 
GIVEN: j 
REFUSED: ____ _ 
MODIFIED: ____ _ 
COVERED: ____ _ 
JUDGE 
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PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
YOU ARE INSTRUCTED that the essential elements of the crime of UNLAWFUL 
ACT REGARDING WATER SYSTEM which the Defendant is charged are: 
1. On or about the 28th day of September, 2012; 
2. in Kootenai County, State ofldaho; 
3. The Defendant, MICHAEL JAY FREITAS, permitted connection or delivery of city 
water; 
4. to third persons; 
5. for use within a residence; 
6. not otherwise provided with water service. 
If any of the above has not been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, you must find the 
defendant not guilty. If each of the above has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, you must 
find the defendant guilty. 
Citation: Spirit Lake Ordinance 7-4-1 0 
GIVEN: I 
------
REFUSED: ______ __ 
MODIFIED: ____ _ 
COVERED: ______ __ 
JUDGE 
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PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
Do not concern yourself with the subject of penalty or punishment. That subject must not in any way affect 
your verdict. If you find the defendant guilty, it will be my duty to determine the appropriate penalty or punishment. 
Citation: ICTI 106j 
GIVEN: __ J ___ _ 
REFUSED: ____ _ 
MODIFIED: ____ _ 
COVERED: ____ _ 
JUDGE 
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PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED 
INSTRUCTION NO. __ _ 
You have been instructed as to all the rules of law that may be necessary for you to reach a verdict. 
Whether some of the instructions will apply will depend upon your determination of the facts. You will disregard 
any instruction which applies to a state of facts which you determine does not exist. You must not conclude from 
the fact that an instruction has been given that the Court is expressing any opinion as to the facts. 
Citation: ICJI 205 
GIVEN: ___ j__ _ 
REFUSED: ____ _ 
MODIFIED: ____ _ 
COVERED: ____ _ 
JUDGE 
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PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
It is alleged that the crime charged was committed "on or about" a certain date. If you fmd the crime was 
committed, the proof need not show that it was committed on that precise date. 
Citation: ICn 208 
GIVEN: ___ }__ _ 
REFUSED: ____ _ 
MODIFIED:. ____ _ 
COVERED: ____ _ 
JUDGE 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
) 
) VERDICT 
) 
vs. ) 
) 
JAY FREITAS, ) 
Defendant. ) 
---f---------------------) 1 
We, the Jury, duly empanelled and sworn to try the above-entitled action, for our v rdict( s )/,V 
that we unanimously find the Defendant: 
\ 
GUlL TY ofUNLA WFUL ACT REGARDING WATERS STEM 
NOT GUILTY of UNLAWFUL ACT REGARDING ATER 
SYSTEM 
DATED this __ day of January, 2013. 
PRESIDING JUROR 
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State v. Tadlock, 1361daho 413 (200tJ 
34 P.3d 1096 
136 Idaho 413 
Court of Appeals of Idaho. 
STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, 
v. 
Kathleen TADLOCK, Defendant-Appellant. 
No. 26063. Aug. 27,2001. 
I Review Denied Nov. 27, 2001. 
Defendant was convicted in the Fifth Judicial District Court, 
Twin Falls County, Nathan W. Higer, J., of felony possession 
of marijuana with intent to deliver. She appealed. The Court 
of Appeals, Lansing, J., held that: (1) necessity was not a 
viable defense; (2) at sentencing, defendant's right to free 
speech was not violated when her political views were 
considered; and (3) unified sentence of five years with one 
year determinate was not excessive. 
Affirmed. 
West Headnotes (11) 
[1] 
[2] 
[3] 
Criminal Law 
®- Instructions 
The question whether a jury was properly 
instructed is one of law over which the Court of 
Appeals exercises free review. 
Criminal Law 
~ Construction and Effect of Charge as a 
Whole 
On appeal, jury instructions are viewed as a 
whole, not individually, to determine whether the 
jury was properly and adequately instructed on 
the applicable law. 
1 Cases that cite this headnote 
Criminal Law 
®- Necessity of Instructions 
A defendant in a criminal action is entitled to 
have his legal theory of defense submitted to the 
jury through an instruction if there is a reasonable 
[4] 
[5] 
[6] 
[7] 
[8] 
view of the evidence that would support the 
theory. 
Criminal Law 
®- Compulsion or Necessity; Justification in 
General 
Elements of necessity defense are: (1) a specific 
threat of immediate harm; (2) the circumstances 
which necessitate the illegal act must not have 
been brought about by the defendant; (3) the same 
objective could not have been accomplished by 
a less offensive alternative available to the actor; 
and (4) the harm caused was not disproportionate 
to the harm avoided. 
Controlled Substances 
®- Medical Necessity 
Necessity is not a viable defense to felony 
possession of marijuana with intent to deliver. 
l.C. § 37-2732(a)(l)(B). 
1 Cases that cite this headnote 
Sentencing and Punishment 
®- Dangerousness 
At sentencing for felony possession of marijuana 
with intent to deliver, defendant's right to 
free speech was not violated when sentencing 
court considered defendant's public advocacy of 
legalization of marijuana as a factor that weighed 
against placing her on probation; defendant's 
political views were relevant to the likelihood that 
she would repeat crime. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 
1; Const. Art. 1, § 9; l.C. § 37-2732(a)(l)(B). 
Criminal Law 
®- Sentencing 
When a sentence is imposed within the maximum 
permitted for the offense, the Court of Appeals 
reviews the sentence for an abuse of discretion. 
Criminal Law 
F Burden of Showing Error 
Vv'estlavi'Nexr@ 2013 Thomson Routers. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 
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[9] 
Criminal Law 
~ Sentencing 
If the sentence is not illegal, the defendant has the 
burden to show that it is unreasonable, and thus a 
clear abuse of discretion. 
Sentencing and Punishment 
~ Deterrence 
Sentencing and Punishment 
~ Protection of Society 
Sentencing and Punishment 
~ Retribution 
Sentencing and Punishment 
~ Actual or Potential Rehabilitation 
A sentence of confinement is reasonable if it 
appears that the confinement is necessary to 
accomplish the primary objective of protecting 
society and to achieve any or all of the related 
goals of deterrence, rehabilitation, or retribution 
applicable to a given case. 
[10] Controlled Substances 
~ Extent of Punishment 
Unified sentence of five years with one 
year determinate was not excessive for felony 
possession of marijuana with intent to deliver. 
I.C. § 37-2732(a)(l)(B). 
[11] Criminal Law 
~ Sentencing 
If reasonable minds might differ as to whether a 
sentence is excessive, the Court of Appeals is not 
free to substitute its view for that of the trial court. 
Attorneys and Law Firms 
**1096 *413 Ronaldo A. Coulter, State Appellate 
Public Defender; Sara B. Thomas, Deputy Appellate Public 
Defender, Boise, for appellant. 
**1097 *414 Hon. Alan G. Lance, Attorney General; 
Kenneth K. Jorgensen, Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for 
respondent. 
Opinion 
LANSING, Judge. 
Kathleen Tadlock appeals from the judgment of conviction 
entered after a jury found her guilty of felony possession of 
marijuana with the intent to deliver, Idaho Code§ 37-2732(a) 
(l)(B). On appeal, Tadlock asserts that the district court 
erred by not instructing the jury regarding the common law 
necessity defense. Tadlock also asserts that the district court 
violated her First Amendment right to free speech when, 
at the sentencing hearing, it considered her prior political 
advocacy of legalizing marijuana. Finally, Tadlock asserts 
that her sentence is excessive. 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Executing a warrant, police officers searched Tadlock's house 
and discovered 260 grams of marijuana, $5,000 in cash, a 
pair of finger scales and a notebook containing notations of 
weights and dollar amounts. Tadlock was charged with felony 
possession of marijuana with the intent to deliver, I.C. § 
37-2732(a)(l)(B). At trial, Tadlock presented testimony that 
she used marijuana to alleviate pain she suffers from a number 
of ailments including osteoporosis, hyperparathyroidism, 
depression, hip and knee pain, endometrial-hyperplasia, 
uterine fibroid, and back pain. She testified that although 
she was prescribed medications, including pain relievers, 
for these ailments, she found the medications difficult to 
take because they are in pill form and she has difficulty 
swallowing pills. According to Tadlock's testimony, she used 
just enough marijuana to relieve her pain and allow her to 
function. Tadlock requested that the jury be instructed on 
the medical necessity defense or, alternatively, the general 
common law necessity defense. The district court declined to 
give either instruction because, in the court's view, there was 
insufficient evidence to meet the elements of those defenses. 
In particular, the district court noted an absence of evidence 
that Tadlock lacked adequate legal medical alternatives to the 
use of marijuana. 
The jury was instructed on the elements of the charged 
offense, possession of marijuana with intent to deliver, and 
also on the lesser included offense of simple possession. The 
WesttawNexr@ 2013 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 2 
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jury returned a verdict finding Tadlock guilty of possession 
of marijuana with the intent to deliver. The district court 
thereafter imposed a unified sentence of five years with one 
year determinate. 
ANALYSIS 
Supreme Court held that although medical necessity is not 
a recognized defense in Idaho, the common law necessity 
defense may be invoked. The Court held in Hastings that a 
defendant who claimed to use marijuana to combat pain and 
muscle spasms from rheumatoid arthritis was entitled to have 
the jury instructed on the necessity defense. 
We conclude that it is unnecessary to determine whether the 
A. Necessity Defense Jury Instruction evidence was sufficient in Tadlock's case for presentation 
[1] [2] [3] As her first issue on appeal, Tadlock of the necessity defense, for even if the district court erred 
challenges the district court's denial of her request for a 
necessity defense instruction. The question whether a jury 
was properly instructed is one of law over which this Court 
exercises free review. State v. Buckley, 131 Idaho 179, 182, 
953 P.2d 619, 622 (Ct.App.l997), affd, 131 Idaho 164, 953 
P.2d 604 (1998). On appeal, jury instructions are viewed 
as a whole, not individually, to determine whether the jury 
was properly and adequately instructed on the applicable law. 
State v. Rozajewski, 130 Idaho 644, 646, 945 P.2d 1390, 1392 
(Ct.App.l997). A defendant in a criminal action is entitled to 
have his legal theory of defense submitted to the jury through 
an instruction if there is a reasonable view of the evidence 
that would support the theory. State v. Howley, 128 Idaho 
874, 878-79, 920 P.2d 391, 395-96 (1996); State v. Johns, 112 
Idaho 873, 880-81, 736 P.2d 1327, 1334-35 (1987); State v. 
Arrasmith, 132Idaho 33, 43,966 P.2d 33, 43 (Ct.App.1998). 
in failing to instruct the jury on this defense, the error was 
harmless. This is so because the necessity defense could have 
applied only to simple possession of marijuana, which was 
the lesser included offense on which the jury was instructed. 
The defense cannot logically apply to the charged offense 
of which Tadlock was found guilty, possession of marijuana 
with intent to deliver. Admittedly, Tadlock's evidence of 
medical need may have been relevant to controvert the mens 
rea element of intent to deliver by showing that Tadlock 
possessed the drug only for her own personal use. However, 
medical necessity could not be a viable justification for 
possession with intent to deliver because Tadlock's own 
medical need for marijuana could not justify her possession 
of the drug with the intent to deliver it to others. Only 
if the jury had first acquitted Tadlock of the intent to 
deliver charge and considered the lesser included offense 
of simple possession would the necessity instruction have 
[4] The necessity defense is based on the premise that "a been applicable. Because the jury found Tadlock guilty of 
person who is compelled to commit an illegal act in order to 
prevent a greater harm should not be punished for that act." 
State v. Hastings, 118 Idaho 854, 855, 801 P.2d 563, 564 
(1990). The elements of the defense are: (1) a specific threat of 
immediate harm; (2) the circumstances which necessitate the 
illegal act must not have been brought about by the defendant; 
(3) the same objective could not have been accomplished 
by a less offensive alternative available to the actor; and 
( 4) the harm caused was not disproportionate to the harm 
avoided. State v. Kapsa, 126 Idaho 512, 520, 887 P.2d 57, 
65 ( Ct.App .1994); Idaho Criminal Jury Instruction 1512. 
When the defense of necessity has been demonstrated, "it 
justifies **1098 *415 the defendant's conduct in violating 
the literal language of the criminal law and so the defendant is 
not guilty of the crime in question." 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE 
& AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL 
LAW § 5.4 at 630. 
[5] Tadlock argues that she presented sufficient evidence 
from which a jury could have found all the elements of the 
necessity defense. She relies upon Hastings, where the Idaho 
possession with the intent to deliver, any error in the denial of 
her requested jury instruction on common law necessity was 
harmless. 
B. Sentence 
1. First Amendment 
[6] Tadlock next asserts that the district court violated her 
right of free speech under the First Amendment to the United 
States Constitution and Article I, § 9 of the Idaho Constitution 
when it considered her public advocacy of legalization of 
marijuana as a factor that weighed against placing her on 
probation. In a supplement to the presentence investigation 
report (PSI), the State submitted printouts of Tadlock's web 
page, which expressed her belief that marijuana should be 
legalized for medicinal purposes. Tadlock's attorney objected 
to the inclusion of this information and moved to strike it from 
the PSI, but the district court denied the motion, concluding 
that Tadlock's attitude about the use and sale of marijuana 
was relevant to the court's determination whether she should 
be placed on probation. In explaining his decision not to 
W<:?stlavvNexr@ 2013 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 3 
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grant probation, the district judge stated, "I don't believe 
that probation is going to be successful, for the same facts 
that I've previously mentioned; that you're likely to continue 
to use marijuana, based upon your belief that it's helpful 
to you medically, and that it should be legalized." Tadlock 
contends that the court's decision not to grant probation, based 
in part upon her advocacy of the legalization of marijuana, 
constituted an unconstitutional imposition of punishment for 
her exercise of free speech. 
We are not persuaded that a constitutional violation occurred 
here. Decisions of the United States Supreme Court provide 
guidance on this issue. In Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939, 
103 S.Ct. 3418, 77 L.Ed.2d 1134 (1983), a plurality of the 
Court held that the defendant's racial motive for a murder (as 
indicated by his membership in the Black Liberation Army, 
which advocated indiscriminate killing of white people and 
the initiation of a race war) was properly considered by the 
sentencing court because it was relevant to several statutory 
aggravating factors in sentencing./d. at 949-50, 103 S.Ct. at 
3424-25, 77 L.Ed.2d at 1143-44. By contrast, in Dawson v. 
Delaware, 503 U.S. 159, 112 S.Ct. 1093, 117 L.Ed.2d 309 
(1992), the Supreme Court said that the First Amendment 
prevents **1099 *416 a state "from employing evidence 
of a defendant's abstract beliefs at a sentencing hearing when 
those beliefs have no bearing on the issue being tried." /d. 
at 168, 112 S.Ct. at 1099, 117 L.Ed.2d at 319. The Court 
held that the admission at sentencing of a stipulation, offered 
in lieu of presentation of evidence, that the defendant was a 
member of the Aryan Brotherhood, was improper, but only 
because "the narrowness of the stipulation left the Aryan 
Brotherhood evidence totally without relevance to Dawson's 
sentencing proceeding." /d. at 165, 112 S.Ct. at 1097, 117 
L.Ed.2d at 317. The Court noted that if admissible evidence 
had been presented that the Aryan Brotherhood is a white 
racist prison gang that is associated with drugs and violent 
escape attempts and that advocates murder of fellow inmates, 
"we would have a much different case." /d. The Court 
continued: 
Because the prosecution did not 
prove that the Aryan Brotherhood had 
committed any unlawful or violent 
acts, or had even endorsed such 
acts, the Aryan Brotherhood evidence 
was ... not relevant to help prove any 
aggravating circumstance. In many 
cases, for example, associational 
evidence might serve a legitimate 
purpose in showing that a defendant 
represents a future danger to 
society. A defendant's membership 
in an organization that endorses the 
killing of any identifiable group, 
for example, might be relevant to 
a jury's inquiry into whether the 
defendant will be dangerous in the 
future. Other evidence concerning 
a defendant's associations might be 
relevant in proving other aggravating 
circumstances. 
/d. at 166, 112 S.Ct. at 1098, 117 L.Ed.2d at 318. (Emphasis 
added.) 
Unlike the situation in Dawson, the information regarding 
Tadlock's expressions of political views on the legalization 
and use of marijuana was relevant to the sentencing decision, 
for it bore upon the likelihood that she would repeat her crime. 
This relevance was appropriately explained by the district 
court: 
[Idaho Criminal] Rule 32 provides for the court to consider 
a broad range of information. In that also includes the 
psychological and mental makeup of the defendant. I 
interpret the rule to provide to the court information 
regarding the defendant's ability or likelihood that you 
might do a successful probation. 
I am cognizant, as pointed out, that her expressions of 
the-her support or activism for legalizing marijuana is an 
expression of her free speech right; [but] it is also an 
expression of her belief about the use and the likelihood 
of her-or not of her using marijuana in the future after 
sentencing by this court. 
The district court was careful to explain that Tadlock was 
not being punished for her expressions or belief about the 
legalization of marijuana: 
Now, as far as the sentence itself is concerned, Ms. 
Tadlock, the court has heard a lot and you put forth a lot of 
testimony at the trial and during the sentencing proceedings 
about the legalization and the use of marijuana. I know you 
have strong beliefs in that respect. And in my view, this trial 
was not about your beliefs on the legalization of marijuana. 
I do not believe that it would be appropriate to try you for 
your beliefs. That is your right to express those views. It 
is also your right to follow the-a legal process to obtain 
~VestlawNeA't' ((;) 2013 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 4 
Michael Jay Freitas 41378 94 of 235
State v. Tadlock, 1361daho 413 (2001J 
34 P.3d 1096 
legalization of that drug in this state. It's been done in other 
states, as you know, like in California and Arizona, they 
passed those. But until such time as that happens and you 
follow those legal procedures, or the legislature determines 
in this state that it's going to be allowed, you have the 
obligation, like everybody else in this room and this county, 
to follow the laws as established by the legislature, whether 
we agree with them or not. 
And I say this to assure you that although I disagree 
with your ideas about the legalization of marijuana, I do 
not disagree with your right to express those opinions. 
And the sentence that I will be imposing is not for your 
views. You're being sentenced for the actions that you were 
convicted of by a jury in this county; that is possession with 
the intent to deliver. 
**1100 *417 The record demonstrates that the district 
court also took multiple other factors into consideration when 
crafting Tadlock's sentence. Furthermore, the sentencing 
transcript and the PSI disclose that Tadlock herself introduced 
much information, including her own statement in allocution, 
regarding her political view on the legalization of marijuana. 
After having done so, it is inconsistent for Tadlock to now 
complain on appeal that the district court erred by considering 
evidence, the subject matter of which she herself presented. 
We conclude that the district court did not violate Tadlock's 
First Amendment rights by considering the information on 
Tadlock's website as the court evaluated the likelihood that 
Tadlock would obey the law if placed on probation. 
is reasonable if it appears that the confinement is necessary 
"to accomplish the primary objective of protecting society 
and to achieve any or all of the related goals of deterrence, 
rehabilitation or retribution applicable to a given case." 
Toohill, supra. 
[10] [11] As indicated above, the district court took 
multiple factors into consideration when sentencing Tadlock. 
Among these factors were the likelihood she would commit 
more crimes, whether correctional treatment is necessary, 
deterrence effect, the protection of society, and Tadlock's 
lack of remorse and denial that she committed a crime. The 
district court also took into consideration Tadlock's minimal 
prior criminal record. The issue presented to this Court is not 
whether the sentence is one that we would have imposed, 
but whether the sentence is plainly excessive under any 
reasonable view of the facts. State v. Burdett, 134 Idaho 271, 
279, 1 P.3d 299, 307 (Ct.App.2000). If reasonable minds 
might differ as to whether the sentence is excessive, this 
Court is not free to substitute its view for that of the trial 
court. Having examined the PSI and the transcript from the 
sentencing hearing, we conclude that the district court acted 
within its discretion when it imposed upon Tadlock a unified 
sentence of five years with one year determinate. 
CONCLUSION 
Any error by the district court in failing to instruct the jury as 
to the common law necessity defense was harmless in light of 
the jury verdict finding Tadlock guilty of possession with the 
intent to deliver. The district court did not violate Tadlock's 
constitutional right of free speech when it considered at 
sentencing Tadlock's expressions of belief that marijuana 2. Excessive sentence . 
[7] [8] [9] F. 11 'd T dl k' t t. th t use should be legal. Finally, we conclude that the distnct ma y, we cons1 er a oc s con en ton a 
her sentence is excessive. Our standards for appellate review 
of a sentence are well settled. When a sentence is imposed 
within the maximum permitted for the offense, we review 
the sentence for an abuse of discretion. State v. Too hill, 1 03 
Idaho 565, 650 P.2d 707 (Ct.App.l982). If the sentence is 
not illegal, the appellant has the burden to show that it is 
unreasonable, and thus a clear abuse of discretion. State v. 
Brown, 121 Idaho 385, 393, 825 P.2d 482, 490 (1992). A 
sentence may represent such an abuse if it is shown to be 
unreasonable upon the facts of the case. State v. Nice, 103 
Idaho 89, 645 P.2d 323 (1982). A sentence of confinement 
court acted within its discretion when it sentenced Tadlock 
to a unified term of five years' imprisonment with one year 
determinate. The judgment of conviction and sentence are 
therefore affirmed. 
Chief Judge SCHWARTZMAN and Judge PERRY concur. 
Parallel Citations 
34 P.3d 1096 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF 
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MICHAEL JAY FREITAS, 
Defendant. 
Case No. CR-2012-18513 
ORDER IN LIMINE 
_In Custody 
_Out of Custody 
The Court having before it the State's Motion in Limine, and good cause thus appearing, 
now therefore; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that any reference to the issues raised in the Motion to 
Dismiss by Defense counsel, the Defendant, and/or defense witnesses is excluded and prohibited. 
ENTERED this ___ day of ________ , 2012. 
JUDGE 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the __ day of , 2012 copies of the foregoing 
document(s) were mailed, postage prepaid, or sent by facsimile or inter office mail to: 
____ Deputy Prosecuting Attorney for Kootenai County FAX 208-446-1833 
___ Defense Counsel Kootenai County Public Defender FAX 208- 446-1701 
Defense Counsel FAX 
--- ---------------
--- Derend~t. ______________ _ 
___ Kootenai County Sheriffs Department FAX 208-446-1407 
___ Idaho Probation & Parole FAX 208-769-1481 
___ Idaho Department of Correction FAX 208-327-7445 
___ CCD Sentencing Team FAX 208-658-2186 
____ Idaho Department of Tr~sportation FAX 208-334-8739 
____ Community Service Interoffice Mail or FAX 208-446-1193 
____ Auditor Interoffice Mail or FAX 208-446-1662 
____ BCI (Bureau of Criminal Investigation) FAX 208-884-7193 
___ Kootenai County Law Library/Tr~scription FAX 208-446-1187 
CLIFFORD T. HAYES 
CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT 
By: __________________ _ 
Deputy Clerk 
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:...;~:.., 
BARRY McHUGH 
Prosecuting Attorney 
501 Government Way/Box 9000 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-9000 
Telephone: (208) 446-1800 
Facsimile: (208) 446-1833 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF 
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MICHAEL JAY FREITAS, 
Defendant. 
Case No. CR-2012-18513 
ORDER 
The above matters came on for a hearing before the Honorable CLARK PETERSON, 
Judge, on the 3rd day of January, 2013. The State was represented by LAURA MCCLINTON, 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, for Kootenai County, Idaho. The defendant was present, 
represented by JAY LOGDSON, Attorney for the Defendant. After argument from all parties, 
the Court enters its order as follows: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the defendant's Motion to Dismisss is denied. 
ENTERED this ___ day of January, 2013. 
JUDGE PETERSON 
ORDER 
1 of2 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the __ day of , 2013, copies of the foregoing 
document(s) were mailed, postage prepaid, or sent by facsimile or inter office mail to: 
____ Deputy Prosecuting Attorney for Kootenai County FAX 208-446-1833 
____ Defense Counsel Kootenai County Public Defender FAX 208- 446-1701 
Defense Counsel FAX 
---- ~------------
---- Derendant. ______________ _ 
___ Kootenai County Sheriff's Department FAX 208-446-1407 
___ Idaho Probation & Parole FAX 208-769-1481 
___ Idaho Department of Correction FAX 208-327-7445 
___ CCD Sentencing Team FAX 208-658-2186 
___ Idaho Department of Transportation FAX 208-334-8739 
___ Community Service Interoffice Mail or FAX 208-446-1193 
___ Auditor Interoffice Mail or FAX 208-446-1662 
___ BCI (Bureau of Criminal Investigation) FAX 208-884-7193 
___ Kootenai County Law Library/Transcription FAX 208-446-1187 
CLIFFORD T. HAYES 
CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT 
By: ___________ _ 
Deputy Clerk 
ORDER 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 1 
Now that you have been sworn as jurors to try this case, I want to go over with you what 
will be happening. I will describe how the trial will be conducted and what we will be doing. At 
the end of the trial, I will give you more detailed guidance on how you are to reach your decision. 
Because the state has the burden of proof, it goes first. After the state's opening 
statement, the defense may make an opening statement, or may wait until the state has presented 
its case. 
The state will offer evidence that it says will support the charge against the defendant. 
The defense may then present evidence, but is not required to do so. If the defense does present 
evidence, the state may then present rebuttal evidence. This is evidence offered to answer the 
defense's evidence. 
After you have heard all the evidence, I will give you additional instructions on the law. 
After you have heard the instructions, the state and the defense will each be given time for 
closing arguments. In their closing arguments, they will summarize the evidence to help you 
understand how it relates to the law. Just as the opening statements are not evidence, neither are 
the closing arguments. After the closing arguments, you will leave the courtroom together to 
make your decision. During your deliberations, you will have with you my instructions, the 
exhibits admitted into evidence and any notes taken by you in court. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. "t-
YOU ARE INSTRUCTED that the defendant, MICHAEL JAY FREITAS, is charged 
with the crime of UNLAWFUL ACT REGARDING WATER SYSTEM alleged to have 
occurred as follows: that the Defendant, MICHAEL JAY FREITAS, on or about the 28th day of 
September, 2012, in the County of Kootenai, State ofldaho, did permit connection or delivery of 
city water, to third persons, for use within a residence not otherwise provided with water service. 
To this charge the defendant has plead not guilty. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 3 
Under our law and system of justice, the defendant is presumed to be innocent. The 
presumption of innocence means two things. 
First, the state has the burden of proving the defendant guilty. The state has that burden 
throughout the trial. The defendant is never required to prove his innocence, nor does the defendant 
ever have to produce any evidence at all. 
Second, the state must prove the alleged crime beyond a reasonable doubt. A reasonable 
doubt is not a mere possible or imaginary doubt. It is a doubt based on reason and common sense. It 
may arise from a careful and impartial consideration of all the evidence, or from lack of evidence. If 
after considering all the evidence you have a reasonable doubt about the defendant's guilt, you must 
find the defendant not guilty .. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 4 
Your duties are to determine the facts, to apply the law set forth in my instructions to 
those facts, and in this way to decide the case. In so doing, you must follow my instructions 
regardless of your own opinion of what the law is or should be, or what either side may state the 
law to be. You must consider them as a whole, not picking out one and disregarding others. The 
order in which the instructions are given has no significance as to their relative importance. The 
law requires that your decision be made solely upon the evidence before you. Neither sympathy 
nor prejudice should influence you in your deliberations. Faithful performance by you of these 
duties is vital to the administration of justice. 
In determining the facts, you may consider only the evidence admitted in this trial. This 
evidence consists of the testimony of the witnesses, the exhibits offered and received, and any 
stipulated or admitted facts. The production of evidence in court is governed by rules of law. At 
times during the trial, an objection may be made to a question asked a witness, or to a witness' 
answer, or to an exhibit. This simply means that I am being asked to decide a particular rule of 
law. Arguments on the admissibility of evidence are designed to aid the Court and are not to be 
considered by you nor affect your deliberations. If I sustain an objection to a question or to an 
exhibit, the witness may not answer the question or the exhibit may not be considered. Do not 
attempt to guess what the answer might have been or what the exhibit might have shown. 
Similarly, if I tell you not to consider a particular statement or exhibit you should put it out of 
your mind, and not refer to it or rely on it in your later deliberations. 
During the trial I may have to talk with the parties about the rules of law which should 
1 
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apply in this case. Sometimes we will talk here at the bench. At other times I will excuse you 
from the courtroom so that you can be comfortable while we work out any problems. Your are 
not to speculate about any such discussions. They are necessary from time to time and help the 
trial run more smoothly. 
Some of you have probably heard the terms "circumstantial evidence," "direct evidence" 
and "hearsay evidence." Do not be concerned with these terms. You are to consider all the 
evidence admitted in this trial. 
However, the law does not require you to believe all the evidence. As the sole judges of 
the facts, you must determine what evidence you believe and what weight you attach to it. 
There is no magical formula by which one may evaluate testimony. You bring with you 
to this courtroom all of the experience and background of your lives. In your everyday affairs 
you determine for yourselves whom you believe, what you believe, and how much weight you 
attach to what you are told. The same considerations that you use in your everyday dealings in 
making these decisions are the considerations which you should apply in your deliberations. 
In deciding what you believe, do not make your decision simply because more witnesses 
may have testified one way than the other. Your role is to think about the testimony of each 
witness you heard and decide how much you believe of what the witness had to say. 
A witness who has special knowledge in a particular matter may give an opinion on that 
matter. In determining the weight to be given such opinion, you should consider the 
qualifications and credibility of the witness and the reasons given for the opinion. You are not 
bound by such opinion. Give it the weight, if any, to which you deem it entitled. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 5 
If during the trial I may say or do anything which suggests to you that I am inclined to 
favor the claims or position of any party, you will not permit yourself to be influenced by any 
such suggestion. I will not express nor intend to express, nor will I intend to intimate, any 
opinion as to which witnesses are or are not worthy of belief; what facts are or are not 
established; or what inferences should be drawn from the evidence. If any expression of mine 
seems to indicate an opinion relating to any of these matters, I instruct you to disregard it. 
I may at times use the word "victim" in these instructions or in the course of this trial. 
This word is used only to refer to a person or persons who are alleged to have been victimized, 
and is used only for convenience. It does not indicate any opinion on my part that a person is a 
victim, or that the defendant has committed an offense. Whether a person is a victim, and 
whether the defendant is guilty of any offense, are matters for you alone to determine based on 
the evidence presented at trial. 
Michael Jay Freitas 41378 105 of 235
INSTRUCTION NO. 6 
Do not concern yourself with the subject of penalty or punishment. That subject must not 
in any way affect your verdict. If you find the defendant guilty, it will be my duty to determine 
the appropriate penalty or punishment. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 7 
If you wish, you may take notes to help you remember what witnesses said. If you do 
take notes, please keep them to yourself until you and your fellow jurors go to the jury room to 
decide the case. You should not let note-taking distract you so that you do not hear other answers 
by witnesses. When you leave at night, please leave your notes in the jury room. 
If you do not take notes, you should rely on your own memory of what was said and not 
be overly influenced by the notes of other jurors. In addition, you cannot assign to one person the 
duty of taking notes for all of you. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 8 
It is important that as jurors and officers of this court you obey the following instructions at 
any time you leave the jury box, whether it be for recesses of the court during the day or when you 
leave the courtroom to go home at night. 
Do not discuss this case during the trial with anyone, including any of the attorneys, parties, 
witnesses, your friends, or members of your family. ''No discussion" also means no emailing, text 
messaging, tweeting, blogging, posting to electronic bulletin boards, and any other form of 
communication, electronic or otherwise. 
Do not discuss this case with other jurors until you begin your deliberations at the end of the 
trial. Do not attempt to decide the case until you begin your deliberations. 
I will give you some form of this instruction every time we take a break. I do that not to 
insult you or because I don't think you are paying attention, but because experience has shown this is 
one of the hardest instructions for jurors to follow. I know of no other situation in our culture where 
we ask strangers to sit together watching and listening to something, then go into a little room 
together and not talk about the one thing they have in common: what they just watched together. 
There are at least two reasons for this rule. The first is to help you keep an open mind. When 
you talk about things, you start to make decisions about them and it is extremely important that you 
not make any decisions about this case until you have heard all the evidence and all the rules for 
making your decisions, and you won't have that until the very end of the trial. The second reason for 
the rule is that we want all of you working together on this decision when you deliberate. If you have 
conversations in groups of two or three during the trial, you won't remember to repeat all of your 
thoughts and observations for the rest of your fellow jurors when you deliberate at the end of the 
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trial. 
Ignore any attempted improper communication. If any person tries to talk to you about this 
case, tell that person that you cannot discuss the case because you are a juror. If that person persists, 
simply walk away and report the incident to the bailiff. 
Do not make any independent personal investigations into any facts or locations connected 
with this case. Do not look up any information from any source, including the Internet. Do not 
communicate any private or special knowledge about any of the facts of this case to your fellow 
jurors. Do not read or listen to any news reports about this case or about anyone involved in this 
case, whether those reports are in newspapers or the Internet, or on radio or television. 
In our daily lives we may be used to looking for information on-line and to "Google" 
something as a matter of routine. Also, in a trial it can be very tempting for jurors to do their own 
research to make sure they are making the correct decision. You must resist that temptation for our 
system of justice to work as it should. I specifically instruct that you must decide the case only on the 
evidence received here in court. If you communicate with anyone about the case or do outside 
research during the trial it could cause us to have to start the trial over with new jurors and you could 
be held in contempt of court. 
While you are actually deliberating in the jury room, the bailiff will confiscate all cell phones 
and other means of electronic communications. Shouid you need to communicate with me or anyone 
else during the deliberations, please notify the bailiff. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 9 
You have now heard all the evidence in the case. My duty is to instruct you as to the law. 
You must follow all the rules as I explain them to you. You may not follow some and 
ignore others. Even if you disagree or don't understand the reasons for some ofthe rules, you are 
bound to follow them. If anyone states a rule of law different from any I tell you, it is my 
instruction that you must follow. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 10 
In every crime or public offense there must exist a union or joint operation of act and 
intent. 
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INSTRUCTION No._li_ 
YOU ARE INSTRUCTED that the essential elements of the crime of UNLAWFUL 
ACT REGARDING WATER SYSTEM which the Defendant is charged are: 
1. On or about the 28th day of September, 2012; 
2. in Kootenai County, State of Idaho; 
3. The Defendant, MICHAEL JAY FREITAS, permitted connection or delivery of city 
water; 
4. to third persons; 
5. for use within a residence; 
6. not otherwise provided with water service. 
If any of the above has not been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, you must find the 
defendant not guilty. If each of the above has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, you must 
find the defendant guilty. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 12 
It is alleged that the crime charged was committed "on or about" a certain date. If you 
find the crime was committed, the proof need not show that it was committed on that precise 
date. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 13 
A defendant in a criminal trial has a constitutional right not to be compelled to testify. 
The decision whether to testify is left to the defendant, acting with the advice and assistance of 
the defendant's lawyer. You must not draw any inference of guilt from the fact that the 
defendant does not testify, nor should this fact be discussed by you or enter into your 
deliberations in any way. 
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INSTRUCTION N0.14 
As members of the jury it is your duty to decide what the facts are and to apply those facts 
to the law that I have given you. You are to decide the facts from all the evidence presented in 
the case. 
The evidence you are to consider consists of: 
1. sworn testimony of witnesses; 
2. exhibits which have been admitted into evidence; and 
3. any facts to which the parties have stipulated. 
Certain things you have heard or seen are not evidence, including: 
1. arguments and statements by lawyers. The lawyers are not 
witnesses. What they say in their opening statements, 
closing arguments and at other times is included to help you 
interpret the evidence, but is not evidence. If the facts as 
you remember them differ from the way the lawyers have 
stated them, follow your memory; 
2. testimony that has been excluded or stricken, or which you 
have been instructed to disregard; 
3. anything you may have seen or heard when the court was 
not in session. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 15 
I have outlined for you the rules of law applicable to this case and have told you of some 
of the matters which you may consider in weighing the evidence to determine the facts. In a few 
minutes counsel will present their closing remarks to you, and then you will retire to the jury 
room for your deliberations. 
The arguments and statements of the attorneys are not evidence. If you remember the 
facts differently from the way the attorneys have stated them, you should base your decision on 
what you remember. 
The attitude and conduct of jurors at the beginning of your deliberations are important. It 
is rarely productive at the outset for you to make an emphatic expression of your opinion on the 
case or to state how you intend to vote. When you do that at the beginning, your sense of pride 
may be aroused, and you may hesitate to change your position even if shown that it is wrong. 
Remember that you are not partisans or advocates, but are judges. For you, as for me, there can 
be no triumph except in the ascertainment and declaration of the truth. 
As jurors you have a duty to consult with one another and to deliberate before making 
your individual decisions. You may fully and fairly discuss among yourselves all of the evidence 
you have seen and heard in this courtroom about this case, together with the law that relates to 
this case as contained in these instructions. 
During your deliberations, you each have a right to re-examine your own views and 
change your opinion. You should only do so if you are convinced by fair and honest discussion 
that your original opinion was incorrect based upon the evidence the jury saw and heard during 
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the trial and the law as given you in these instructions. 
Consult with one another. Consider each other's views, and deliberate with the objective 
of reaching an agreement, if you can do so without disturbing your individual judgment. Each of 
you must decide this case for yourself; but you should do so only after a discussion and 
consideration of the case with your fellow jurors. 
However, none of you should surrender your honest opinion as to the weight or effect of 
evidence or as to the innocence or guilt of the defendant because the majority of the jury feels 
otherwise or for the purpose of returning a unanimous verdict. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 16 
You have been instructed as to all the rules of law that may be necessary for you to reach 
a verdict. Whether some of the instructions will apply depend upon your determination of the 
facts. You will disregard any instruction which applies to a state of facts which you determine 
does not exist. You must not conclude from the fact that an instruction has been given that the 
Court is expressing any opinion as to the facts. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 17 
The original instructions will be with you in the jury room. They are part of the official 
court record. For this reason please do not alter them or mark on them in any way. The 
instructions are numbered for convenience in referring to specific instructions. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 18 
Upon retiring to the jury room, select one of you as a presiding officer, who will preside 
over your deliberations. It is that person's duty to see that discussion is orderly; that the issues 
submitted for your decision are fully and fairly discussed; and that every juror has a chance to 
express himself or herself upon each question. 
In this case, your verdict must be unanimous. When you all arrive at a verdict, the 
presiding juror will sign it and you will return it into open court. 
Your verdict in this case cannot be arrived at by chance, by lot, or by compromise. 
If, after considering all of the instructions in their entirety, and after having fully 
discussed the evidence before you, the jury determines that it is necessary to communicate with 
me, you may send a note by the bailiff. You are not to reveal to me or anyone else how the jury 
stands until you have reached a verdict or unless you are instructed by me to do so. 
A verdict form suitable to any conclusion you may reach will be submitted to you with 
these instructions. 
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STATE OF IDAHO 
Plaintiff 
vs. 
MICHAEL JAY FREITAS 
Defendant 
STATE OF IDAHO 
FILED: .....,~-l£_ 
INSTRUCTION NO. 19 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Case No. CRM-2012-18513 
VERDICT 
We, the Jury, unanimously find the defendant MICHAEL JAY FREITAS: 
__ NOT GUILTY ofUNLA WFUL ACT REGARDING WATER SYSTEM 
V GUILTY ofUNLA WFUL ACT REGARDING WATER SYSTEM 
Dated this /-- ~--I J day of January 2013. 
.~ 
Ju<TJ ~. ~o/h ~ 
Prdiding Juror 
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FIRST JUDICI DISTRICT COURT, ST ATEOF IDAHO, UNTY OF KOOTENAI 
324 W. GAR:t.c.~ AVENUE, P.O. BOX 9000, COEUR D' ALI!.NE, IDAHO 83816-9000 
STATE OF IDAHO V 
MICHAEL JAY FREITAS 
5870 W RHOADE ISLAND STREET 
SPIRIT LAKE, ID 83869 
DL# ID 
DO AGENCY: SPIRIT LAKE POLICE DEPT 
CASE# CR-2012-0018513 CITATION# 7813 
CHARGE: M291-7.4.10-SL UNLAWFUL TAMPERING WllH WATER SYSTEM 
PUTY 
AMENDED:----------------------------------------------------------------------
The defendant having been fully advised of his/her statutory and constitutional rights including the right to be represented by counsel, and 
D Been advised of right to court appointed counsel if indigent 
D Defendant waived right to counsel 
~ Defendant represented by counsel 
D Judgment, Plea of Guilty I Rights Waived 
D Withheld Judgment D Accepted 
D Dismissed ____________ _ 
D Judgment-Not Guilty 
)(!Judgment on Trial-Guilty 1{<ih1 cf tt1 
tJ Judgment for Defendant I Infraction 
D Judgment for State I Infraction 
D Bond Forfeited I Conviction Entered - Case Closed 
D Bond Forfeited I Dismissed 
MONIES ORDERED PAID: A $2.00 handling fee will be imposed on each installment. 
IE Fine I Penalty$ S"DO which includes costs, and probation fee if applicable. Suspended$ ______ _ 
~Pay within 30 days of today, or enroll in time payment program BEFORE due date. 
D Community Service hours by Setup Fee $ _______ Insurance Fee $ ______ _ 
Must sign up within 7 days. 
D Reimburse ___________________________________ _ 
D Restitution 
------------------------------------~Bond Exonerated, provided that any deposit shall first be applied pursuant to Idaho Code 19-2923 in satisfaction of outstanding fines, fees 
and costs with any remainder to be refunded to the posting party. D Authorization from defendant to pay restitution and/or infractions from bond. 
t!lNo Contact Order, as condition of bond, terminated. 
INCARCEFfATION ORDERED: 
D Jail days, Suspended days, Credit days, Discretionary Jail days are imposed & will 
be scheduled by the Adult Misdemeanor Probation Office, or Court, for violations of the terms below or on the attached addendum. 
D Report to Jail Release D Work Release Authorization (if you qualify). 
D Sheriff's Community Labor Program in lieu of Jail (if you qualify) hours by Must sign up within 7 days. 
Follow the Labor Program schedule and policies. 
0 ______________________________ ~---------------------------------------
DRIVING PRIVILEGES SUSPENDED days commencing~----------------------
REINSTATEMENT OF DRIVING PRIVILEGES MUST BE AC MPLISHED before you can drive. Apply to DRIVER'S SERVICES, P.O. Box 7129, 
Boise, ID 83707-1129. 
D Temporary Driving Privileges Granted commenci 
To, from and for work purposes I required m ical care I court ordered alcohol program I community service. Must carry proof of work 
schedule and liability insurance at all time . Not valid if insurance expires. 
PROBATION ORDERED FOR YEAR(S) THE FOLLOWING CONDITIONS: 0 Supervised - See Addendum 
D Violate no federal, state or local laws D Commit no similar offenses. 
D Maintain liability insurance on any icle that you drive. 
D Do not operate a motor vehicle w· any alcohol or controlled substances in your bloodstream. 
D You must submit to any blood coho I concentration test requested of you, with reasonable cause, by a peace officer. 
D Obtain a Substance Abuse/ ery Evaluation, and file proof of evaluation, within days. 
D Enroll in & complete program. File proof of completion within days. 
~ Notify the court, in wri · g, of any address change within 10 days. Agrees to accept future service by mail at the last known address. 
D Interlock ignition de ce required on vehicle for year(s). To be installed per attached addendum. 
D Other _____________________________________________ ----:::::;:=;=:::=----------------
THE SUSPENDED PENALTIES ARE SUBJECT TO YOUR COMPLIANCE WITH ALL 
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THIS JUDGMENT WITHIN 42 DAYS 
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Jay Logsdon, Deputy Public Defender 
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STATE OF IDAHO 
FCOUNTY OF KOOTENA!/ss IL£0: 
The Law Office of the Public Defender Kootenai County 
POBox 9000 
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C~4:~URT Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816 
Phone: (208) 446-1700; Fax: (208) 446-1701 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
v. 
Plaintiff/ 
Respondent, 
MICHAEL JAY FREITAS, 
Defendant/ 
Appellant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
--------------------------~) 
CASE NUMBER CR-12-0018513 
Misd 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
TO: THE ABOVE NAMED RESPONDENT, STATE OF IDAHO, AND THE CLERK OF 
THE ABOVE ENTITLED COURT: 
1. The above named Appellant hereby appeals against the above named Respondent, the 
State of Idaho, to the District Court of the First Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and for the 
County of Kootenai, the Judgment entered in the Magistrate's Division of said District Court in the 
above entitled matter on or about January 8, 2013, the Honorable Clark Peterson, Magistrate, 
presiding. 
2. That the party has a right to appeal to the Kootenai County District Court, and the 
judgment described in paragraph one above is an appealable order under and pursuant to Idaho 
Criminal Rule 54.l{a). 
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3. That this appeal is taken upon matters oflaw and fact. 
4. A preliminary statement of the issues on appeal, which the appellant then intends to 
assert in the appeal, provided any such list of issues on appeal shall not prevent the appellant from 
asserting other issues on appeal, is/are: 
(a) Did the Magistrate Court err in denying the defendant's Motion to Dismiss? 
(b) Did the Magistrate Court err in denying the defendant's Motion for Judgment of 
Acquittal? 
(c) Did the Magistrate Court err in denying the defendant's proposed jury instruction six? 
(d) Was the evidence presented at trial sufficient for conviction? 
5. No portion ofthe record is sealed. 
6. Reporter's Transcript. Pursuant to I.C.R. 54.6(a) and I.A.R. 25(a) and (c)(5) 
as they apply to this appeal under I.C.R. 54.7(d), Appellant requests the preparation of the entire 
reporter's transcript of the hearing on Appellant's Motions to Dismiss held on January 3, 2013, and 
the trial held on January 8, 2013. The proceedings were digitally recorded by the Clerk, and the 
recording is in the possession of the Clerk. 
7. Clerk's Record. The appellant requests the standard clerk's record pursuant to 
I.C.R. 54.8. The appellant requests the following documents to be included in the clerk's record 
pursUfuJ.t to I.C.R. 54.18 and I.A.R. 28(c), in addition to those automatically included under I.C.R. 
54.8: 
(a) Any exhibits. 
(b) A copy ofthe defendant's Motion to Dismiss filed December 12,2012. 
(c) A copy of the plaintiffs Brief in Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss filed December 
3, 2012. 
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(d) A copy of the defendant's requested jury instruction six. 
7. I certify: 
(a) A copy of this Notice of Appeal has been served upon the court reporter 
(transcriptionist). 
(b) The Appellant is exempt from paying the estimated transcript fee because the 
Appellant is an indigent who is represented by the Office of the Kootenai County Public Defender. 
(c) The Appellant is exempt from paying the filing fee because the Appellant is an 
indigent who is represented by the Office of the Kootenai County Public Defender. 
(d) The Appellant is exempt from paying the estimated fee for the preparation of the 
record because the Appellant is an indigent who is represented by the Office of the Kootenai 
County Public Defender. 
(e) Service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant to Idaho 
Criminal Rule 54.4, to wit: the Kootenai County Prosecuting Attorney. 
DATED this _j_ day of January, 2013. 
BY: 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
THE LAW OFFICE OF THE PUBLIC 
DEFENDER OF KOOTENAI COUNTY 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this c Cf day of January, 2013, served a true and 
correct copy of the attached NOTICE OF APPEAL via interoffice mail or as otherwise indicated upon 
the parties as follows: 
Kootenai County Prosecuting Attorney via 
_y}_ Fax 208-446-1833 
Kootenai County Transcript Department FAX 
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ORDER TO STAY SENTENCE PENDING 
APPEAL 
MICHAEL JAY FREITAS, 
Defendant/ 
Appellant. 
------------------------~) 
The Court having before it the Motion to Stay Sentence Pending Appeal, having heard 
argument on January 8, 2013, and good cause appearing, now, th~refore 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that sentence in the above entitled matter be stayed pending 
the resolution of the defendant~s appeal in district court. 
ORDERED this .ik day of January, 2013. ~ u~ Mttit>J C: 
CLARK TERSON . 
MAGISTRATE 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature ofthe Case 
This is an appeal from a judgment of guilty. The state alleged that the defendant had 
violated Spirit Lake Ordinance 7-4-10. The Magistrate Court heard argument and found that I.C. 
Spirit Lake Ordinance 7-4-1 0 on its face did not violate the requirements of procedural due 
process embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Further, the 
Court heard argument and found that Spirit Lake Ordinance 7-4-10 did not violate Article I§ 13, 
Article XII§ 2, and Article XV§§ 1, 4, and 5 ofthe Idaho Constitution on its face or as applied. 
The Court interpreted Spirit Lake Ordinance 7-4-10, and the defendant was tried under the 
Court's interpretation. At trial, the Court allowed over the defense's objection the state to ask the 
jurors on voir dire whether they thought the ordinance was "ridiculous" and to inquire as to the 
importance of the rule of law. The Court later denied the defendant's motion for acquittal. The 
Court further rejected the defendant's requested instruction as to the limits of the city's property. 
The jury found the defendant guilty. The defendant now appeals the judgment. 
B. Course of Proceedings & Statement of Facts 
On September 27,2012, Brenda Nash moved into the home of George Darrell Adams in 
Spirit Lake, Idaho. Tr Vol. II, p. 68, L. 8-16, p. 69, L. 13-25. With her came her son, his three 
children and fiancee Jeremy Lombardi, Stephanie Savage, Brooklyn Savage, Skylar Lombardi, 
and Aurora Lombardi. Tr Vol. II, p. 75, L. 13-20. The home had running water, but on July 26, 
- 1 -
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2012, the city of Spirit Lake had shut offthe water and had not turned it back on until October 
18,2012. Tr Vol. II, p. 65, L. 2-21, p. 70, L. 16-21. 
Also on September 27, 2012, Officer Terry Wise of the Spirit Lake Police Department 
visited the mobile home of Michael Freitas. Tr Vol. II., p. 83, L. 6-9, p. 84, L. 7-21, p. 85, L. 22-
24. The officer had noticed that Mr. Freitas, who was the neighbor of Ms. Nash, had a hose 
running from the spigot on his home to some point on Ms. Nash's home. Tr Vol. II, p. 84, L. 22-
25, p. 85, L. 1-21. The officer believed water to be running due to water escaping at the 
connection point between separate hoses being used to stretch between the homes. Tr Vol. II, p. 
86, L. 1-20. The officer warned Mr. Freitas that she believed he was in violation of a Spirit Lake 
Ordinance, and gave him a copy of it. Tr Vol. II, p. 85, L. 1-5. She cited him the following day 
for violating Spirit Lake Ordinance 7-4-10. Tr Vol. II, p. 87, L. 20-21. 
On January 3, 2013, the Magistrate Court of Kootenai County held a hearing on Mr. 
Freitas' Motion to Dismiss the charge against him. Tr. Vol. I, p. 1, L. 1, p. 22, L. 22-23. Mr. 
Freitas and the state stipulated to the factual summary in the state's Brief in Opposition to 
Motion to Dismiss for purposes of the hearing to provide the Court with a factual basis for the as 
applied challenge. Tr. Vol. I, p. 1, L. 8-25; p. 2, L.l-16. Additionally, the state called Barbara 
Brown, clerk-treasurer ofthe City of Spirit Lake. Tr Vol. I, p. 3, L. 15-16, p. 4, L. 15-19. 
Ms. Brown testified that the City of Spirit Lake charged residential properties $15 a 
month for 12,000 gallons of water and $1.25 for every thousand thereafter. Tr Vol. I, L. 16-22. 
The rates had been in place since either 2006 or 2007. Tr Vol. I, p. 5, L. 23-25. Ms. Brown 
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testified that the city tried to keep the prices low, and further, that at least as of a few years ago, 
Spirit Lake's water rates were "fairly low" as compared to a lot of cities in Idaho. Tr Vol. I, p. 6, 
L. 5-11, p. 9, L. 3-25, p. 10, L. 1-7. The city bills based on meters in the summer, and simply 
charges a flat rate in the winter. Tr Vol. I, L. 18-23. Ms. Brown could not state how much water 
the average household uses. Tr Vol. I, p. 6, L. 12-15. She testified that Mr. Freitas had paid for 
the water that came to his home and that he had provided to his neighbor. Tr Vol. I, p. 8, L. 1-18. 
Ms. Brown testified that Ordinance 7-4-10 has been enforced prior to this case for sharing water, 
because 
it's not appropriate, it's against the rules, and no matter where you 
live, there are rules. 
Tr Vol. I, p. 7, L. 9-16. 
The state argued that this criminalization was necessary to keep the cost of water down 
and for sanitary reasons. Tr Vol. I, p. 25, L. 6-7, 11-12. After hearing argument and reviewing 
the parties' motions and memorandums, the Court made the following findings as to the 
procedural due process challenge: 
THE COURT: I certainly can't find that the law is impermissibly vague in all of its 
applications. I think there's language within the ordinance which sets forth some very 
clear meaning. So as a result, I'll find that uh, the motion to dismiss is- on its void for 
vagueness challenge on its face is denied. 
Tr. p. 26, L. 15-20. 
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THE COURT: It has to create minimum guidelines for uh, those persons in the law 
enforcement and judicial community to be able to enforce the statute, also provide people 
with reasonable notice, adequate fair warning the prescribed conduct. I think the statute 
at issue here is clear. I think it can be read in its many parts given a common sense 
reading. It's unlawful for any person to connect to, interfere or tamper with, turn on or 
off, permit connection or delivery of water to third persons for use within a residence or 
other building not otherwise provided with water service in accordance with this chapter, 
or to operate or introduce any substance into any part of the City water system. 
Essentially, what it prohibits, is uh, improperly connect to the city water system, 
improperly interfering with or tampering with that system, uh, improperly connecting and 
delivering water to third persons under certain circumstances, and then improperly 
operating or introducing a substance into any part of the water system, again under certain 
circumstances. 
Tr Vol. I, p. 26, L. 22-25, p. 27, L. 1-17. 
The Court went on and appeared to find that the statute also passed rational scrutiny: 
THE COURT: Those all seem to be very clear and-- and uh, reasonable. The city 
certainly has an interest in uh, being the sole regulators of their water system, and to 
permit tampering in the way it's gone on here would essentially be to permit persons to 
set themselves up as their own private water delivery services to other individuals, and 
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then the State or the municipality of the states would lose its regulatory control over those 
persons. 
Tr Vol. I, p. 27, L. 18-25, p. 28, L. 1. 
The Court stated as to the as applied challenge: 
THE COURT: It seems clear that the defendant received notice that uh, his neighbor was 
not receiving water from the city and that essentially what happened here is in direct 
contravention of the statute, which is uh, the defendant deciding that he was going to 
circumvent the water delivery system of the municipality and provide water himself to 
this other residence, which prohibits the City in this case from having its valid regulatory 
concerns regarding the delivery of water, making sure that it's clean, making sure it's 
appropriate, billing and restricting its use, and all the other issues that arise from the 
delivery of water. So as a result, the Court finds you've failed to meet your burden 
regarding the demonstrating the statute as applied is unconstitutional. 
Tr Vol. I, p. 28, L. 2-16. 
Counsel for the defendant requested further findings as to the limits of the ordinance, 
whether it conflicted with the general laws, and whether it was not either unreasonable or 
arbitrary. Tr Vol. I, p. 29, L. 9-14. The Court stated: 
THE COURT: I think I have to construe statutes to be constitutional. Obviously, the 
statute has to be confined to the limits of the jurisdictional limits of the body enacting the 
law. Uh, and I have to read the statute that way. I don't find it to be in conflict with other 
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general laws of the State. In fact, I think the State statutes we reviewed specifically 
empower municipalities to make these types of uh, enactments. And then that it's not an 
unreasonable or arbitrary enactment. I think in my prior recitation I noted that I think that 
the uh, ordinance here is both reasonable and not arbitrary. And so I-- I find that neither 
ofthose three factors are applicable here, at least on the information that's before the 
Court here today. 
Tr Vol. I, p. 29, L. 15-25, p. 30, L. 1-4. 
Thus, the defendant's motion to dismiss was denied. Then, on January 8, 2013, the Court 
held a trial in this matter. During voir dire, the prosecutor began asking the jurors about the law 
in the case. 
MS. MCLINTON: So, like you heard earlier, basically what this case is about is a Spirit 
Lake Ordinance that limits how residents can use their water. It permit- it prohibits 
residents from permitting - -
MR. LOGSDON: Your Honor, I'm gonna object at this point. We're not supposed to be 
discussing any law. 
THE COURT: All right. Well, I haven't heard the whole question, but go ahead and 
finish up your question and then I'll rule on your objection. 
MS. MCLINTON: Basically, as I stated earlier, it prohibits residents from permitting 
people from using their water in another residence that isn't otherwise provided with 
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water. Basically, what I'm wondering is if anyone thinks that that ordinance is simply 
ridiculous. 
THE COURT: I'll overrule your objection. That's an appropriate question. 
Tr Vol. II, p. 23, L. 24-25, p. 24, L. 1-14. 
The prosecutor continued asking about the opinion of jurors as to the validity of the law. 
Tr Vol. II, p. 24, L. 15-25, p. 25, L. 1-22. Later, the prosecutor began asking whether there were 
any laws that the jury thought were disagreeable. 
MS. MCLINTON: Now, we were talkin' a little bit about that Spirit Lake ordinance. 
And in general I'm just wondering has anyone ever felt like you disagreed with a law that 
has made some sort of conduct criminal? 
Tr Vol. II, p. 29, L. 6-12. 
Such questions continued until the prosecutor switched over to why people follow rules. Tr Vol. 
II, p. 29, L. 9-25, p. 30, L. 1-25. 
MS. MCLINTON: How many of you feel like generally you abide by rules? Or you try 
to. You gues can raise your hands. Somebody - - somebody out here. Why do you - -
Why do you abide by rules? 
TrVol.II,p.31,L.l-4. 
These questions continued until defense counsel objected. Tr Vol. II, p. 31, L. 4-21. 
MS. MCCLINTON: So what happens if people start picking and choosing what laws or 
what rules that they are going to follow? 
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MR. LOGSDON: Your Honor, I'm gonna object. We are way off and we are talking 
about essentially things like rule of the law, et cetera, and so forth. 
THE COURT: All right. I think we're close, Ms. McClinton, but I think that's a 
permissible-- I think she's' inquiring of the jury's attitudes about uh, how one should 
behave if they have a law that they don't agree with, and I think that's an appropriate 
mqmry. 
Tr Vol. II, p. 31, L. 18-25, p. 32, L. 1-3. 
Such questions then continued. Tr Vol. II, p. 32, L. 4-21. 
After openings, the state called Barbra Brown, the Sprit Lake City Clerk. Tr Vol. II, p. 60, 
L. 1-25. Ms. Brown testified that the records of the city showed that the water at 5822 West 
Rhode Island St., residence of George Adams, was shut off on July 26, 2012, and turned back on 
on October 18, 2012. Tr Vol. II, p. 64, L. 20-25, p. 65, L. 1-21. 
The state then called Brenda Nash, who at the time of the incident had lived in George 
Adams' home. Tr Vol. II, p. 67, L. 1-2, p. 69, L. 13-25. Ms. Nash testified that she had been told 
that the water coming to her house came from the defendant and that she used it within the 
residence. Tr Vol. II, p. 70, L. 16-21, p. 71, L. 18-23. 
The state then called Officer Terry Wise of the Spirit Lake Police Department. Tr Vol. II, 
p. 82, L. 3-4, p. 83, L. 8-9. She testified that on September 27, 2012, she visited the mobile 
home of Michael Freitas. Tr Vol. II., p. 83, L. 6-9, p. 84, L. 7-21, p. 85, L. 22-24. The officer had 
noticed that Mr. Freitas, who was the neighbor of Ms. Nash, had a hose running from the spigot 
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on his home to some point on Ms. Nash's home. Tr Vol. II, p. 84, L. 22-25, p. 85, L. 1-21. The 
officer believed water to be running due to water escaping at the connection point between 
separate hoses being used to stretch between the homes. Tr Vol. II, p. 86, L. 1-20. The officer 
warned Mr. Freitas that she believed he was in violation of a Spirit Lake Ordinance, and gave 
him a copy of it. Tr Vol. II, p. 85, L. 1-5. She cited him the following day for violating Spirit 
Lake Ordinance 7-4-10. Tr Vol. II, p. 87, L. 20-21. When asked whether she had had a 
conversation with the defendant, she also testified that at the time she gave him the citation, Mr. 
Freitas said that 
"it was something to the effect that urn, he didn't really realize-- he didn't think that 
there was anything wrong as far - - as long as the water was going through his meter and 
he's paying for it, that he said he should be able to do whatever he wanted to do with his 
water, that he could put it in his yard or give it to a neighbor." 
Tr Vol. II, p. 89, L. 19-25, p. 90, L. 1-3. 
After Officer Wise the state rested. Defense counsel moved for an acquittal under I.C.R. 
29. The Court denied the motion. 
THE COURT: Well, Rule 29 governs motions for judgment of acquittal for insufficiency 
of the evidence. The test is whether there's substantial evidence on which rational triers 
of fact could find the defendant guilty. And uh, I have to view the evidence in the light 
most favorable to the State, keeping in mind that it's the jury that eventually has the job 
to determine credibility and weigh the evidence. 
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The Court's mindful that where inculpatory evidence is so insubstantial that jurors could 
not help but have a reasonable doubt as to the proof of that element, a judgment of an 
acquittal should be entered. However, the prosecution need not have offered direct 
evidence on every element of the crime if there is otherwise a sufficient basis for the jury 
to find an element beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Keeping in mind all the facts that have been presented in adopting the argument of uh, 
Ms. McClinton, the Court will deny your Rule 29 motion at this time. 
Tr Vol. II, p 95, L. 6-24. 
The prosecutor had argued that 
[Officer Wise] indicated, when I asked that it was in fact city water, he said he was 
paying for it and he could do with it what he pleased. 
Tr Vol. II, p. 94, L. 7-10. 
Nowhere in the record is there any indication that the prosecutor had inquired of her witnesses 
whether the water the defendant was providing was from the City of Spirit Lake. 
The Court then held a hearing on jury instructions. The defendant accepted that the 
state's elements instruction fit the law of the case and the earlier holding of the Court and did not 
object. Tr Vol. II, p. 98, L. 1-3. The defendant offered proposed jury instruction six, requesting 
that the Court instruct the jury that 
The Spirit Lake City water system is property of the City up to and including any shut-off 
valve and/or meter which may be installed at or near the property of any lot. 
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Tr Vol. II, p. 99, L. 11-14. 
The Court denied the instruction. 
THE COURT: The Court determined it would not give that as it's not a clarifying uh, 
legal instruction that relates to any of the facts in dispute. While the elements certainly 
includes uh, delivery of water, there is just no factual dispute here regarding what is the 
property of what, what is the city water system, et cetera. 
(inaudible) ... persist in my ruling and not give that instruction. 
Tr Vol. II, p. 99, L. 16-22, p. 100, L. 12-13. 
The jury found the defendant guilty. Tr Vol. II, p. 117, L. 22-24. The Court then 
sentenced the defendant but ordered his sentence be stayed pending the resolution of his appeal 
pursuant to I.C.R. 54.5. Tr Vol. II, p. 122, L. 16-23, p. 124, L. 11-14. The defendant timely filed 
a notice of appeal under I.C.R. 54.1(a), et.seq. from the judgment ofthe Court. 
ISSUES ON APPEAL 
I. The Magistrate Court erred in finding that Spirit Lake Ordinance 7-4-1 0 is 
constitutional on its face. 
II. The Magistrate Court erred in not finding that Spirit Lake Ordinance 7-4-10 is 
constitutional as applied to the facts of this case. 
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III. Even if the Magistrate Court did not err in holding that Spirit Lake Ordinance 7-4-
10 is constitutional, the Magistrate Court misinterpreted the statute and thus the 
defendant was tried under the wrong elements. 
IV. Even if the Magistrate Court did not err in holding that Spirit Lake Ordinance 7-4-
1 0 is constitutional or in its interpretation of the ordinance, then the Court erred in 
denying the defendant's motion for acquittal. 
V. Even if the Magistrate Court did not err in holding that Spirit Lake Ordinance 7-4-
10 is constitutional or in its interpretation of the ordinance, then the Court erred in 
refusing to give the defendant's proposed jury instruction six. 
VI. The Magistrate Court erred in overruling the defendant's objections to the state's 
improper questions during voir dire. 
A. Introduction 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
The Constitution "protects against the Government; it does not leave us at the mercy of 
noblesse oblige. [The Supreme Court] would not uphold an unconstitutional statute merely 
because the Government promised to use it responsibly." United States v. Stevens, 130 S.Ct. 
1577, 1591 (2010) citing Whitman v. American Trucking Assns., Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 473 (2001). 
The Magistrate Court erred when it found Spirit Lake Ordinance 7-4-10 constitutional in spite of 
the fact that it lacks sufficient clarity, is not limited to the municipality, criminalizes everyday 
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behaviors of Idahoans for either arbitrary or monopolistic purposes, and conflicts with the 
General Laws. 
B. Standard for Review 
An appellate court exercises free review over questions oflaw. Idaho v. Button, 134 
Idaho 814 (Ct.App.2000); Powell v. Sellers, 130 Idaho 122, 125 (Ct. App. 1997). 
C. The Spirit Lake Ordinance 7-4-10 is unconstitutionally vague and thus violates the notice 
requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 
Spirit Lake Ordinance 7-4-10 is void for vagueness on its face. In order to comport with 
the notice requirements of due process guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution and Article I § 13 of the Idaho Constitution, a law must use language that 
conveys a sufficiently definite description of the proscribed conduct. 1990 Idaho Op. Atty. Gen. 
15, Idaho Op. Atty. Gen. No. 90-3, 1990 WL 48948 at *2 (Idaho A.G.), citing Keyishian v. Board 
of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967); H & V Engineering v. Board of Professional Engineers, 113 
Idaho 646 (1987). As the Court wrote in Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984), 
The requirement that government articulate its aims with a 
reasonable degree of clarity ensure that state power will be 
exercised only on behalf of policies reflecting an authoritative 
choice among competing social values, educes the danger of 
caprice and discrimination in the administration of the laws, 
enables individuals to conform their conduct to the requirements of 
law, and permits meaningful judicial review. 
Due Process also guarantees that a statute wiH not be so written as to ailow arbitrary and 
capricious enforcement. 1990 Idaho Op. Atty. Gen. 15 at *2 citing LDS, Inc. v. Healy, 589 P.2d 
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490 (Colo.1979). Furthermore, Due Process requires that explicit standards be created for 
individuals or groups tasked to apply basic policy. !d. citing Tuma v. Board of Nursing, 100 
Idaho 74 (1979); Saxon Coffee Shop, Inc. v. Boston Licensing Board, 407 N.E.2d (1980); Chief 
of Fire Dept. of Worcester v. Wibley, 507 N.E.2d 256 (Mass. 1987); Wheeler v. State Board of 
Forestry, 192 Cal.Rptr. 693 (Cal.App. 1983). 
Ordinance 7-4-1 0 reads in relevant part 
Every part of the city water system up to, and including, any 
shutoff valve and/or meter, which may be installed at or near the 
property line of any lot, is the property of the city. It shall be 
unlawful for any person to connect to, interfere or tamper with, 
turn on or off, permit connection or delivery of water to third 
persons for use within a residence or other building not otherwise 
provided with water service in accordance with this chapter, or to 
operate or introduce any substance into any part of the city water 
system unless that person is acting under the direct supervision of 
a qualified employee of the city or first obtains express written 
permission from the mayor. 
This ordinance can be broken down to outlaw the following 
1. Connect to water for use by a third person within a residence or other 
building not otherwise provided with water service in accordance with this 
chapter. 
2. Interfere or tamper with water for use by a third person within a residence 
or other building not otherwise provided with water service in accordance 
with this chapter. 
3. Turn on or off water for use by a third person within a residence or other 
building not otherwise provided with water service in accordance with this 
chapter. 
4. Permit connection or delivery of water to third persons for use within a 
residence or other building not otherwise provided with water service in 
accordance with this chapter. 
It is difficult to understand why the city would have concerned itself with those interfering with 
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the illegal use of water by others, or why the city is not concerned about people who connect 
illegally for their own use. One way to correct the absurdity is to remove the "of water to third 
persons" language, but that fails to fix the interfering part, while removing the "not otherwise 
provided" qualifier makes the connecting part absurd. However, this Court may not correct 
absurdity, but must construe the statute as written. Verska v. Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical 
Center, 151 Idaho 889, 896 (2011). 
Further, the ordinance begins by stating what parts of the water system are the property of 
the city, and ends by prohibiting putting things into the water system. Therefore, strictly 
construed, the "water" referred to the operative language is a reference to the water system and 
the water that still belongs to the city of Spirit Lake. 
As it stands, the law is too confusing to provide either reasonable persons or the 
government with any idea as to how it is meant to be enforced. Therefore, it must be struck 
down. 
D. The City of Spirit Lake has no claim of ownership over water once it has been drawn. 
The City of Spirit Lake owns and operates a municipal water system. See Ordinance 7-4-
2, 7-4-3. The service sells water for use by residents in a propriety capacity. Skaggs Drug 
Centers v. City of Idaho Falls, 90 Idaho 1, 7 (1965) citing Gilbert v. Village of Bancroft, 80 
Idaho 186 (1958); Hooton v. City of Burley, 70 Idaho 369 (1950). 
The city's relationship with its citizens as regards the water service is contractual. City of 
Grangeville v. Haskin, 116 Idaho 535 (1989). Once the water has been drawn, the resident owes 
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the municipality for that water which is recorded by a meter so that the city may collect using a 
monthly bill. See Ordinances 7-4-4, 7-4-5. Municipalities are granted the power to own, 
maintain, and operate a water system by the Idaho Legislature. See I. C.§ 50-323. No 
constitutional provision, law, or Spirit Lake ordinance allows the Spirit Lake to retain a 
possessory interest in the water once it has been drawn. 
E. Spirit Lake Ordinance 7-4-10 violates the limits set on municipal power under Article XII 
§ 2 of the Idaho Constitution. 
1. The City of Spirit Lake has no authority to pass laws criminalizing the delivery of 
water. 
1. Spirit Lake Ordinance 7-4-10 conflicts with the General Laws of Idaho by 
claiming powers outside the scope ofthose provided by I. C. § 50-1 030(f). 
The Idaho Supreme Court "has repeatedly held that municipalities may exercise only 
those powers granted to them or necessarily implied from the powers granted." City of 
Grangeville, 116 Idaho at 538 citing Caesar v. State, 101 Idaho 158, 160 (1980); Hendricks v. 
City of Nampa, 93 Idaho 95, 98 (1969). If there is a fair, reasonable, substantial doubt as to the 
existence of a power, the doubt must be resolved against the city. O'Bryant v. City of Idaho Falls, 
78 Idaho 313, 320 (1956), Oregon Short Line Railroad Co. v. Village of Chubbuck, 83 Idaho 62, 
65 (1960). 
A city acts in a proprietary capacity when it owns, maintains, and operates a water system 
for the benefit of its inhabitants. Skaggs Drug Centers, 90 Idaho at 7 citing Gilbert, 80 Idaho; 
Hooton, 70 Ida..lJo. Municipalities are gra.11ted the power to own, maintain, and operate a water 
system by the Idaho Legislature. See I. C. § 50-323. The Legislature further provided that 
municipalities may 
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.. . prescribe and collect rates, fees, tolls or charges, including the 
levy or assessment of such rates, fees, tolls or charges against 
governmental units, departments or agencies, including the state of 
Idaho and its subdivisions, for the services, facilities and 
commodities furnished by such works, or by such rehabilitated 
existing electrical generating facilities, and to provide methods of 
collections and penalties, including denial of service for 
nonpayment of such rates, fees, tolls or charges; ... 
I.C. 50-1030(f) 
The City of Spirit Lake passed local ordinances 7-4-2 and 7-4-3 making the city the 
owner and operator of its municipal water system. The city also provided for fees and denial of 
service. See Ordinance 7-4-4, 7-4-8. Once service is denied, the city may declare the residence 
or building unfit for habitation and a public nuisance. See Ordinance 7-4-9. 
The city took an extra step to consolidate its power over water by passing ordinance 7-4-
1 0. The ordinance states 
Every part of the city water system up to, and including, any 
shutoff valve and/or meter, which may be installed at or near the 
property line of any lot, is the property of the city. It shall be 
unlawful for any person to connect to, interfere or tamper with, 
turn on or off, permit connection or delivery of water to third 
persons for use within a residence or other building not 
otherwise provided with water service in accordance with this 
chapter, or to operate or introduce any substance into any part of 
the city water system unless that person is acting under the direct 
supervision of a qualified employee of the city or first obtains 
express written permission from the mayor. (emphasis added) 
While unclear, the ordinance arguably makes it unlawful for a person to permit connection or 
delivery of water to third persons for use within a residence not otherwise provided with water 
service in accordance with this chapter. While this leads to the absurd result that a person 
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commits a misdemeanor by filling a water bottle with tap water in Spirit Lake and later sharing 
that tap water with a person that does not live in their home while both are in either a home or 
building without water from Spirit Lake, criminal laws must be strictly construed, and the 
Supreme Court will not change or strike down a law for absurdity. See Verska, 151 Idaho at 895; 
State v. Sivak, 119 Idaho 320, 325 (1990). 
The ordinance so interpreted, however, conflicts with the powers granted the municipality 
by I. C. 50-1 030(f). In BHA Investments, Inc. v. City of Boise, 138 Idaho 356, 357 (2003), the 
Idaho Supreme Court found that a liquor license transfer fee imposed by the city went beyond its 
statutory authority. In comparing the city ordinance with state law, the Court found: 
The plain language of I C. § 23-916 provides cities with authority 
to impose a license fee, not a transfer fee. The license fees from 
section 23-904, titled "License fees," are the fees to which the 
statute plainly refers. I C. § 23-916 predates the statute allowing 
the state to collect transfer fees. Therefore, I C. § 2 3-916 could not 
have been drafted to include transfer fees, since they were non-
existent when I C. § 23-916 was passed. The legislature has not 
changed the relevant language of the statute granting cities 
authority to collect a "license fee" since the passage of the 
transfer fee statute in 1980. The state legislature has not granted 
cities the authority to impose a transfer fee. The City exceeded its 
power in collecting the transfer fee. (footnotes omitted). 
Id. at 358. 
In this case, the City of Spirit Lake's authority is limited by I.C. 50-1030(f). The City 
seeks to expand the list of possible actions it may take regarding its water system to include 
criminalizing the delivery of water to third persons in a building or residence that is not provided 
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with water by the city water system. See Ordinance 7-4-10; Tr Vol. I, p. 26, L. 22-25, p. 27, L. 1-
17. The wording ofl.C. 50-1030(f) creates a nonexhaustive list of possibilities through use of 
the word "including." See Federal Lank Bank of St. Paul v. Bismarck Lumber Co., 314 U.S. 95, 
100 (1941 ). However, the list "including" creates is illustrative. Richardson v. National City 
Bank of Evansville, 141 F.3d 1228, 1232 (7th Cir. 1998). 
In City of Grangeville, 116 Idaho at 539, the Idaho Supreme Court struck down an 
ordinance allowing a municipality to place a lien for nonpayment of utilities on a property owner 
when his tenants failed to pay. The Court found that 
the city may collect the charges for the water, sewer and garbage 
services provided by the city from those who use the services. This 
right to collect does not depend on any expressed or implied power 
of the city, but rather on principles of contract law that obligate 
one who accepts a service to pay for it. What the city has attempted 
to do here is to rewrite those principles to allow collection from 
the owner, even though the services were not ordered, contracted 
for, or used by the owner. 
!d. at 538-39. 
The Court held 
An implied power to collect from an owner who had not ordered, 
contracted for, or used the service would be unreasonable because 
it would create a liability not consistent with principles of contract 
law. We are not prepared to read this power into these statutes 
[referring to I C.§§ 50-323 and 50-1030(/)}. 
!d. at 539. 
In other words, though not providing an exhaustive list, I. C. § 50-1 030(f) does not grant 
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municipalities plenary authority to do whatever they wish to their citizenry for the good of the 
water system. 
The City of Spirit Lake relies on its police powers expressed in Article XII § 2 of the 
Idaho Constitution. 
Any county or incorporated city or town may make and enforce, 
within its limits, all such local police, sanitary and other 
regulations as are not in conflict with its charter or with the 
general laws. 
The City also relies on I. C. § 50-302 which states in pertinent part: 
(1) Cities shall make all such ordinances, bylaws, rules, 
regulations and resolutions not inconsistent with the laws of the 
state of Idaho as may be expedient, in addition to the special 
powers in this act granted, to maintain the peace, good 
government and welfare of the corporation and its trade, 
commerce and industry. Cities may enforce all ordinances by fine, 
including an infraction penalty, or incarceration; provided, 
however, except as provided in subsection (2) of this section, that 
the maximum punishment of any offense shall be by fine of not 
more than one thousand dollars ($1, 000) or by imprisonment not 
to exceed six (6) months, or by both such fine and imprisonment. 
Neither the constitutional section nor the statute, however, can submerge the narrowing of 
authority provided in I.C. § 50-1030(f). See Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co., 426 U.S. 148, 
153 (1976) ("It is a basic principle of statutory construction that a statue dealing with a narrow, 
precise, and specific subject is not submerged by a later enacted statute covering a more 
generalized spectrum."); Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 550-51 (1974) ("Where this is no 
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clear intention otherwise, a specific statute will not be controlled or nullified by a general one, 
regardless of the priority of enactment."). 
And so this Court is left with deciding whether criminal penalties are allowable under I.C. 
§ 50-1 030(t). This question is comparable, if not the same, as the one confronted by the Idaho 
Supreme Court in State v. Kavajecz, 139 Idaho 482 (2003). In that case 
[the Court] addressed whether touching or kissing the chest of a 
prepubescent girl constituted lewd conduct. [The] Court held that 
it did not because the type of conduct included in the phrase 
"including but not limited to" must be the conduct of a like or 
similar class or character to the types of conduct specifically 
listed 
State v. Flegel, 151 Idaho 525, 528 (2011) citing Kavajecz. 139 
Idaho at 486-87. 
Thus, in the case before this Court, the municipality has been granted powers of a like or 
similar class or character to 
.. . prescribe and collect rates, fees, tolls or charges, including the 
levy or assessment of such rates, fees, tolls or charges against 
governmental units, departments or agencies, including the state of 
Idaho and its subdivisions, for the services, facilities and 
commodities furnished by such works, or by such rehabilitated 
existing electrical generating facilities, and to provide methods of 
collections and penalties, including denial of service for 
nonpayment of such rates, fees, tolls or charges; ... 
I.C. 50-1030(±) 
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The list clearly consists only of civil penalties. An ordinance may not "classify conduct more 
harshly than a state statute." State v. Reyes, 146 Idaho 778, 781 (Ct. App. 2008). As the Reyes 
Court 
note[d,} [there are} important policy implications of allowing 
cities and counties to criminalize matters the legislature has 
specifically chosen to decriminalize. Allowing cities and counties 
to reclassify infractions as misdemeanors would lead to an 
inconsistent application and enforcement of the laws across the 
state. A motorist stopped for an infraction such as speeding in one 
city would be issued a citation and subjected to the infraction 
procedures and penalties, while the same motorist stopped for 
speeding in a city that has reclassified speeding as a misdemeanor 
may be arrested and taken to jail, request and receive an attorney 
and a jury trial, and potentially serve jail time in addition to 
paying a substantial fine. Such inconsistent treatment of similarly-
situated defendants is not what the legislature intended or what the 
law allows. 
Id 
Therefore, Ordinance 7-4-10 conflicts with the General Laws of Idaho, and must be struck down. 
2. Spirit Lake Ordinance 7-4-10 is not confined to the limits of Spirit Lake. 
A municipal corporation is granted police powers under Article XII § 2 of the Idaho Constitution. 
Any county or incorporated city or town may make and enforce, 
within its limits, all such local police, sanitary and other 
regulations as are not in conflict with its charter or with the 
general laws. 
From a review of the cases construing such constitutional provision it may be said that 
there are three general restrictions which apply to legislation under the authority conferred by 
such provision: (1) the ordinance or regulation must be confined to the limits of the 
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governmental body enacting the same, (2) it must not be in conflict with other general laws of the 
state, and (3) it must not be an unreasonable or arbitrary enactment. State v. Clark, 88 Idaho 365, 
374 (1965). Police powers must be used to serve the public interest. See id at 375. 
The ordinance makes no attempt to limit its scope to the City of Spirit Lake. Every 
person engaged in any chain of events that leads to the use of water in a home not provided that 
water in accordance with the municipality's ordinances will be in violation of these laws. That 
would of course be most ofldaho. The Magistrate Court held that the statute must be construed 
to be constitutional, however, no such imperative exists. State v. Manzanares, 152 Idaho 410, 
439 (2012) quoting Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 515 (1964) ("It must be 
remembered that '[a]lthough this Court will often strain to construe legislation so as to save it 
against constitutional attack, it must not and will not carry this to the point of perverting the 
purpose of a statute ... ' or judicially rewriting it." (quoting Scales v. US., 367 U.S. 203, 211 
(1961))); Tr Vol. I, p. 29, L. 15-25. 
In Blaha v. Board of Ada Count Com 'rs, 134 Idaho 770, 777 (2000) the Court found that 
[b] eyond the corporate limits of a city, the county has jurisdiction 
by statute to accept and approve subdivision plats. See 1 C. § 50-
1308. For the City of Eagle to be allowed to exercise co-equal 
jurisdiction with Ada County in the impact area lying beyond the 
city limits would not only be in conflict with the statute but also 
inconsistent with constitutional/imitations placed on a city's 
powers. Article XIL § 2 of the Idaho Constitution provides that any 
county or incorporated city or town may make and enforce, within 
its limits, all such local police, sanitary and other regulations as 
·are not in conflict with its charter or with the general laws. This 
Court has held that the power of cities and counties only exists 
within the sovereign boundaries of the cities and the counties 
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respectively. See Clyde Hess Distributing Co. v. Bonneville 
County, 69 Idaho 505 (1949) (valid county regulation enforceable 
so far as territory embraced in county was concerned, exclusive of 
municipalities where the regulation was without force and effect); 
Boise City v. Blaser, 98 Idaho 789 (1977) (To give effect to a 
county permit within city limits would be to violate the separate 
sovereignty provisions of Idaho Canst., art. XIL § 2.); Hobbs v. 
Abrams, 104 Idaho 205 (1983) (ordinance or regulation must be 
confined to the limits of the governmental body enacting the same). 
Therefore, any reading of the implementing ordinances granting 
the City the power to restrict development in the impact area by 
denying approval of a subdivision application made to the County 
would be an extraterritorial exercise ofjurisdiction by the City and 
an infringement on the constitutional right of the County. 
(footnotes omitted). 
Ordinance 7-4-10 does not limit itself to the City of Spirit Lake and is therefore in violation of 
the Idaho Constitution. 
3. Spirit Lake Ordinance 7-4-10 is improper, unreasonable and/or arbitrary. 
A municipal corporation is granted police powers under Article XII § 2 of the Idaho 
Constitution. 
Any county or incorporated city or town may make and enforce, 
within its limits, all such local police, sanitary and other 
regulations as are not in conflict with its charter or with the 
general laws. 
From a review of the cases construing such constitutional provision it may be said that 
there are three general restrictions which apply to legislation under the authority conferred by 
such provision: (i) the ordinance or reguiation must be confined to the iimits of the 
governmental body enacting the same, (2) it must not be in conflict with other general laws of the 
-24-
Michael Jay Freitas 41378 158 of 235
state, and (3) it must not be an unreasonable or arbitrary enactment. State v. Clark, 88 Idaho at 
374. Police powers must be used to serve the public interest. See id. at 375. 
Ordinance 7-4-1 0 is argued by the state to make it illegal to provide water being paid for 
in one place to a person in a residence or building not provided with water by the City of Spirit 
Lake. The state argued that this criminalization was necessary to keep the cost of water down 
and for sanitary reasons. Tr Vol. I, p. 25, L. 6-7, 11-12. The Court found that the city has an 
interest in being the sole regulator ofwater delivery. Tr Vol. I, p. 27, L. 18-25, p. 28, L. 1. 
As to the state's first contention and the Court's finding oflegitimate purpose, the city's 
interest in being sole regulator of water delivery and its need to prevent competition fails to be 
proper. The municipality's attempt at monopolization runs afoul of§ 5 of the Federal Trade 
Commission Act, 38 Stat. 719, 15 U.S.C. § 45, and§ 7 of the Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 731, 15 
U.S.C. § 18. "Because municipalities and other political subdivisions are not themselves 
sovereign, state-action immunity under Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943), does not apply to 
them directly." FTC v. Phoebe Putney Health System, Inc., No. 11-1160. --- S.Ct. ----,2013 
WL 598434 at *6 (U.S.2013) citing Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advertising, Inc., 499 U.S. 365, 
370 (1991); Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389,411-413 (1978) (plurality 
opinion). "At the same time, however, substate governmental entities do receive immunity from 
antitrust scrutiny when they act 'pursuant to state policy to displace competition with regulation 
or monopoly public service."' !d. citing Omni Outdoor Advertising, Inc., 499 U.S., at 413. 
In order for a Court to find that Spirit Lake's monopoly does not violate federal law, it 
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must be able to find that the state clearly articulated its intention that the city could consolidate 
power over water delivery by criminalizing the act if done by others. See Phoebe Putney Health 
System, Inc., 2013 WL 598434 at *7. In Phoebe Putney Health System, Inc., the United States 
Supreme Court found that the act of a Georgia municipality in buying out its competition was not 
protected from the anti-trust act as there was no clear articulation from the state government that 
municipalities could behave in such an anticompetitive manner. !d. at *7. The Court found 
Our case law makes clear that state-law authority to act is 
insufficient to establish state-action immunity; the substate 
governmental entity must also show that it has been delegated 
authority to act or regulate anticompetitively. In BoulderL we held 
that Colorado's Home Rule Amendment allowing municipalities to 
govern local affairs did not satisfy the clear-articulation test. 
There was no doubt in that case that the city had authority as a 
matter of state law to pass an ordinance imposing a moratorium 
on a cable provider's expansion of service. But we rejected the 
proposition that "the general grant of power to enact ordinances 
necessarily implies state authorization to enact specific 
anticompetitive ordinances" because such an approach "would 
wholly eviscerate the concepts of 'clear articulation and 
affirmative expression' that our precedents require. " We explained 
that when a State's position "is one of mere neutrality respecting 
the municipal actions challenged as anticompetitive, " the State 
cannot be said to have " 'contemplated' " those anticompetitive 
actions. 
The principle articulated in Boulder controls this case. Grants of 
general corporate power that allow substate governmental entities 
to participate in a competitive marketplace should be, can be, and 
typically are used in ways that raise no federal antitrust concerns. 
As a result, a State that has delegated such general powers "can 
hardly be said to have 'contemplated' " that they will be used 
anticompetitively. Thus, while the Law does allow the Authority to 
acquire hospitals, it does not clearly articulate and affirmatively 
express a state policy empowering the Authority to make 
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states 
acquisitions of existing hospitals that will substantially lessen 
competition. 
!d. citing Omni, 499 U.S., at 372; Community Communications Co. 
v. Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 45-46, 55-56 (1982); 1A P. Areeda & H. 
Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law ~ 225a, p. 131 (3d ed.2006) ("When a 
state grants power to an inferior entity, it presumably grants the 
power to do the thing contemplated, but not to do so 
anticompetitively"). 
The City of Spirit Lake is granted authority to run a water system by I. C. 50-323 which 
[c]ities are hereby empowered to establish, create, develop, 
maintain and operate domestic water systems; provide for 
domestic water from wells, streams, water sheds or any other 
source; provide for storage, treatment and transmission ofthe 
same to the inhabitants of the city; and to do all things necessary 
to protect the source of water from contamination. The term 
"domestic water systems" and "domestic water" includes by way 
of example but not by way of limitation, a public water system 
providing water at any temperature for space heating or cooling, 
culinary, sanitary, recreational or therapeutic uses. 
I. C. § 50-323 is a "general grant of power" and does not give cities the right to create 
monopolies or act in anticompetitive ways. Ordinance 7-4-10 clearly goes beyond this grant of 
authority. Even assuming the ordinance does nothing to prevent a person or corporate entity 
from delivering water from an outside source, nothing the state legislature has enacted would 
lead one to conclude that they meant for municipalities to establish a stranglehold on the delivery 
of water from their own water supply. The statute is unlawful and harms the welfare of the 
community by being anticompetitive in violation of Article XII § 2 of the Idaho Constitution and 
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I. C. § 50-302. It must be struck down. 
In addition to violating our national policy of competition, the law is arbitrary. Sharing 
water cannot harm the person sharing, the person being shared with, the community, or the 
municipality. Further, nothing prevents a person or corporate entity from simply paying for 
another person's water bill. The state's proffered sanitary issue is irrelevant- the city has no 
ordinance controlling how the water is delivered to those paying- it has made no attempt to 
interdict those who would drink from the hose at their own home or would use rusty lead pipes. 
Ordinance 7-4-10 is clearly not related to sanitary issues. The ordinance is utterly arbitrary and 
must be struck down. 
II. 
A. Introduction 
The Magistrate Court erred in not finding that Spirit Lake Ordinance 7-4-10 is 
unconstitutional as applied to the facts of this case. The Court was provided with a summary of 
the facts and the testimony of Ms. Brown and found no issue with the application of the statute. 
Criminalizing the act of charitably gifting water one has paid for to another goes beyond the 
boundaries of our national values and this Court should find Ordinance 7-4-10 unconstitutional 
as applied to this case. 
B. Standard of Review 
An appellate court exercises free review over questions of law. Idaho v. Button, 134 
Idaho 814 (Ct.App.2000); Powell v. Sellers, 130 Idaho 122, 125 (Ct. App. 1997). 
-28-
Michael Jay Freitas 41378 162 of 235
C. Spirit Lake Ordinance 7-4-10 violates the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution, Article I §§ 1, 4, 14, Article XII§ 2, and Article XV §§ 1, 4, and 5 ofthe 
Idaho Constitution as applied to the facts of this case. 
This case is about a man who took pity on a neighbor and gave her, her children, and her 
grandchildren water to use at home. No reasonable person could read Ordinance 7-4-10 to have 
intended this as a consequence of its unclear language. See Argument I.C, supra. 
Further, it is well-established that free alienation is a property right. See Bruno v. First 
Federal Sav. & Loan Ass'n of Boise, 115 Idaho 1104 (1989). But charitable giving is something 
more profound; it is a value that predates and is part and parcel of our rights. 
'There was a statute in Bologna that whoever drew blood in the 
streets should be severely punished, and yet it was held not to 
apply to the case of a barber who opened a vein in the street. It is 
commanded in the decalogue that no work shall be done upon the 
Sabbath, and yet giving the command a rational interpretation 
founded upon its design the Infallible Judge held that it did not 
prohibit works of necessity, charity, or benevolence on that day. ' 
In 1 Blackstone's Commentaries, 91, the learned author observes 
with reference to the construction of statutes: 
'If there arise out of them any absurd consequences manifestly 
contradictory to common reason, they are, with regard to those 
collateral consequences, void * * * When some collateral matter 
arises out of the general words, and happen to be unreasonable, 
then the judges are, in decency, to conclude that the consequence 
was not foreseen by the Parliament, and, therefore, they are at 
liberty to expound the statute by equity and only quoad hoc 
disregard it. ' 
Discargar v. City ofSeattle, 171 P.2d 205,209 (Wash.1946) citing 
Riggs v. Palmer, 22 N.E. 188, 189 (N.Y. 1889). 
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Writing in concurrence in Martin v. City of Struthers, Ohio, 319 U.S. 141, 151 (1943) Justice 
Murphy wrote 
[a] s construed by the state courts and applied to the case at bar, 
the Struthers ordinance prohibits door to door canvassing of any 
kind, no matter what its character and purpose may be, if attended 
by the distribution of written or printed matter in the form of a 
circular or pamphlet. I do not believe that this outright prohibition 
is warranted. As I understand it, the distribution of circulars and 
pamphlets is a relatively minor aspect of the problem. The primary 
concern is with the act of canvassing as a source of inconvenience 
and annoyance to householders. But if the city can prohibit 
canvassing for the purpose of distributing religious pamphlets, it 
can also outlaw the door to door solicitations of religious 
charities, or the activities of the holy mendicant who begs alms 
from house to house to serve the material wants of his fellowmen 
and thus obtain spiritual comfort for his own soul. 
Prohibition may be more convenient to the law maker, and easier 
to fashion than a regulatory measure which adequately protects 
the peace and privacy of the home without suppressing legitimate 
religious activities. But that does not justify a repressive enactment 
like the one now before us. Freedom of religion has a higher 
dignity under the Constitution than municipal or personal 
convenience. In these days free men have no loftier responsibility 
than the preservation of that freedom. A nation dedicated to that 
ideal will not suffer but will prosper in its observance. (emphasis 
added). 
!d. citing Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 164 (1937). 
According to Marriarn-Webster, the word charity originated in the 13th Century. Marriam-
Webster, charity, http:/ /www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/charity (last accessed March 7, 
2013). The Bible makes many references to charity, for example: 
And though I bestow all my goods to feed the poor, and though I 
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give my body to be burned, and have not charity, it profiteth me 
nothing. Charity suffereth long, and is kind; charity envieth not; 
charity vaunteth not itself, is not puffed up. And now stays faith, 
hope, charity, these three; but the greatest of these is charity. 
1 Corinthians 13:3-13 
Thus it is hard to believe that the expression of kindness that is charity is without 
constitutional protection. Whether that protection comes from the First, Fifth, Ninth, or 
Fourteenth Amendment, or a conglomeration of the four, the fact remains that a law that punishes 
giving water to the poor and thirsty is abominable. The Fourteenth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution protects from governmental intrusion 
those personal activities and decisions that this Court has 
identified as so deeply rooted in our history and traditions, or so 
fundamental to our concept of constitutionally ordered liberty, that 
they are protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.FN19 
FN19. See Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 US. 494, 503 (1977) 
("[T}he Constitution protects the sanctity of the family precisely 
because the institution of the family is deeply rooted in this 
Nation's history and tradition" (emphasis added)); Griswold v. 
Connecticut, 381 US. 479, 485-486 (1965) (intrusions into the 
"sacred precincts of marital bedrooms" offend rights "older than 
the Bill of Rights"); id., at 495-496 (Goldberg, J, concurring) (the 
law in question "disrupt fed} the traditional relation of the family-
a relation as old and as fundamental as our entire civilization"); 
Loving v. Virginia, 388 US. 1, 12 (1967) {"The freedom to marry 
has long been recognized as one of the vital personal rights 
essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness"); Turner v. Safley, 
482 US. 78, 95 (1987) ( "[T}he decision to marry is a 
fundamental right"); Roe v. Wade, 410 US. 113 (1973) (stating 
that at the founding and throughout the 19th century, "a woman 
enjoyed a substantially broader right to terminate a pregnancy"); 
Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rei. Williamson, 316 US. 535, 541 (1942) 
("Marriage and procreation are fundamental"); Pierce v. Society 
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ofSisters, 268 US. 510,535 (1925); Meyerv. Nebraska, 262 US. 
390, 399 (1923) (liberty includes "those privileges long recognized 
at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by 
free men''). 
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 727-28 n.l9 (1997). 
Moreover, if Article I § 1 of the Idaho Constitution, which states 
[a]ll men are by nature free and equal, and have certain 
inalienable rights, among which are enjoying and defending life 
and liberty; acquiring, possessing and protecting property; 
pursuing happiness and securing safety 
is to be deemed to have any meaning whatsoever, it should be read to protect a person's right to 
freely give of themselves to those less fortunate. 
There is a practical reason for courts to acknowledge this. No matter how it tries, the 
government will likely never be able to stop the American people from doing good. Outlawing 
charity will only breed martyrs. This is not a path that the government of this municipality, state, 
or nation wants to go down. This ordinance goes beyond the boundaries of protecting to actually 
harming our society's welfare. It must be struck down. 
III. 
A. Introduction 
If the Magistrate Court did not err in dismissing the case because Spirit Lake Ordinance 
7-4-10 is constitutional, then the Court erred in its interpretation of the statute. Due to the 
Court's error, the defendant was tried under the wrong elements, and the finding of guilt must be 
reversed. 
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B. Standard of Review 
An appellate court exercises free review over questions oflaw. Idaho v. Button, 134 
Idaho 814 (Ct.App.2000); Powell v. Sellers, 130 Idaho 122, 125 (Ct. App. 1997). 
C. The Magistrate Court's reading of the statute was incorrect, and therefore the defendant 
was tried under the wrong elements. 
The Magistrate Court construed Ordinance 7-4-1 0 to mean 
[e}ssentially, what it prohibits, is uh, improperly connect to the city water system, 
improperly interfering with or tampering with that system, uh, improperly 
connecting and delivering water to third persons under certain circumstances, 
and then improperly operating or introducing a substance into any part of the 
water system, again under certain circumstances. 
Tr Vol. I, p. 27, L. 10-17. 
However, the ordinance, ifread properly, has nothing to do with this case. The ordinance 
refers to interfering with, tampering with, turning on or off, permitting connection or delivery of 
water to third persons for use within a residence or other building not otherwise provided with 
water service in accordance with this chapter. The statute is best read to mean that it would be 
unlawful for anyone to interfere with, tamper, tum on or off, permit connection or delivery of 
water to another within a residence or building- through the use of the city's water system. The 
water system extends to the "standard service connection" to the "main distribution line." See 
Ordinances 7-4-3 and 7-4-4. In other words, the ordinance seeks to outlaw acts that would either 
do harm to the water system or siphon water from it without paying- such as digging up the water 
line and making a new connection to it. It has no application to water drawn and properly paid 
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for by a citizen through standard and acceptable piping. If this is a reasonable reading of the 
statute it must also be the correct one. State v. Sivak, 119 Idaho 320, 325 (1990). Therefore, the 
elements instruction was incorrect at trial and the judgment must be reversed. 
IV. 
A. Introduction 
If the Magistrate Court did not err in dismissing the case because Spirit Lake Ordinance 
7-4-10 is constitutional, and the Court was correct in its interpretation of the ordinance, the state 
failed to provide sufficient evidence for all the elements. 
B. Standard of Review 
On review, this Court must determine whether "the evidence is sufficient to sustain a 
conviction ofthe crime charged." State v. Hansen, 125 Idaho 927, 930 (1994). This Court 
examines the evidence to determine whether a reasonable mind could conclude beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant's guilt as to each material element of the offense was proven. 
State v. DeGrat, 128 Idaho 352, 355 (1996). 
C. The state failed to produce sufficient evidence for a conviction. 
Under the state's elements instruction, the state had to prove that the water the defendant 
provided his neighbors came from the City of Spirit Lake. The state introduced only the 
following evidence as to this element- when asked whether she had had a conversation with the 
defendant, Officer Wise also testified that at the time she gave him the citation, Mr. Freitas said 
that 
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"it was something to the effect that urn, he didn't really realize-- he didn't think that 
there was anything wrong as far - - as long as the water was going through his meter and 
he's paying for it, that he said he should be able to do whatever he wanted to do with his 
water, that he could put it in his yard or give it to a neighbor." 
Tr Vol. II, p. 89, L. 19-25, p. 90, L. 1-3. 
The officer had previously given him a copy of the text of Spirit Lake Ordinance 7-4-10. Tr Vol. 
II, p. 85, L. 1-5. As discussed in Argument I.C, the Ordinance is not a model of clarity. It is 
therefore impossible to draw a conclusion as to where the defendant received his water. He 
could very well have been simply arguing about the ordinance. He may have water from a 
different water system that goes through a meter. The jury was not instructed that only one 
possible source of water could have a meter attached. The facts in this case do not allow a 
reasonable person to conclude the defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. This Court 
should reverse the jury's finding. 
v. 
A. Introduction 
If the Magistrate Court did not err in dismissing the case because Spirit Lake Ordinance 
7-4-10 is constitutional, then the Court erred in refusing the defendant's proposed jury instruction 
that the city's property did not extend beyond the meter. 
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B. Standard of Review 
An appellate court exercises free review over questions oflaw. Idaho v. Button, 134 
Idaho 814 (Ct.App.2000); Powell v. Sellers, 130 Idaho 122, 125 (Ct. App. 1997). 
C. The defendant was entitled to his proposed jury instruction. 
The defendant requested that the jury be instructed as to the language at the start of the 
ordinance. The City of Spirit Lake thought it was important to include it, and the defendant 
believe it is as well. The Idaho Supreme Court held, in State v. Lanliford, 113 Idaho 688, 694 
(1987): 
Where the jury instructions, taken as a whole, correctly state the 
law and are not inconsistent, but may be reasonably and fairly 
harmonized, it will be assumed that the jury gave due 
consideration to the whole charge and was not misled by any 
isolated portion thereof 
Due to the difficult of deciphering what Ordinance 7-4-10 intends, it is difficult to know whether 
or not the language requested is necessary to understand it, but because it is a criminal charge, the 
defendant argues that the jury should have been able to view all of the law- particularly since an 
element of the crime required the defendant to be using the city's water. 
VI. 
A. Introduction 
The Court erred in overruling the defendant's objections to the prosecutor's voir dire 
questions dealing with law. 
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B. Standard of Review 
An appellate court exercises free review over questions of law. Idaho v. Button, 134 
Idaho 814 (Ct.App.2000); Powell v. Sellers, 130 Idaho 122, 125 (Ct. App. 1997). 
C. The prosecutor's questions as to the opinions of the jury as to the law were improper. 
The goal ofvoir dire is to assure retention of a fair and impartial jury. State v. Hart, 112 
Idaho 759, 761 (Ct.App.1987). Attorneys are given wide latitude in asking questions to 
determine whether there are grounds to challenge a juror, either for cause or peremptorily. State 
v. McKeehan, 91 Idaho 808, 819 (1967); State v. Camarillo, 106 Idaho 310,312 (Ct.App.1984). 
However, the questions must be designed to address the venirepersons' qualifications to sit as 
jurors. Idaho Criminal Rule 24(b) specifies that "[a]ny question propounded by an attorney to a 
prospective juror which is not directly relevant to the qualifications of the juror, or is not 
reasonably calculated to discover the possible existence of a ground for challenge, or has been 
previously answered, shall be disallowed by the court .... " Thus, questions that are designed not to 
elicit factual information from the juror, but to inquire into a juror's personal knowledge or 
understanding ofthe law are impermissible. State v. Bitz, 93 Idaho 239,244 (1969); State v. 
Hoagland, 39 Idaho 405, 417 (1924). 
As the Court found in State v. Severance, 132 Idaho 637, 639 (Ct.App.1999): 
If a query into a potential juror's personal knowledge of existing 
and applicable law is not relevant to the jury selection process, the 
prosecutor's inquiry here, asking the venireperson's beliefs about 
how the law should be changed, is even further afield The only 
law applicable to Severance's guilt or innocence was that which 
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was in effect at the time of the alleged offense and upon which the 
jurors were obligated to take instruction from the trial court. The 
prosecutor's request for disclosure of a prospective juror's attitude 
toward lowering the BAC limit was not designed to reveal 
anything about the individual's ability to sit as a fair and unbiased 
juror. 
In this case, the prosecutor asked about the jurors' opinion of the law at hand, of laws 
they believed ridiculous in general, and of the importance oflaw in general. Tr Vol. II, p. 23, L. 
24-25, p. 24, L. 1-25, p. 25, L. 1-22, p. 29, L. 6-12,9-25, p. 30, L. 1-25, p. 31, L. 1-25, p. 32, L. 
1-21. None of these were proper subjects for the prosecutor's voir dire. The judge's ruling was 
in error. If such questions are going to be allowed, then certainly defense counsel should be 
allowed to ask the very same questions at any trial. See Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 
305-6 (2004). 
CONCLUSION 
The case before this Court requires it to review an ordinance that violates the values of 
the community by being both anticompetitive and anticharity. The ordinance is first, extremely 
difficult to read, second, goes beyond the powers vested in the municipality that passed it, and 
most of all, an improper and arbitrary abuse of power. This Court must strike it down and 
reverse the judgment. 
Even if this Court does find a way to save the ordinance from nullification, the 
interpretation of the statute by the lower Court was faulty, the jury was tainted by improper voir 
dire questions by the state, and the whole law was hidden from the jury's view. The judgment 
cannot stand, and this Court should reverse it and remand. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature ofthe Case 
This is an appeal from a verdict entered by the Magistrate Court fmding Michael J. 
Freitas (Appellant) guilty of misdemeanor violation of Spirit Lake City Ordinance 7-4-10-
Unlawful Act Regarding a Water System. A six-person jury found Appellant guilty of violation 
of Spirit Lake City Ordinance 7-4-10 after a trial. The Magistrate Court previously denied 
Appellant's Motion to Dismiss and held that the ordinance in question was constitutional. 
B. Facts and Procedural History 
On or about September 28, 2012, Officer Terry Wise, of the Spirit Lake Police 
Department, cited Michael J. Freitas (hereinafter Appellant) for providing water to his neighbor's 
residence in violation of Spirit Lake City Ordinance 7-4-10. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 89, L. 7-18). The 
neighboring residence in question is located at 5822 West Rhode Island Street, in Spirit Lake, 
Idaho and was owned by George Adams at the time this incident occurred. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 64, L. 
20-25). City records indicated that water service to Mr. Adams' residence had been turned off by 
the City of Spirit Lake on July 26, 2012. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 65, L. 2-13). Further, city records 
indicated that water service had been turned back on to the above mentioned residence on 
October 18, 2012. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 65, L. 14-21). On September 27, 2012, Officer Wise had 
advised Appellant that he was in violation of Spirit Lake Ordinance 7-4-10 by running a hose 
from his trailer to his neighbor's residence where water service had been shut off. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 
84, L. 7-25, p. 85 L. 1-13). Officer Wise could actually see that water was freely flowing from 
the hose, as water was squirting out at a point where the two hoses were connected. (Tr. Vol. II, 
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p. 86, L. 13-20). Officer Wise provided a highlighted copy of the City ordinance 7-4-10 to the 
Appellant and issued a verbal warning to discontinue the delivery of water, but did not cite 
Appellant for the offense at that time. Tr. Vol. II, p. 87, L. 13-17, p. 88 L. 2-4). The next day, 
September 28, 2012, when Officer Wise returned to the Appellant's residence, located at 5870 
Rhode Island Street, in Spirit Lake Idaho, Officer Wise observed the hose was still being used to 
transport City water to the neighboring residence and Appellant was cited for violating said 
ordinance. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 89, L. 7-25). 
After Appellant was handed a copy of the citation, he indicated that he didn't believe he 
was doing anything wrong, so long as he was paying for the water that was going through his 
meter. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 89, L. 2-21). Appellant further indicated that he was in fact providing water 
to his neighbors, at George Adams' residence. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 90, L. 4-24). 
On January 3, 2013, the Magistrate Court heard Appellant's Motion to Dismiss. The 
Court denied the Motion to Dismiss and held that the statute was constitutional. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 28, 
L. 7-25). This case then went to trial on January 8, 2013. Appellant was found guilty of 
Unlawful Act Regarding Water System, a violation of Spirit Lake Ordinance 7-4-10, and 
sentence was imposed by the Court at that same date and time. Sentence was subsequently 
stayed, pending appeal. 
Appellant subsequently filed this appeal, alleging that the Magistrate Court erred in 
holding that Spirit Lake City Ordinance 7-4-10 was constitutional, that the Court erred in 
refusing to give Appellant's proposed jury instruction #6, that the Court erred in denying 
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Appellant's Rule 29 Motion for Acquittal, and finally that the Court erred in not overruling 
Appellant's objections to the State's line of questioning during voir dire. 
ISSUES ON APPEAL 
I. The Magistrate Court did not err in upholding the constitutionality of Spirit Lake 
City Ordinance 7-4-10. 
II. The Magistrate Court did not err in refusing to give Appellant's proposed Jury 
Instruction #6. 
Ill. The Magistrate Court did not err in denying Appellant's Motion for Acquittal 
under Idaho Criminal Rule 29. 
IV. The Magistrate Court did not err by not overruling Appellant's objections to the 
State's line of questioning in voir dire. 
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STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Idaho Criminal Rules provide that all appeals from a magistrate court not involving a trial 
de novo shall be heard by the district court as an appellate proceeding1• An appellate court 
exercises free review over questions of law. Powers v. Sellers, 130, 132, Idaho 122, 125 
(Ct.App.1997). However, Appellate review of the sufficiency of the evidence is limited in scope. 
See State v. Lawyer, 150 Idaho 170, 172, 244 P.3d 1256, 1258 (Ct.App.2010). A judgment of 
conviction, entered upon a jury verdict, will not be overturned on appeal where there is 
substantial evidence upon which a reasonable trier of fact could have found that the prosecution 
sustained its burden of proving the essential elements of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt. 
State v. Herrera-Brita, 131 Idaho 383, 385, 957 P.2d 1099, 1101 (Ct.App.1998); State v. 
Knutson, 121 Idaho 101, 104, 822 P.2d 998, 1001 (Ct.App.1991). We will not substitute our 
view for that of the jury as to the credibility of the witnesses, the weight to be given to the 
testimony, and the reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence. Knutson, 121 Idaho at 
104, 822 P.2d at 1001; State v. Decker, 108 Idaho 683, 684, 701 P.2d 303, 304 (Ct.App.1985). 
Moreover, we will consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution. Herrera-
Brita, 131 Idaho at 385, 957 P.2d at 1101; Knutson, 121 Idaho at 104, 822 P.2d at 1001. 
1 ICR54.17(a) 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE MAGISTRATE COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING APPELLANT'S 
MOTION TO DISMISS. 
Appellant alleges that the city of Spirit Lake does not have the authority to regulate 
Appellant's use of City water once it is paid for, and that Spirit Lake Ordinance 7-4-10 is 
unconstitutionally vague and should be struck down. However, the State of Idaho through its 
Constitution and Legislature, has specifically authorized municipalities to make and enact 
ordinances and other laws, and to enforce such laws by way of criminal sanctions. Such laws 
must be upheld unless found to be in conflict with the general laws of the State, or found to be 
unreasonable and arbitrary. The burden is placed on the challenging party to prove that such laws 
are in conflict with general state laws, or that they are unreasonable or arbitrary. Further, there is 
a strong presumption that statutes are constitutional unless shown to be impermissibly vague on 
its face or as it is applied. Spirit Lake City Ordinance 7-4-10 must be upheld, as it has a clear 
meaning as to what it prohibits and can clearly be applied to Appellant's case at hand. 
A. Spirit Lake City Ordinance 7-4-10 is Not Unconstitutionally Vague on its Face or as 
Applied. 
The Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment ofthe United States Constitution 
requires that the laws of the United States and of the several states not be vague when defining 
criminal conduct. Idaho v. Korsen, 138 Idaho 706,711,69 P.3d 126, 131 (2003). The U.S. 
Constitution and policy requires that "no [person] ... be required at the peril ofloss ofliberty to 
speculate as to the meaning of penal statutes." I d. 
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A statute is unconstitutional and therefore void-for-vagueness where "its prohibitions are 
not clearly defined." !d. A prohibition is not clearly defined if it "fails to give adequate notice to 
people of ordinary intelligence concerning the conduct it proscribes ... or if it fails to establish 
minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement or others who must enforce the statute." !d. at 
712, 69 P.3d 132. The key to determining whether a statute is void-for-vaguness "is not the 
possibility that it will sometimes be difficult to determine whether the incriminating fact it 
establishes has been proved; but rather the indeterminacy of precisely what the fact is." United 
States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285,286, 128 S.Ct. 1830, 1835 (2008). In cases of constitutional 
challenges, the burden is on the challenging party; there is a strong presumption in favor of the 
validity of a statute. Idaho v. Leferink, 133 Idaho 780,783,992 P.2d 775,778 (1999). 
A statute may be challenged as unconstitutionally vague in two, mutually exclusive, 
ways. Burton v. Dep 't ofTransp., 149 Idaho 746, 748,240 P.3d 933, 935 (2010). First, "[a] 
statute may be challenged as unconstitutionally vague on its face[.]" !d. A statute is facially 
unconstitutional if "'the law is impermissibly vague in all of its applications.'" Korsen, 13 8 
Idaho 712, 69 P.3d 132. 
Second, a statute may be challenged as unconstitutionally vague "as applied to the 
complainant's conduct." Burton, 149 Idaho 748, 240 P.3d 935. A statute is unconstitutionally 
vague as applied if "the statute failed to provide fair notice that the complainant's specific 
conduct was prohibited or failed to provide sufficient guidelines such that police had unbridled 
discretion in determining whether to charge the complainant." !d. 
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1. FACIAL CHALLENGE. 
A statute is unconstitutionally facially vague if there are no circumstances under which 
the statute could be constitutionally applied. Idaho v. Cobb, 132 Idaho 195, 199, 969 P.2d 244, 
248 (1998). A statute can survive a constitutional challenge where there is an identifiable 
circumstance in ''which the statute or ordinance unquestionably could be constitutionally 
applied." !d. at 247, 969 P.2d 247. 
Spirit Lake Ordinance § 7-4-1 0 states in relevant part: 
It shall be unlawful for any person to connect to, interfere or tamper with, turn on or off, 
permit connection or delivery of water to third persons for use within a residence or other 
building not otherwise provided with water service in accordance with this chapter ... " 
This ordinance is not ambiguous and its language is clear when given its "commonly understood, 
everyday mea.nlngs." Idaho v. Warriorwoman, 2008 WL 4202272 at *5 (Idaho Dist., 1st Dist., 
Aug. 15, 2008) (unpublished opinion); Korsen, 138 Idaho at 713, 69 P.3d at 133. A person of 
ordinary intelligence can understand that this statute means that a person cannot "connect or 
deliver" Spirit Lake water to an individual for the use within a residence that is not otherwise 
provided with Spirit Lake city water. Basically, the City of Spirit Lake is seeking to keep private 
homeowners from acting as private regulatory entities and providing water service to other 
residents who have decided not to pay for their own water service. This is exactly how Defense 
Counsel has read the statute, "The ordinance makes it unlawful for a person to permit connection 
or delivery of water to third persons for use within a residence not otherwise provided with water 
service in accordance with this chapter." Defendant's Motion to Dismiss p. 3. As such, there is a 
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specific and identifiable circumstance where this ordinance can be constitutionally applied, and 
the void for vagueness challenge for the facial prong should fail. 
2. AS APPLIED. 
To determine whether a law is void-for-vagueness under an as applied challenge, the 
court should apply a two prong test. Idaho v. Foelsch, 2009 WL 3287575, at *3 (Idaho Dist., 1st 
Dist., Sept. 17, 2009) (unpublished opinion). The law will be unconstitutionally vague, as 
applied, if "(1) the law [does not] create minimum guidelines for police, judges, or juries charged 
with enforcement ofthe statute; and (2) [the law does not] provide a reasonable person with 
adequate and fair warning of the proscribed conduct." ld. In other words, a law is 
unconstitutionally vague if it gives authorities ''unbridled discretion" and it does not put the 
individual on notice of what action is required or forbidden. Korsen, 138 Idaho 712, 69 P.3d 132. 
As mentioned above, the statute prohibits a person from connecting to or delivering Spirit 
Lake water to an individual for the use within a residence or building, which is not otherwise 
being provided with water service. In the present case the Defendant connected and used a hose 
to deliver water from his trailer to his neighbor's residence. (Tr. Vol. II., p. 90, L. 4-23). His 
neighbor's residence had previously had its water service shut off on July 26, 2012. (Tr. Vol. II, 
p. 65, L. 7-13). Appellant's conduct in this matter is exactly what the ordinance sought to 
prohibit. Further, Appellant was previously put on notice that his conduct was in violation of said 
ordinance on September 27,2012. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 84, L. 7-25). Officer Wise made contact with 
Appellant and handed him a copy of Spirit Lake City Ordinance 7-4-1 0, also issuing him a 
verbal warning to discontinue providing water to his neighbor's residence. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 88, L. 
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7-25). A reasonable person reading the above portion of the ordinance in question would 
understand the conduct that it seeks to prohibit. 
In this case, Appellant was sufficiently placed on notice that his conduct violated said 
ordinance, but he chose to ignore the verbal warning he received on September 27, 2012 and 
continued providing his water to his neighbor's residence via a hose. As applied to the facts of 
this case, Appellant's conduct clearly violates said ordinance. Said ordinance puts an individual 
on notice of what conduct is forbidden and provides law enforcement and Judges guidelines for 
how to enforce it. As such, the ordinance can be constitutionally applied to the facts of this 
particular case and the void for vagueness challenge under the "as applied" prong should fail. 
B. Appellant has not Shown that the Implication of Spirit Lake City Ordinance 7-4-10 
Amounts to a Taking. 
The "Just Compensation Clause," which is also referred to as the "Takings Clause," is a 
"complicated and multi-faceted area of constitutional law. Boise Tower Associates, LLC v. 
Hogland, 147 Idaho 774, 215 P.3d 494, 503-04 (Idaho 2009). A government must provide 
compensation if the government's "regulations deprive an owner of ' all economically beneficial 
us[e]' ofher property." !d. quoting Lingle, 544 U.S. at 538, 125 S.Ct. at 2081, 161 L.Ed.2d at 
887 (2005). ((emphasis and bracket in original).2 There is no claim of inverse condemnation, 
claim under the Takings Clause, "unless an actual taking of private property is established." 
2 A taking may also include where the government physically modifies the property interest of a 
party, or where the taking is temporary in nature. Boise Tower Associates, LLC v. Hogland, 147 
Idaho 774215 P.3d 494, 503-04 (Idaho 2009). Neither of these types of taking apply to the 
ordinance in question in the present case. 
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Covington v. Jefferson County, 137 Idaho 777,780,53 P.3d 828, 831 (Idaho 2002) citing Snyder 
v. State, 92 Idaho 175, 179, 438 P.2d 920, 924 (1968). 
In the present case, whether the City of Spirit Lake has a property interest or not in City 
water, there is no taking that requires compensation. The Spirit Lake City Ordinance simply 
denies a person who is paying for city water from sharing it with an individual who does not 
have running water at their residence. Not only is the interference with use of water de minimus, 
but citizens of Spirit Lake retain almost the entire economic value in the water, and what is lost 
falls nowhere near "all economically beneficial use." Further, the appropriate remedy under the 
Taking Clause is to provide the compensation for depriving the owner of a property interest, not 
to dismiss an action or find a regulation unconstitutional. Appellant therefore cannot establish 
that a taking has occurred, and as such, the Takings Clause has no implication requiring the 
conviction to be overturned. 
C. The City of Spirit Lake has the Lawful Authority to Pass Spirit Lake City Ordinance 7-4-
10, and to Enforce it via Criminal Sanctions. 
A municipality may make and enforce "all such local police, sanitary and other 
regulations as are not in conflict with its charter or with the general laws. Caesar v. State, 101 
Idaho 158, 161, 610 P.2d 517, 520 (Idaho 1980) quoting Idaho Const. art. XII,§ 2. This 
constitutional grant of powers is viewed "as a grant oflocal police powers to Idaho cities." !d. 
"The burden falls on the party challenging the validity of a police power to show that it is either 
in conflict with the general laws ofthe state, unreasonable or arbitrary. Potts Canst. Co. v. N 
Kootenai Water Dist., 141 Idaho 678, 682, 116 P.3d 8, 11 (Idaho 2005) citing Plummer v. City of 
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Fruitland, 139 Idaho 810, 813, 87 P.3d 297, 300 (2004). "Generally courts are not concerned 
with the wisdom of ordinances and will uphold a municipal ordinance unless it is clearly 
unreasonable or arbitrary." !d. Further, "[i]t is well recognized that the social objective of 
preventing fmancial hardship and possible reliance upon the welfare agencies of the state is a 
permissible goal of police power action." Adams v. City of Pocatello, 91 Idaho 99, 101,416 P.2d 
46,49 (Idaho 1966) citing Home Accident Ins. Co. v. Industrial Commission, 34 Ariz. 201, 269 
P. 501 (1928). 
The Idaho Legislator has also granted cities the authority to create regulations "to 
maintain the peace, good government and welfare of the corporation and its trade, commerce and 
industry." I.C. § 50-302. I.C. § 50-302 provides: 
(1) Cities shall make all such ordinances, bylaws, rules, regulations and resolutions not 
inconsistent with the laws of the state of Idaho as may be expedient, in addition to the 
special powers in this act granted, to maintain the peace, good government and 
welfare of the corporation and its trade, commerce and industry. Cities may enforce 
all ordinances by fine, including an infraction penalty, or incarceration; provided, 
however, except as provided in subsection (2) of this section, that the maximum 
punishment of any offense shall be by fine of not more than one thousand dollars 
($1,000) or by imprisonment not to exceed six (6) months, or by both such fme and 
imprisonment. 
This Statute expressly authorizes that a city may enforce these ordinances through fmes and by 
incarceration. !d. 
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Further, one such trade, commerce, and industry a city may regulate under§ I.C. 50-302 
includes the management of a city water system. See I. C. §50-323. Specifically, I. C. §50-323 
provides that: 
Cities are hereby empowered to establish, create, develop, maintain and operate domestic 
water systems; provide for domestic water from wells, streams, water sheds or any other 
source; provide for storage, treatment and transmission of the same to the inhabitants of 
the city; and to do all things necessary to protect the source of water from contamination. 
The term "domestic water systems" and "domestic water" includes by way of example 
but not by way of limitation, a public water system providing water at any temperature 
for space heating or cooling, culinary, sanitary, recreational or therapeutic uses. 
The City of Spirit Lake has exercised its lawful authority under the Idaho Constitution 
and Legislative Powers to pass Spirit Lake City Ordinance 7-4-10. This statute prohibits an 
individual from allowing connection or delivery of city water to third persons for use within a 
residence that is not receiving city water. The City created this ordinance in an attempt to prevent 
unlawful sharing of city water for the use in a residence which does not have running water. The 
City of Spirit Lake is well within its authority to develop, maintain, and operate its domestic 
water system as the sole regulator of such a system. 
Appellant argues that I.C. § 50-1030(±) acts to limit a municipalities' authority to provide 
criminal sanctions in order to enforce ordinances. However, I. C. § 50-1030(±) provides that "In 
addition to the powers which it may now have, any city shall have power under and subject to 
the following provisions" which include: 
To prescribe and collect rates, fees, tolls or charges, including the levy or assessment of 
such rates, fees, tolls or charges against governmental units, departments or agencies, 
including the state ofldaho and its subdivisions, for the services, facilities and 
commodities furnished by such works, or by such rehabilitated existing electrical 
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generating facilities, and to provide methods of collections and penalties, including denial 
of service for nonpayment of such rates, fees, tolls or charges. 
I. C. § 50-1 030(f) does not act as a limitation on what municipalities are authorized to do in order 
to enforce such ordinances in relation to maintaining a cities' water system, but indicates that "in 
addition to the powers which it may now have" the city may also have the power to "prescribe 
and collect rates, fees ... and to provide methods of collections and penalties, including denial of 
service for nonpayment of such rates ... See Jd This statute simply gives municipalities further 
powers, in addition to powers already granted, to charge for services and to provide for civil 
penalties, including denial of services should such fees not be paid. This cannot be read to 
prohibit a municipality from enforcing such laws and ordinances by way of criminal penalties, 
but should be read to give municipalities further powers to regulate/maintain a cities' water 
system. 
As such, the City of Spirit Lake certainly has been granted the power by the State 
Legislature to regulate, maintain, and operate the city's water system and to create ordinance 7-
4-10, which provides for criminal sanctions and monetary penalties, as an enforcement 
mechanism. 
II. THE MAGISTRATE COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING TO GIVE 
APPELLANT'S PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTION #6. 
A. Appellant's Proposed Jury Instruction #6 was not a Clarifying Instruction that 
Related to any of the Elements of the Offense Charged and Thus the Court's 
Refusal to Give it as an Instruction was not Improper. 
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When reviewing jury instructions, we ask whether the instructions as a whole, and not 
individually, fairly and accurately reflect applicable law. State v. Bowman, 124 Idaho 936, 942, 
866 P.2d 193, 199 (Ct.App.1993). 
Appellant argues that it was in error for the Magistrate Court not to utilize Appellant's 
Proposed Jury Instruction #6 which stated: 
The Spirit Lake city water system is property of the city up to and including any shutoff 
valve and/or meter which may be installed at or near the property line of any lot. 
The State did not object to the Instruction being admitted. However, the Magistrate Court's 
refusal to use Appellant's Proposed Jury Instruction #6 was not in error, as it didn't help to 
clarify any of the elements of the crime the State had to prove. The fact that any shutoff valve or 
meter at or near a property line is property of the city, was not clarifying information that needed 
to be included in jury instructions. The instructions that were given, fairly and accurately 
depicted the applicable law. The Proposed Instruction was not necessary, as all the State had to 
prove was that Appellant permitted connection or delivery of city water to third persons. 
III. THE MAGISTRATE COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING APPELLANT'S 
RULE 29 MOTION. 
A. The Evidence Presented at Trial was Sufficient so that a Reasonable Trier of 
Fact could have Concluded that Every Element of the Offense Charged was 
Proven Beyond a Reasonable Doubt, Thus Sustaining a Conviction. 
Idaho Criminal Rule 29 states: 
The court on motion of the defendant or on its own motion shall order the entry of 
judgment of acquittal of one or more offenses charged in the indictment, information or 
complaint after the evidence on either side is closed if the evidence is insufficient 
to sustain a conviction of such offense or offenses. 
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When the defendant moves under I.C.R. 29, or a judgment of acquittal, the trial court, viewing 
the evidence in the light most favorable to the state, must determine whether the inculpatory 
evidence presented as to any essential element ofthe crime is so insubstantial that jurors could 
not help but have a reasonable doubt. State v. Murphy, 133 Idaho 489, 492, 988 P.2d 715, 718. 
(Ct.App.1999) citing to State v. Hoffman, 116 Idaho 480, 482, 776 P.2d 1199, 1201 
(Ct.App.1989). Upon review, this Court must determine whether the evidence presented at trial 
was sufficient to sustain a conviction of the crime charged. See State v. Hansen, 125 Idaho 927, 
930, 877 P.2d 898, 901 (1994). 
Appellant argues that the State failed to prove Element #3 beyond a reasonable doubt; 
that the water being provided from Appellant's home to his neighbor's residence was city water. 
Here, the State presented evidence that when Officer Wise issued the citation to Appellant, he 
indicated that "as long as the water was going through his meter and he's paying for it, that he 
should be able to do whatever he wanted to do with his water, that he could put it in his yard or 
give it to a neighbor." Tr. Vol. II, p. 89 L. 21-25, p. 90 L. 1-3. Appellant further indicated that he 
was paying for the water he was receiving at his home and that it "went through his meter." Tr. 
Vol. II, p. 89 L. 21-25, p. 90 L. 4-20. The State argued during the Rule 29 Motion, that when 
Officer Wise was asked whether Appellant indicated that he was paying for city water, she 
indicated that he said he was. Tr. Vol. II, p. 94 L. 1-11. In this case, there is substantial 
circumstantial evidence, if not direct evidence, that Appellant was in fact paying for the City of 
Spirit Lake water service. As such, the evidence as presented, viewed in light most favorable to 
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the non-moving party, was not so insubstantial that jurors could not help but to have a reasonable 
doubt as to proof of Element #3. As such, Appellant's Rule 29 Motion was properly denied. 
IV. THE MAGISTRATE COURT DID NOT ERR IN OVERRULING 
APPELLANT'S OBJECTIONS DURING THE STATE'S QUSTIONS DURING 
VOIR DIRE. 
A. Appellant's Objections During Voir Dire were Properly Overruled. 
I.C.R. 24 (b) provides in part that: 
Any question propounded by an attorney to a prospective juror which is not directly 
relevant to the qualifications of the juror, or is not reasonably calculated to discover the 
possible existence of a ground for challenge, or has been previously answered, shall be 
disallowed by the court upon objection or upon the court's own initiative. 
The goal of voir dire is to assure retention of a fair and impartial jury. To this end, the trial judge 
is vested with broad discretion in establishing the boundaries beyond which the voir dire 
examination will not extend. State v. Camarillo, 106 Idaho 310,678 P.2d 102 (Ct.App.1984). 
The imposition of limitations will not be disturbed absent a manifest abuse of discretion. State v. 
Camarillo, supra; State v. Merrifield, 109 Idaho 11, 704 P.2d 343 (Ct.App.1985). However, if 
improper questions were allowed during voir dire, not every trial error calls for reversal of a 
judgment, however; a conviction may not be disturbed for an error that did not affect the 
substantial rights ofthe parties. See I.C.R. 52. A trial error will be deemed harmless if the 
appellate court is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury would have reached the 
same result in the case had the error not occurred. State v. Peite, 122 Idaho 809, 821, 839 P.2d 
1223, 1235 (Ct.App.1992). 
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In this case, the State asked questions regarding prospective jurors thoughts on the Spirit 
Lake City Ordinance in question, in order to determine if any jurors thought the law was 
something that shouldn't be taken very seriously. The State's intentions were to see ifthere were 
any preconceived notions about the validity of the law, and if prospective jurors would be able to 
try the case fairly. The State was not asking questions regarding the prospective jurors' 
understanding of the law, but whether or not they had any problem in applying an ordinance that 
likely most of the jurors had never heard of before. The State also asked questions relating to the 
importance of rules and laws, all of which were designed to illicit the juror's attitudes regarding 
what to do if they disagree with a law. These questions were proper, as they were relevant to the 
prospective jurors' qualifications. For example, if these questions brought out a juror's belief that 
he or she didn't have to abide by rules and laws, this would be cause for the State to exercise a 
for cause challenge. The Magistrate Court properly allowed such a line of questioning. However, 
if this Court found that such line of questioning was improper, such an error should be deemed 
harmless, as it did not affect the substantial rights of the Appellant. 
CONCLUSION 
The State asserts that the Magistrate Court did not err in denying Appellant's Motion to 
Dismiss, and thus the constitutionality of Spirit Lake City Ordinance 7-4-1 0 should be upheld. 
Further, the State argues that the Magistrate Court did not err in denying Appellant's Rule 29 
Motion, and the District Court should not overturn such a ruling. The State does not believe the 
Magistrate Court erred by allowing the State's line of questioning during voir dire, and finally 
17 
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ISSUES ON APPEAL 
I. The state errs in all of its argument regarding the constitutionality of the 
ordinance. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
A. The state incorrectly states the test for a void for vagueness challenge. 
The state quotes State v. Cobb, 132 Idaho 195 (1998), for the incorrect analysis for a void 
for vagueness challenge to a criminal statute. The defendant asks this Court to recognize that, in 
light of U.S. Supreme Court precedent that so holds, and despite Idaho Supreme Court precedent 
to the contrary, in the context of criminal laws a Fourteenth Amendment, facial-vagueness 
challenge does not require a showing that the law is unconstitutionally vague in all its 
applications. 
Generally, the doctrine of stare decisis requires a court to follow controlling precedent 
unless there is a compelling reason to depart from such precedent. See, e.g., State v. Reyes, 131 
Idaho 239, 240 (1998). Such reasons include where the controlling precedent is manifestly 
vnong; where it has proven over time to be unwise or unjust; or where overruling the precedent is 
necessary to vindicate plain, obvious principles of law and remedy continued injustice. !d. Prior 
precedent from the Idaho Supreme Court concludes that, in order for a facial vagueness challenge 
to a criminal law to be successful, the complainant must demonstrate that the law is 
impermissibly vague in all of its applications. State v. Korsen, 138 Idaho 706, 712 (2003) 
- 1 -
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abrogated on other grounds by Evans v. Michigan, 133 S.Ct. 1069 (U.S.Mich.2013); State v. 
Hellickson, 135 Idaho 742, 745 (2001); State v. Prather, 135 Idaho 770, 773 (2001); State v. 
Leferink, 133 Idaho 780, 784 (1999); Cobb, 132 Idaho at 199; State v. Bitt, 118 Idaho 584, 587 
(1990). 
These decisions have universally relied upon the United States Supreme Court decision in 
Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, 455 U.S. 489 (1982), as the source of this rule. Korsen, 138 
Idaho at 712; Leferink, 133 Idaho at 784; Cobb, 132 Idaho at 199; Bitt, 118 Idaho at 587.1 
However, reliance upon the specific standard from Village of Hoffman Estates is misplaced as it has 
been expressly stated by the United States Supreme Court to be an improper standard in the context 
of a Fourteenth Amendment, facial-vagueness challenge to a criminal law. Kolender v. Lawson, 461 
U.S. 352, 358 (1983); see also City ofChicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 55 (1999) (plurality 
opinion). 
The United States Supreme Court in Village of Hoffman Estates was called upon to 
address the issue of whether a local civil ordinance requiring businesses to obtain a license in 
order to sell certain classes of products was unconstitutionally vague on its face. Village of 
Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 491-492. In the context ofthis regulatory statute, the Court held 
that, "a 'facial' challenge, in this context, means a claim that the law is 'invalid in toto- and 
therefore incapable of any valid application."' !d. at 495, n.5 (quoting Steffel v. Thompson, 415 
U.S. 452, 474 (1974)). The Court in Village of Hoffman Estates proceeded to clarify that this 
1 While Hellickson and Prather cite to Cobb as the legal authority in support of this standard, the Court in Cobb 
cites to Village of Hoffman Estates as the legal authority for this rule. Hellickson, 135 Idaho at 746, 24 P.3d at 63; 
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rule was a "less strict vagueness test" than would normally be applied because the ordinance was 
an economic regulation and that the "degree of vagueness that the Constitution tolerates" 
depends upon the nature of the enactment. Id. at 498. 
The United States Supreme Court has subsequently specifically articulated that the 
standard from Village of Hoffman Estates that required a showing that the statute was vague in 
all of its applications is not the correct standard when the law at issue imposes criminal penalties. 
Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 358, n.8 (1983). In Kolender, the Court articulated several 
reasons why this standard was inapplicable where the law being challenged is a criminal law. 
Importantly, the Court placed heavy emphasis on the fact that, where a law imposes criminal 
penalties, "the standard of certainty is higher." I d. In other words, the Court will require more 
definiteness to the language of criminal laws in order to pass constitutional muster, and will 
correspondingly impose greater scrutiny to claims that a criminal law is unconstitutionally void 
for vagueness. As the Court noted, "this concern has, at times, led us to invalidate a criminal 
statute on its face even when it could conceivably have had some valid application." ld. 
The Court in Kolender also went on to note that the standard articulated in Village of 
Hoffman Estates was a "iess strict vagueness standard" applied because, "the ordinance in 
Hoffman Estates 'simply regulates business behavior,' and that 'economic regulation is subject to 
a less strict vagueness test because its subject matter is often more narrow."' ld. (quoting Village 
of Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 499). 
Prather, 135 Idaho at 773,25 P.3d at 86. 
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In addition, in Korsen, the Idaho Supreme Court relied upon United States v. Salerno, 481 
U.S. 739, 745 (1987). However, just as in Hoffman Estates, in Salerno the United States 
Supreme Court addressed a regulatory statute, not a statute which imposes criminal punishment: 
Respondents first argue that the Act violates substantive due process 
because the pretrial detention it authorizes constitutes impermissible 
punishment before trial. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535, and 
n. 16 (1979). The Government, however, has never argued that 
pretrial detention could be upheld if it were "punishment." The Court 
of Appeals assumed that pretrial detention under the Bail Reform Act 
is regulatory, not penal, and we agree that it is. 
Salerno, 481 U.S. at 746. Thus, application of the standards articulated in Salerno is inappropriate 
when the statute at issue authorizes criminal penalties, i.e. punishment. 
As shown above, prior Idaho precedent requiring a showing that a criminal law is 
impermissibly vague in all its applications is directly contrary to the express holding of the 
United States Supreme Court in Kolendar, which articulates the proper standard for a Fourteenth 
Amendment based facial-vagueness challenge to a law which imposes criminal penalties. As 
such, the line of Idaho cases which apply the "less strict vagueness standard" from cases 
addressing regulatory statutes to claims to federal constitutional claims addressing criminal 
statutes is manifestly wrong and was expressly rejected by the United States Supreme Court as 
such. Rather, because the defendant brings his claim under the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and the ordinance at issue imposes 
criminal penalties, the proper analysis to be applied is that articulated by the United States 
Supreme Court in Kolender, which allows a law which imposes a criminal penalty to be 
- 4-
Michael Jay Freitas 41378 204 of 235
invalidated on its face even when it could conceivably have had some valid application. 461 
U.S. at 358. 
B. The state fails to provide authority for its illogical argument that the defendant by making 
any other argument against a law that requires him to interpret it somehow provides proof 
that the law is not vague. 
The state apparently argues that because defense counsel stated an interpretation of the 
ordinance within the context of an argument as to its validity the statute cannot possibly be void 
for vagueness. The state seems to be arguing that if a defendant makes an argument against a 
vague statute besides challenging its vagueness he has waived his argument by conceding that the 
statute is not vague. The state's reasoning would be infallible if not for the fact that the 
defendant's argument exists within the context of the state's application of the statute to his 
conduct. Thus, obviously the defendant may both challenge the adequacy of the state's 
interpretation as well as point out that the law itself is so vague as to offend the Constitution. 
Further, the state cites no authority for its assertion that the defendant has somehow 
conceded the clarity of a statute by using the state's interpretation for an argument. When issues 
on appeal are not supported by propositions of law, authority, or argument, they will not be 
considered. State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263 (1996). A party waives an issue cited on appeal 
if either authority or argument is lacking. I d. This Court should not consider arguments made 
without authority. See State v. Tyler, 153 Idaho 623, 288 P.3d 840, 845 (Ct.App.2012). 
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C. The state's argument that because a police officer told the defendant the executive's 
interpretation of the ordinance the law cannot be vague as applied to his actions is a 
complete misunderstanding of our judicial system. 
The state makes the argument that because a police officer told the defendant to stop 
providing water to his neighbor he was "on notice" as to what the law was. The state seems to 
think that the executive has the authority to interpret the law, and that review of a law for 
vagueness under the constitution is merely reviewing whether a police officer was able to charge 
someone with violating the executive's interpretation of it. However, it is actually the judiciary 
that is charged with the task of saying what the law is. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 
(1803). In addition, the question in a void for vagueness claim is whether the ordinance as 
written is vague, not whether a police officer was able to formulate an interpretation and apply it 
to the conduct at issue. Kolender, 461 U.S. at 358. 
D. The state misinterprets I.C. § 50-1030. 
The state argues that because I.C. § 50-1030 begins with "[i]n addition to the powers 
which it may now have, any city shall have power under and subject to the following provisions," 
that the city of Spirit Lake was granted the power to criminally punish conduct involving its 
water system. Prior to I. C. § 50-1030, however, a city would have a difficult time criminalizing 
the use of a water system it had no power to build, operate or maintain. See I. C. § 50-1 030(a) & 
(d). Certainly, any such law would have been irrational and arbitrary, much like outlawing a 
person from transforming into a duck in the middle of town or speaking in tree. 
A far better reading would be that in addition to powers already granted, the state 
legislature further granted the municipality certain new, though limited, powers to create and 
- 6 -
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maintain waterworks. Rather than read I.C. § 50-323 as granting cities the ability to provide 
water however they choose to their residents and brand them as criminals for any deviation, with 
I.C. § 50-1030 as merely suggestions as to sane methods for maintaining control, this Court 
should read I.C. § 50-1030 as providing the means the legislature saw fit for the survival of 
municipal waterworks. 
The defendant would point out that the state appears to admit that Spirit Lake's ordinance 
is for the purpose of creating a monopoly in violation of§ 5 of the Federal Trade Commission 
Act, 38 Stat. 719, 15 U.S.C. § 45, and § 7 ofthe Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 731, 15 U.S. C. § 18. 
DATED this "l_( day of May, 2013. 
BY: 
OFFICE OF THE KOOTENAI 
COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 2'f2 day of May, 2013, served a true and 
correct copy of the attached BRIEF SUPPORTING APPEAL via interoffice mail or as otherwise 
indicated upon the parties as follows: 
Kootenai Cou..11ty Prosecutor FAX 446-18 3 3 
-¥- ViaFax 
Interoffice Mail 
Michael Jay Freitas 41378 207 of 235
Log of 1K-COURTROOM9 Ofl 7/1/2013 Page 1 of 1 
Description CR 2012-18513 Freitas, Michael20130701 Oral Argument 
Judge Haynes ~/) ~ Clerk Suzi Sverdsten Court Reporter Val Nunemacher 
D 11 7iiiz013 ii ~===tion II 1 K-COURTROOM9 
Time Speaker Note 
09:40:07 AM J Def is not in custody. PD-Jay Logsdon KCPA-Eileen McGovern 
09:41:20 AM J Court has reviewed the briefing and memorandum of law prepared by my judicial staff attorney. 
09:41:44 AM 9/28/12 client charged with unlawful act, providing a hose from his 
trailer to the trailer next door. The ordinance confusing. Reads 
ordinance. It is similar to 18-4304 and 18-4621, but neither statutes 
PD include the language about 3rd persons. It is denying a person 
water for use in their home on the basis of not being able to pay 
your bill. City is punishing person who tries to provide water and 
person who can't afford water. Ask the Court find this statute is 
unconstitutional. 
09:48:35 AM Briefing provide. Ordinance on its face is clear. Organizes 
PA circumstances related to water, maintaining the water system by 
the municipality. Not vague. We rely on a structure in society. 
09:51:04 AM We aren't just talking about shutting the water to the house, makes 
PD it illegal to deliver water to someone to a house without water. The 
children have gone to the house that is receiving water. 
09:54:20 Amr J Will take the matter under advisement and will issue a decision. 
09:54:36 AM 
09:54:36 Aivi II End 
Produced by FTR Gold™ 
www .fortherecord .com 
file://R:\LogNotes- HTML\District\Criminal\Haynes\CR 2012-18513 Freitas, Michael201... 7/1/2013 
Michael Jay Freitas 41378 208 of 235
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C~~K DlfJRICT COUJ'T 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF -~i~ 
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNT OF KOOTENAI 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
MICHAEL JAY FREITAS, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
--------------------------------
) 
) CASE NO. CR 12-18513 
) 
) 
) INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE 
) OPINION 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Intermediate Appeal from the Magistrate's Division of the District Court of the First 
Judicial District, State ofldaho, Kootenai County. Hon. Clark Peterson, Magistrate. 
Judgment of conviction for Unlawful Act Regarding Water System, affirmed. 
Jay Logsdon, Office of the Kootenai County Public Defender's Office, appeared and 
argued for Defendant-Appellant. 
Eileen McGovern, Kootenai County Prosecuting Attorney's Office, appeared and argued 
for Plaintiff-Respondent. 
I. Statement of the Case 
This matter is a criminal appeal from the Magistrate's Division of the District 
Court involving a misdemeanor conviction from a Spirit Lake City ordinance relating to 
the City's water system. A jury found Defendant-Appellant Michael Jay Freitas (Freitas) 
guilty of Unlawful Act Regarding Water System. The magistrate entered a judgment of 
conviction and ordered Freitas to pay a fine. Freitas now appeals to this Court. 
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II. Factual and Procedural History 
Freitas lived next door to a residence located at 5822 West Rhode Island Street, 
Spirit Lake, Idaho; said residence owned by George Adams. 1 Water service to that 
residence had been turned off by the City on July 26, 2012, for non-payment of service 
fees. 
On September 27, 2012, Spirit Lake Police Officer Terry Wise advised Freitas 
that he was in violation of Spirit Lake Ordinance 7-4-10 (the Ordinance) because he had 
water hoses running from Freitas's residence to Adams's. Officer Wise provided Freitas 
with a copy of the Ordinance and issued a verbal warning to discontinue delivery of 
water. Also on September 27, 2012, Brenda Nash (Nash), her son, his three children and 
his fiance moved into the residence with Adams.2 
On September 28, 2012, Officer Wise cited Freitas for providing city water to his 
neighbor's residence in violation of the Ordinance. On October 18, 2012, the water 
service to Adams's residence was restored. 
On December 12, 2012, Freitas filed his Motion to Dismiss. In his motion, 
Freitas argued that the Ordinance was unconstitutional, and even if the Ordinance was 
constitutional, it was unconstitutionally applied. In the alternative, Freitas argued that the 
Ordinance was void for vagueness. The state opposed the motion, and on January 3, 
2013, the matter came on for hearing. After hearing argument, the magistrate orally 
denied the Motion to Dismiss.3 
1 George Adams was also referred to at trial as Darrell Adams. Trial Transcript, p.69 at ~~ 17-19. 
2 Freitas asserts that six individuals were residing in the residence at the time. The trial transcript provides 
that Adams was also residing in the residence as well, totaling seven individuals. Id at p. 70, ~~ 2-4. 
3 The appellate record does not contain a written order denying the Motion to Dismiss. 
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On January 8, 2013, the jury trial commenced. At the conclusion of the state's 
case, Freitas moved for a judgment of acquittal, which was denied. The jury returned a 
guilty verdict finding Freitas guilty ofUnlawful Act Regarding Water System. Also, on 
January 8, 2013, the parties agreed to proceed to sentencing and Judgment was entered 
ordering Freitas to pay a fine of $500.00 within 30 days; no jail or probation was 
ordered.4 
On January 9, 2013, Freitas timely filed his Notice of Appeal. On January 16, 
2013, this Court entered its Order to Stay Sentence Pending Appeal. 
On March 12, 2013, Freitas filed his Appellate Brief. On May 20, 2013, the state 
filed its Respondent's Brief. On May 22, 2013, Freitas filed his Reply Brief. 
On July 1, 2013, this Court heard oral argument on appeal and deemed the matter 
fully submitted. 
III. Standards 
I.C.R. 54.17 provides: 
All appeals from a magistrate shall be heard by the district 
court as an appellate proceeding unless the district court 
orders a trial de novo as provided in these rules. The scope 
of appellate review on appeal to the district court shall be 
as follows: 
(a) Upon an appeal from a magistrate to the district court, 
not involving a trial de novo, the district court shall review 
the case on the record and determine the appeal as an 
appellate court in the same manner and upon the same 
standards of review as an appeal from the district court to 
the Supreme Court under the Idaho appellate rules. 
In assessing the sufficiency of evidence, we "will uphold a judgment of 
conviction entered upon a jury verdict so long as there is substantial evidence upon which 
4 Although I. C. § 50-302 provides the maximum fme for violation of an ordinance as up to $1,000.00, City 
of Spirit Lake Ordinance 1-4-l(A) provides that the maximum penalty for violation of a Spirit Lake 
ordinance is only $300.00. This has not been raised or mentioned by either party on appeal. 
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a rational trier of fact could conclude that the prosecution proved all essential elements of 
the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 712, 215 P.3d 
414, 432 (2009). "Evidence is substantial if a reasonable trier of fact would accept it and 
rely upon it in determining whether a disputed point of fact has been prove[n]." Id. On 
appeal, this Court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution. 
State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 286, 77 P.3d 956, 975 (2003). Further, we "will not 
substitute our own judgment for that of the jury on matters such as the credibility of 
witnesses, the weight to be given to certain evidence, and the reasonable inferences to be 
drawn from the evidence." Severson, 147 Idaho at 712, 215 P.3d at 432. 
When reviewing the decision of a district court acting in its appellate capacity 
over the magistrate division, Idaho appellate courts review the magistrate court's decision 
independently of, but with due regard for, the district court's intermediate appellate 
decision. Further, Idaho appellate courts will uphold the magistrate court's findings of 
fact if they are supported by substantial, competent evidence in the record. See Swanson 
v. Swanson, 134 Idaho 512, 515, 5 P.3d 973, 976 (2000); Balderson v. Balderson, 127 
Idaho 48, 51, 896 P.2d 956, 959 (1995). With respect to conclusions of law, appellate 
courts exercise free review. Id. 
IV. Discussion 
Freitas asserts that the magistrate erred by: (1) finding the ordinance 
constitutional; (2) finding that the ordinance is constitutional under the facts of this case; 
(3) misinterpreting the statute resulting in Freitas being tried under the wrong elements; 
(4) denying Freitas's Motion for Acquittal; (5) refusing to give Freitas's proposed jury 
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instruction No. 6; and (6) overruling Freitas's objections to the state's vmr dire 
questioning. 
A. Is the ordinance vague on its face? 
Freitas first argues that the Ordinance is unconstitutionally vague on its face and 
thus violates the notice requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution and Article I § 13 of the Idaho Constitution. Freitas asserts that the 
Ordinance has so many elements to it that it is "too confusing to provide either 
reasonable persons or the government with any idea as to how it is meant to be enforced." 
Appellant's Brief at p. 15. 
The State argues that the Ordinance is not ambiguous and its language is clear 
when given its commonly understood every day meanings. The Ordinance, the State 
asserts, prohibits a person from connecting or delivering Spirit Lake water to an 
individual for the use within a residence that is not otherwise provided with Spirit Lake 
city water. Therefore, a person of ordinary intelligence would understand that this is what 
the Ordinance states. 
City of Spirit Lake Ordinance 7-4-10 provides: 
UNLAWFUL ACT: 
Every part of the city water system up to, and including, 
any shutoff valve and/or meter, which may be installed at 
or near the property line of any lot, is the property of the 
city. It shall be unlawful for any person to connect to, 
interfere or ta.•nper with, tum on or off, permit connection 
or delivery of water to third persons for use within a 
residence or other building not otherwise provided with 
water service in accordance with this chapter, or to operate 
or introduce any substance into any part of the city water 
system unless that person is acting under the direct 
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supervision of a qualified employee of the city or first 
obtains express written permission from the mayor. 
(Ord. 430, 8-22-1998). 
City of Spirit Lake Ordinance 4-7-11 provides: 
PENALTY FOR VIOLATION: 
Any person found to be guilty of a violation of this chapter 
shall be guilty of committing a misdemeanor offense. Each 
and every violation and each and every day or part of a day 
a violation continues shall be deemed a separate offense. 
The penalty for misdemeanor offenses is that prescribed by 
the most current Spirit Lake city ordinance prescribing the 
penalty for misdemeanor offenses. (Ord. 430, 8-22-1998). 
The Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution requires 
that the laws of the U.S. and of the several states not be vague when defining criminal 
conduct. See, Idaho v. Korsen, 138 Ida4o 706, 711, 69 P.3d 126, 131 (2003), abrogated 
on other grounds by Evans v. Michigan, 133 S.Ct. 1069, 185 L.Ed.2d 124 (2013). The 
U.S. Constitution and policy requires that no [person] ... be required at the peril ofloss of 
liberty to speculate as to the meaning of penal statutes. !d. A statute is unconstitutional 
and therefore void-for-vagueness where its prohibitions are not clearly defined. !d. 
This Court finds that Ordinance 7-4-10 can be understandably broken down to 
provide: 
1. The City of Spirit Lake owns the water system up to a shut off valve and/or water 
meter; 
2. It is unlawful for any person to connect to, interfere or tamper with the City's 
water system unless allowed to do so by City ordinance; 
3. It is unlawful to turn on/off the City's water system unless allowed to do so by 
City ordinance; 
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4. It is unlawful to allow someone to connect to the City water system unless 
allowed; 
5. It is unlawful to deliver water provided by the City's water system to someone 
who is not receiving City water when that water is to be used inside a residence or 
building that is not receiving City water; and 
6. It is unlawful to put any substance into the City's water system without 
permission from a qualified City employee or the mayor of Spirit Lake. 
Therefore, this Court finds that the Ordinance is not unconstitutionally vague on 
its face because its prohibitions are clearly defined and a person of ordinary intelligence 
would understand the Ordinance. As such, the magistrate did not err by denying Freitas's 
Motion to Dismiss. 
B. Is the Ordinance unconstitutionally vague when applied to the facts? 
Freitas argues that "criminalizing the act of charitably gifting water one has paid 
for to another goes beyond the boundaries of our national values .... " Appellant's Brief at 
p. 28. Further, Freitas argues that the Ordinance is unconstitutional under the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, Article I §§ 1, 4, 14; Article XII § 2, and Article 
XV §§ 1, 4 and 5 of the Idaho Constitutions. Lastly, Freitas argues that because the 
ordinance goes beyond the boundaries of protecting to actually harming our society's 
welfare[,] the Ordinance must be struck down. Appellant's Brief at p. 32. 
The State argues that Freitas connected and used a hose to deliver water from his 
hose to his neighbor's residence, which is exactly the conduct that the Ordinance 
prohibits. Further, Officer Wise informed Freitas of the violation of the Ordinance, 
provided Freitas with a copy of the Ordinance and gave him a warning to stop providing 
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the water to Adams' residence. This sufficiently provided Freitas with notice and the 
Ordinance provides courts and law enforcement guidelines for enforcement. Therefore, 
the State asserts that the Ordinance is not unconstitutional when applied to the facts of 
this case. 
A statute may be unconstitutionally vague as applied to the complainant's 
conduct. Burton v. Dep't ofTransp., 149 Idaho 746, 748, 240 P.3d 933, 935 (2010). A 
statute is unconstitutionally vague as applied if the statute failed to provide fair notice 
that the complainant's specific conduct was prohibited or failed to provide sufficient 
guidelines such that police had unbridled discretion in determining whether to charge the 
complainant. Id. 
A municipality may make and enforce "all such local police, sanitary and other 
regulations as are not in conflict with its charter or with the general laws. Caesar v. 
State, 101 Idaho 158, 161, 610 P.2d 517 (1980) (quoting Idaho Const. Art. XII, §2). This 
constitutional grant of powers is viewed as a grant of local police powers to Idaho cities. 
Id. The burden falls on the party challenging the validity of a police power to show that 
it is in conflict with the general laws of the state, unreasonable or arbitrary. Potts Canst. 
Co. v. N Kootenai Water Dist., 141 Idaho 678, 682, 116 P.3d 8, 11 (2005) (citations 
omitted). Generally courts are not concerned with the wisdom of ordinances and will 
uphold a municipal ordinance unless it is clearly unreasonable or arbitrary. Id. Further, it 
is well recognized that the social objective of preventing financial hardship and possible 
reliance upon the welfare agencies of the state is a permissible goal of police power 
action. Adams v. City of Pocatello, 91 Idaho 99, 101, 16 P.2d 46, 49 (1966) (citations 
omitted). 
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE OPINION Page 8 of21 
Michael Jay Freitas 41378 216 of 235
Article XII § 2 of the Idaho Constitution provides: 
Local police regulations authorized. Any county or 
incorporated city or town may make and enforce, within its 
limits, all such local police, sanitary and other regulations 
as are not in conflict with its charter or with the general 
laws. 
I.C. § 50-302 provides: 
Promotion of general welfare -- Prescribing penalties. 
(1) Cities shall make all such ordinances, bylaws, rules, 
regulations and resolutions not inconsistent with the laws of 
the state of Idaho as may be expedient, in addition to the 
special powers in this act granted, to maintain the peace, 
good government and welfare of the corporation and its 
trade, commerce and industry. Cities may enforce all 
ordinances by fine, including an infraction penalty, or 
incarceration; provided, however, except as provided in 
subsection (2) of this section, that the maximum 
punishment of any offense shall be by fine of not more than 
one thousand dollars ($1,000) or by imprisonment not to 
exceed six ( 6) months, or by both such fine and 
imprisonment. 
(2) Any city which is participating in a federally mandated 
program, wherein penalties or enforcement remedies are 
required by the terms of participation in the program, may 
enforce such requirements by ordinance, to include a 
criminal or civil monetary penalty not to exceed one 
thousand dollars ($1,000), or imprisonment for criminal 
offenses not to exceed six (6) months, or to include both a 
fine and imprisonment for criminal offenses. 
The Idaho Legislature has specifically addressed various trades, commerce, and 
industries a city may regulate under I.C. § 50-302(a), e.g., transit atid domestic water 
systems. 
I.C. § 50-323 provides: 
Domestic water systems. 
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Cities are hereby empowered to establish, create, develop, 
maintain and operate domestic water systems; provide for 
domestic water from wells, streams, water sheds or any 
other source; provide for storage, treatment and 
transmission of the same to the inhabitants of the city; and 
to do all things necessary to protect the source of water 
from contamination. The term "domestic water systems" 
and "domestic water" includes by way of example but not 
by way of limitation, a public water system providing water 
at any temperature for space heating or cooling, culinary, 
sanitary, recreational or therapeutic uses. 
I.C. § 50-1030(f) provides: 
Powers. 
In addition to the powers which it may now have, any city 
shall have power under and subject to the following 
provisions: 
(f) To prescribe and collect rates, fees, tolls or charges, 
including the levy or assessment of such rates, fees, tolls or 
charges against governmental units, departments or 
agencies, including the state of Idaho and its subdivisions, 
for the services, facilities and commodities furnished by 
such works, or by such rehabilitated existing electrical 
generating facilities, and to provide methods of collections 
and penalties, including denial of service for nonpayment 
of such rates, fees, tolls or charges; 
Spirit Lake Ordinance 7-4-9 provides: 
DWELLING WITHOUT WATER SERVICE DECLARED 
A HEALTH HAZARD AND A PUBLIC NUISANCE: 
The human habitation of any residence or use of any other 
building or structure for purposes other than warehousing 
or storage of nonperishable goods or commodities where no 
workers regularly labor without a ready supply of mnn.ing 
potable water whether from the city system or other 
authorized source, inside of such dwelling or other 
structure shall constitute a health hazard and a public 
nuisance. In such circumstances the city may cause 
proceedings to be brought for the abatement of the 
occupancy or use of such a place. 
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A. Habitation Of Dwelling Without Water Service 
Unlawful: The human habitation of any residential 
dwelling or other building or structure without a required 
source of running potable water as required by this chapter 
shall be unlawful and subject to the penalty described in 
section 7-4-11 ofthis chapter. (Ord. 430, 8-22-1998). 
Freitas argues that I. C. § 50-1 030(f) limits a city to only collecting fees for a 
service provided by the city, and it also limits penalties to denial of services, but not to 
criminal prosecution. 
This Court disagrees. I.C. § 50-302 grants cities the right to create and maintain 
domestic water systems. I.C. § 50-1030(f) provides that a city may penalize a user, 
including denying service. The including language is what Freitas argues limits Spirit 
Lake from making a violation of the Ordinance a criminal penalty. However, Article XII 
§ 2 of the Idaho Constitution and I.C. § 50-302 provide that a city may create ordinances 
to maintain the peace, good government and welfare of the corporation and its trade, 
commerce and industry. Further, cities may enforce all ordinances by fine, including an 
infraction penalty, or incarceration. 
Spirit Lake Ordinance 7-4-9 shows that the City is attempting to maintain the 
welfare of its citizens by ensuring that residences have running, potable water to prevent 
health hazards. Further, the remaining sections of Chapter 4, Domestic Water Ordinance, 
show that the City is attempting to maintain the welfare of its trade, commerce, and 
industry, i.e. the City's water system. Spirit Lake Ordinance 4-7-11 provides the penalty 
for violation of Ordinance 7-4-10, as allowed by the Idaho Legislature pursuant to I.C. § 
50-1030(f) and Article XII§ 2 ofthe Idaho Constitution. 
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Freitas also asserted that it is not proper to criminalize charitable acts. That may 
be true in a generalized way, but in this situation, Freitas could have assisted the Nash 
family by numerous "legal" methods, e.g., paying the re-connection fee, paying the 
Nash's water bill, or allowing the Nash family to utilize Freitas' water inside his home 
(showers, toilets, etc.). 
Therefore, the Ordinance is constitutional on its face and as applied to the facts of 
this case. As such, the magistrate did not err by denying Freitas' Motion to Dismiss. 
C. Did the magistrate instruct the jury with the correct elements? 
Freitas argues that the Magistrate did not properly read the Ordinance and 
instructed the jury with the wrong elements. Specifically, Freitas asserts that the 
Ordinance relates to doing harm to the City's water system or illegally connecting to the 
water system; however, the magistrate provided elements relating to delivering water to 
third persons. 
Criminal statutes must be strictly construed. State v. Sivak, 119 Idaho 320, 325, 
806 P.2d 413, 418 (1990). In State v. Gleason, the Idaho Supreme Court provided, "[o]n 
the issue of the jury instruction, we review the same to determine whether it charges the 
jury with all matters necessary for their information with respect to the nature and 
elements of the crime charged." 123 Idaho 62, 65, 844 P.2d 691,694 (1992) (citation 
omitted). 
The record shows that at the January 3, 2012, hearing on Freitas' Motion to 
Dismiss, the magistrate stated in his oral ruling: 
Essentially, what it prohibits, is uh, improperly connecting 
to the City water system, improperly interfering with or 
tampering with that system, uh, improperly turning on or 
off the water system, uh, improperly connecting and 
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delivering water to third persons under certain 
circumstances, and then improperly operating or 
introducing a substance into any part of the water system, 
again under certain circumstances. 
Motion Hearing Transcript (Vol. 1 ), p. 27 at ll. 10-17 (emphasis added). 
The magistrate's understanding of the Ordinance's elements at the Motion to 
Dismiss are sufficiently accurate. 5 
The trial transcript contains a record of the elements instruction, which provides: 
You're instructed that the essential elements ofthe crime of 
unlawful act regarding water system which the defendant is 
charged are: One, on or about the 28th of September 2012; 
two, in Kootenai County, State of Idaho; three, the 
defendant, Michael J. Freitas, permitted connection or 
delivery of city water; four, to third persons; five, for use 
within a residence; six, not otherwise provided with water 
service. If any of the above has not been proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt, you must find the defendant not guilty. 
If each of the above has been proven beyond a reasonable 
doubt, you must find the defendant guilty. 
Trial Transcript, p. 104, ll. 17-25; p. 105, ll.l-3. 
This Court finds that these are the applicable elements for the crime charged in 
this matter under the Ordinance, and as alleged by the state. 
Therefore, Freitas was tried under the appropriate elements of the Ordinance, for 
the criminal act he was alleged to have committed. The magistrate did not err in 
instructing the jury. 
D. Did the Magistrate properly deny Freitas's Motion for Acguittal? 
Freitas argues that the only evidence presented at trial relating to the source of the 
water was provided by Officer Wise, which is insufficient to show that the water at issue 
5 Freitas only requested proposed instruction No.6 to be included with the standard Clerk's Record. 
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was provided by the City of Spirit Lake's water system. Freitas asserts that the water 
may have come from some other source that is attached to the water meter. 
The State argues that Freitas's I.C.R. 29 motion for judgment of acquittal was 
properly denied because Officer Wise testified that at the time of issuing the citation 
Freitas stated he was paying for the water running through his meter and he could do with 
it what he wanted. As such, the state asserts, there is substantial circumstantial evidence, 
if not direct evidence, when viewed in light most favorable to the state, that Freitas was 
paying for the City's water. 
I.C.R. 29(a) provides: 
Motion before submission to jury. The court on motion of 
the defendant or on its own motion shall order the entry of 
judgment of acquittal of one or more offenses charged in 
the indictment, information or complaint after the evidence 
on either side is closed if the evidence is insufficient to 
sustain a conviction of such offense or offenses. If a 
defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal at the close of 
the evidence offered by the state is not granted, the 
defendant may offer evidence. In the event the court 
dismisses the charged offense, the court must consider 
whether the evidence would be sufficient to sustain a 
conviction on a lesser included offense. 
In reviewing a denial of a motion for a judgment of acquittal, the appellate court 
must independently consider the evidence in the record and determine whether a 
reasonable mind could conclude that a defendant's guilt as to each material element of 
the offence was proven beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Willard, 129 Idaho 827, 828, 
933 P.2d 116, 117 (Ct. App. 1997) (citation omitted). The test of sufficiency of the 
evidence to sustain a conviction is whether there is substantial evidence upon which 
rational triers of fact could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Rodriguez, 106 
Idaho 30, 674 P.2d 1029 (Ct. App. 1983). When a motion for judgment of acquittal has 
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been denied, and the defendant stands convicted, all reasonable inferences on appeal are 
taken in favor of the prosecution. State v. O'Campo, 103 Idaho 62, 644 P.2d 985 (Ct. 
App. 1982). 
The record shows that there was testimony by several witnesses as to the elements 
relating to date of commission of the crime and the location. As to elements four, five 
and six, the record shows that there was substantial and competent evidence that Nash 
and her family (third persons) were receiving water at Adams's residence. Further, 
Officer Wise testified that she observed a water hose attached to Freitas's residence and 
Adams's residence that was leaking enough water to form a puddle. There was also 
testimony from Barbara Brown that the Adams residence did not have water service at 
the time. 
As to the third element (connection to or delivery of city water) the record shows 
that Officer Wise testified to her interaction with Freitas on September 28, 2012. 
Q. Okay. And did you have any conversation with Freitas at that point? 
A. I did have - it was a short one. And Mr. Freitas said that - it was something 
to the effect that urn, he didn't really realize - he didn't think that there was 
anything wrong as far- as long as the water was going through his meter and he's 
paying for it, that he said he should be able to do whatever he wanted to do with 
his water, that he could put it in his yard or give it to a neighbor. 
Q. Okay. So Mr. Freitas said that he was paying for the water he was receiving at 
this home? 
A. Um-hmm. 
Trial Tra..11script at p. 89, 11. 19-25; p. 90, 11. 1-6. 
Q. So the statement, if I'm- understood you correctly that Mr. Freitas said was 
that he could do whatever he wanted with his water. 
A. Yes. As long as he was paying for it; it went through his meter. 
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Id at p. 90, 11. 16-20. 
As to the acquittal motion, the magistrate provided the I.C.R. 29 standards and 
then stated: 
Court: Keeping in mind all the facts that have been presented in adopting the 
argument of uh, Ms. McClinton, the Court will deny your Rule 29 motion at this 
time. Anything further outside the presence of the jury? I do think the most 
interesting element there was whether or not this was city water, and I think Ms. 
McClinton's argument that he acknowledged having paid for it, uh, even if not 
expressly stated, certainly by implication, suggests that it is uh-it is uh, the city 
provided water. 
Id at p. 95, 11. 22-25; p. 96, 11.1-6. 
Therefore, there was substantial and competent evidence as to whether Freitas 
delivered "city" water to the Adams residence. 
There was other evidence presented about the City's water system (Barbara 
Brown, City Clerk/Treasurer and water service record keeper) Adams's water being 
turned off. Brenda Nash testified that there was a hose connected to her residence, but 
she didn't really know where it was attached to. Further, Nash testified that Freitas was 
providing the water, according to Adams, because the water was turned off. 
Therefore, the Court finds Officer Wise's testimony as to Freitas's statement 
sufficient to establish that the source of the water was the City water system and through 
Freitas's meter to the Adams residence. As such, the Motion for Judgment of Acquittal 
was properly denied. 
E. Did the Magistrate properiy refuse Freitas's proposed jury instruction 
No.6? 
Freitas asserts that his proposed jury instruction number six included the first 
portion of the Ordinance, which provided that the City of Spirit Lake owns the water 
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system up to the meter and/or shut off valve. This instruction was refused. As such, 
Freitas argues that because the Ordinance is so confusing, the entire Ordinance should 
have been given. 
The State argues that all it needed to prove was that Freitas permitted connection 
or delivery of city water to third persons, and Freitas's proposed instruction No. 6 did not 
help in clarifying the elements of the criminal violation. 
"The issue of whether a particular jury instruction is necessary and whether the 
jury has been properly instructed is a matter of law over which this Court exercises free 
review." State v. Adamcik, 152 Idaho 445, 472, 272 P.3d 417, 444 (2012) (quoting State 
v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259,264,923 P.2d 966,971 (1996)). 
Jury instructions must correctly inform the jury as to the elements of the crime 
charged. State v. Hickman, 146 Idaho 178, 181, 191 P .3d 1098, 1101 (2008). The 
question of whether the jury has been properly instructed is a question of law over which 
we exercise free review. State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 710, 215 P.3d 414, 430 
(2009). When reviewing jury instructions, we ask whether the instructions as a whole, 
and not individually, fairly and accurately reflect applicable law. State v. Bowman, 124 
Idaho 936, 942, 866 P.2d 193, 199 (Ct. App. 1993). Jury instructions that fail to require 
the State to prove every element of the offense violate due process and, therefore, rise to 
the level offundamental error. Hickman, 146 Idaho at 182, 191 P.3d at 1102. 
Freitas's Jury Instruction No. 6 provided: 
The Spirit Lake city water system is property of the city up 
to and including any shutoff valve and/or meter which may 
be installed at or near the property line of any lot. 
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The record shows that at trial, Freitas's counsel argued that the instruction should 
be given because of Officer Wise's testimony as to Freitas's belief that the water 
belonged to him. Counsel asserted that Instruction No. 6 would help clarify the 
ownership issue for the jury. 
The record also shows that the state did not object to the giving of Instruction No. 
6, but the magistrate nevertheless refused the instruction. The magistrate provided: 
The Court determined it would not give that as it's not a 
clarifying uh, legal instruction that relates to any of the 
facts in dispute. While the elements certainly includes uh, 
delivery of water, there is just no factual dispute here 
regarding what is the property of what, what is the city 
water system, et cetera. 
Trial Transcript at p. 99, 11. 16-22. 
While this portion of the Ordinance may have been relevant to a charge involving 
tampering with the City's water system, damaging piping in Freitas's front yard or 
damaging piping outside of Freitas's property line, it does not speak to the pertinent 
charge of unlawful delivery of water. The jury only needed to determine if Freitas 
delivered water to a third person for use in a residence that did not have City water 
service. The ownership of the water system was irrelevant, and the Magistrate did not err 
by refusing Freitas's proposed jury instruction No.6. 
F. Did the Magistrate err by overruling Freitas's objections to the state's 
voir dire questioning. 
Freitas argues that during voir dire the prosecuting attorney asked the potential 
jurors their opinions about the Ordinance, laws that they might believe to be ridiculous 
and the importance of laws in general. Freitas asserts that the magistrate erred by 
permitting the state to continue with this type of questioning after he objected. 
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The State argues that it asked questions regarding prospective jurors' thoughts on 
the Ordinance in order to determine if any jurors thought the law was something that 
should not be taken very seriously in order to root out pre-conceived notions about the 
validity of the Ordinance and whether jurors would be able to try the case fairly. Further, 
even if the questions were improper, the state asserts, such error was harmless because 
the questioning did not affect Freitas's substantial rights. 
I.C.R. 24(b) provides in pertinent part: 
The voir dire examination shall be under the supervision of 
the court and subject to such limitations as the court may 
prescribe in the futherance of justice and the expeditious 
disposition of the case. Any question propounded by an 
attorney to a prospective juror which is not directly relevant 
to the qualifications of the juror, or is not reasonably 
calculated to discover the possible existence of a ground for 
challenge, or has been previously answered, shall be 
disallowed by the court upon objection or upon the court's 
own initiative. 
Placing limits beyond which the voir dire examination may not properly go is a 
matter which rests in the sound discretion of the trial court; the exercise of such 
discretion will not be disturbed except for a manifest abuse of discretion. State v. 
Camarillo, 106 Idaho 310, 678 P.2d 102 (Ct. App. 1984). In determining whether the 
trial court abused its discretion, appellate courts inquire: (1) whether the trial court 
correctly perceived the issue as a discretionary one; (2) whether the trial court acted 
within the outer bounds of its discretion and consistently with the applicable legal 
standards; and (3) whether the trial court reached its decision by an exercise of reason. 
State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 600, 768 P.2d 1331, 1333 (1989); State v. Ortiz, 148 
Idaho 38, 41, 218 P.3d 17, 20 (Ct. App. 2009). 
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Any error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect substantial rights 
shall be disregarded. I.C.R. 52. In determining whether an error has affected substantial 
rights or is harmless, the inquiry is whether it appears from the record that the error 
contributed to the verdict, leaving the appellate court with a reasonable doubt that the 
jury would have reached the same result had the error not occurred. State v. Bussard, 114 
Idaho 781, 760 P.2d 1197 (Ct. App. 1988). 
The magistrate, in his discretion, allowed the questioning. This court finds no 
abuse of discretion because the state's questioning was relevant as to the charge alleged. 
Further, even if the state's particular questioning as to the jurors' thoughts about the 
Ordinance was allowed in error, such error is harmless because it does not appear from 
this record that the particular questions asked of potential jurors led to Freitas' 
conviction. 
V. Conclusion 
City of Spirit Lake Ordinance No. 7-4-10 is constitutional and the magistrate did 
not err by denying the Motion to Dismiss. Further, the magistrate did not error by 
denying the Motion for Acquittal, in instructing the jury, or by overruling the voir dire 
objections. 
The judgment of conviction is affirmed. 
DATED this 8~ day of August, 2013. 
LANSIN . HA YN S, Dtstnct Judge 
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NOTICE OF APPEAL 
TO: THE ABOVE NAMED RESPONDENT, STATE OF IDAHO, AND THE CLERK OF 
THE ABOVE ENTITLED COURT: 
1. The above named Appellant Michael J. Freitas hereby appeals against the above 
named Respondent, the State of Idaho, to the Idaho Supreme Court from the Intermediate Appellate 
Opinion entered in the above-entitled matter on August 8, 2013, the Honorable Lansing L. Haynes, 
District Judge, presiding. Judge Hayne's Intermediate Appellate Opinion affirmed the final Judgment 
and Sentence entered in the Magistrate's Division of said District Court in the above-entitled matter 
on or about January 8, 2013, the Honorable Clark Peterson, Magistrate, presiding. 
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2. That the party has a right to appeal to the Kootenai County District Court, and the 
judgment described in paragraph one above is an appealable order under and pursuant to Idaho 
Appellate Rule 11 ( c )(1 0). 
3. That this appeal is taken upon matters oflaw and fact. 
4. A preliminary statement of the issues on appeal, which the appellant then intends to 
assert in the appeal, provided any such list of issues on appeal shall not prevent the appellant :from 
asserting other issues on appeal, is/are: 
(a) Whether the District Court erred in upholding the Magistrate Court's denial of the 
defendant's Motion to Dismiss? 
(b) Whether the District Court erred in upholding the Magistrate Court's denial of the 
defendant's Motion for Judgment of Acquittal? 
(c) Whether the District Court erred in upholding the Magistrate Court's denial of the 
defendant's proposed jury instruction six? 
5. No portion of the record is sealed. 
6. Reporter's Transcript. A reporter's transcript of the Appellant's Motions to 
Dismiss held on January 3, 2013, and the trial held on January 8, 2013, have already been prepared. 
The appellant would request that they be included in the record for this appeal. Appellant requests the 
preparation of the entire reporter's transcript of the oral argument before the District Judge held on 
July 1, 2013, pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 25(b). 
7. Clerk's Record. The appellant requests the standard clerk's record pursuant to 
I.A.R. 28(b)(2). The appellant requests the following documents to be included in the clerk's record, 
in addition to those automatically included under I.A.R. 28(b )(2): 
(a) Any exhibits. 
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A copy of the appellant's Motion to Dismiss filed December 12,2012. (b) 
(c) 
3, 2012. 
A copy of the plaintiff's Brief in Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss filed December 
A copy of the appellant's requested jury instruction six. (d) 
(e) 
12,2013. 
A copy of the appellant's Brief Supporting Appeal to the District Court filed March 
7. I certify: 
A A copy of this Notice of Appeal has been served upon all court reporters :from whom a 
transcript is requested. The name and address of each such reporter is marked below in the Certificate 
of Service. 
B. The Appellant is exempt :from paying the estimated transcript fee because the 
Appellant is an indigent who is represented by the Office of the Kootenai County Public Defender. 
C. The Appellant is exempt :from paying the filing fee because the Appellant is an 
indigent who is represented by the Office of the Kootenai County Public Defender. 
D. The Appellant is exempt :from paying the estimated fee for the preparation of the 
record because the Appellant is an indigent who is represented by the Office of the Kootenai County 
Public Defender. 
E. Service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant to Rule 20 
I.A.R., to wit the Kootenai County Prosecuting Attorney and the Idaho Attorney General. 
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DATED this Q day of August, 2013. 
BY: 
THE LAW OFFICE OF THE PUBLIC 
DEFENDER OF KOOTENAI COUNTY 
J LOGsf>ON 
EPUTY PUBLIC DEFENDER 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this J 3 day of August, 2013, served a true and 
correct copy of the attached NOTICE OF APPEAL via interoffice mail or as otherwise indicated upon 
the parties as follows: 
X 
X 
Kootenai County Prosecuting Attorney 
P.O. Box 9000 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83 816 
Lawrence G. Wasden 
Attorney General 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010 
u 
u 
!){! 
u 
u 
~ 
First Class Mail 
Certified Mail 
Facsimile (208) 446-1833 
First Class Mail 
Certified Mail 
Facsimile (208) 854-8071 
X Reporter for District Judge Lansing Haynes, Valerie Nunemacher (Kootenai County, PO Box 
9000, Coeur d'Alene, ID 83 816) via Interoffice Mail 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTEAI 
STATE OF IDAHO 
Plaintiff/Respondent 
Michael Jay Freitas 
Defendant/ Appellant 
vs. 
Plaintiffs Exhibit No. 1 filed 1-8-13 
Transcript: Motion Hearing filed 2-20-13 
Transcript: Jury Trial filed 2-20-13 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
SUPREME COURT 
41378 
CASE NUMBER 
CR 2012-18513 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE 
I, Amanda McCandless Clerk of the District Court of the First Judicial District of the 
State of Idaho, in and for the County of Kootenai, do hereby certify that the foregoing 
Record in this cause was compiled and bound under my direction and is a true, correct 
and complete Record of the pleadings and documents requested by Appellate Rule 28. 
I further certify that the following will be submitted as exhibits to this Record on Appeal: 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
STATE OF IDAHO 
Plaintiff/Respondent 
vs. 
Michael Jay Freitas 
Defendant/ Appellant 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
SUPREME COURT 
41378 
CASE CR12-18513 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, Amanda McCandless, Deputy Clerk of the District Court of the First Judicial 
District of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Kootenai, do hereby certify that I 
have personally served or mailed, by United States Mail, one copy of the Clerk's Record 
to each ofthe attorneys of record in this cause as follows: 
Mr. Michael Jay Freitas 
Public Defender 
400 Northwest Blvd. 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83 814 
Attorney for Appellant 
Mr. Lawrence Wasden 
Attorney General State of Idaho 
700 W. Jefferson# 210 
Boise ID 83 720-001 0 
Attorney for Respondent 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of said 
Court this 22nd day of October 2013. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
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